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wundervault

wundervault

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TDQS

A4.3/5.0

Scored across 11 tools

Disambiguation4/5

The eleven tools each target a distinct action-resource pair: call a web service, pay a 402, save an existing secret, sign, push secrets to a Worker, mint a new key, get a 2FA code, list entries, git over SSH, exec over SSH, and finish. The main friction is vault_call vs vault_new_key and vault_save_secret vs vault_new_key, since all three end with a secret in the vault, but the descriptions draw explicit boundaries (vault_call refuses the key-creation addresses; save takes a value you already have, new_key mints one at a service). An agent should be able to select correctly without guessing.

Naming Consistency4/5

Every name shares a single vault_ prefix in snake_case, so the family is instantly recognizable. Most are verb-led (call, pay, sign, save, send, done), with a few noun-form exceptions (vault_git, vault_ssh_exec, vault_entries_list), which is a minor deviation rather than a mixed convention.

Tool Count5/5

Eleven tools for a secrets broker covering HTTP calls, payments, signing, SSH/git, 2FA, key provisioning and lifecycle signalling is well within a reasonable scope. Each tool corresponds to a genuine capability and none looks like filler or a near-duplicate.

Completeness4/5

The agent-facing surface covers discovery (entries list), all the main secret-using paths (HTTP, pay, sign, 2FA, SSH, git, Worker secrets), provisioning (save, new key) and clean termination (done). Gaps are mostly owner-side by design: no tool to delete/revoke an entry, no way to inspect the audit log, and no direct rotation of an existing secret beyond the new_key replace flow, which agents must work around via vault_call DELETE.

Maintenance

ActivityNo data
ResponsivenessOutdated data