safe-key-mcp
This server does not currently have a deployable release on Glama. Follow the repository's setup instructions to install and configure it for your MCP client, including any required credentials and local dependencies.
safe-key-mcp
An MCP server for safe secret access by AI agents. Secrets are stored encrypted. AI agents see only names and descriptions, never values. All actions are executed server-side. Outputs are scrubbed before being returned.
Context — Why this project exists
Today, AI coding agents (Claude, GPT, Codex, etc.) increasingly need to interact with authenticated services: GitHub APIs, cloud providers, databases, SSH servers, email, etc.
The current solutions are problematic:
Approach | Problem |
Paste tokens in the chat | Token ends up in conversation history, logs, and LLM provider servers |
Environment variables | AI can |
| AI can |
1Password MCP | Proprietary, paid, limited to 1Password users |
The fundamental issue: every existing approach eventually exposes the secret value to the AI as plaintext text — which gets sent to inference servers, stored in logs, and leaked in conversation history.
The real threat model
The AI is not the enemy. The real risks are:
Accidental leaks in logs, debug output, error messages
Prompt injection from a malicious website extracting secrets
Conversation history readable by developers or stored on LLM servers
Verbose tool output that echoes back headers, URLs, or environment variables
We don't need military-grade sandboxing. We need secrets to never appear in the AI's context window.
Related MCP server: Janee
How it works
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│ safe-key-mcp server │
│ │
│ vault.enc (AES-256-GCM encrypted) │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ github_token = ghp_xxx │ │
│ │ api_key = sk-xxxxx │ │
│ │ ssh_key_ovh = -----BEGIN… │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ MCP Tools: │
│ • list_secrets() → names only │
│ • http_request(secret, url, …) │
│ • shell_exec(secret, template) │
│ • ssh_exec(secret, host, cmd) │
│ │
│ Output sanitizer: │
│ Scrubs all known secret values │
│ from every response before sending │
└──────────────┬──────────────────────┘
│
[names only ↑] [scrubbed output ↓]
│
┌──────────────┴──────────────────────┐
│ AI Agent │
│ "Use github_token to GET /repos…" │
│ │
│ Never sees: ghp_xxx │
│ Never sees: sk-xxxxx │
│ Never sees: -----BEGIN… │
└──────────────────────────────────────┘Encryption
AES-256-GCM authenticated encryption
Master password derived via PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 (600,000 iterations)
Each save uses a fresh random salt (16 bytes) and nonce (12 bytes)
Vault file is a single binary blob — not human-readable
Sanitizer
The output sanitizer is a defence-in-depth measure. It replaces any occurrence of a known secret value with [REDACTED] in all tool responses. This catches:
Error messages that echo back a URL containing a token
Verbose curl/HTTP output that includes headers
Shell command output that accidentally prints environment variables
It is not a security boundary against a determined attacker with shell access.
MCP Tools
Tool | What the AI sends | What the AI receives |
| nothing | names + descriptions (no values) |
|
| HTTP response with values scrubbed |
|
| stdout/stderr with values scrubbed |
|
| stdout/stderr with values scrubbed |
http_request auth styles
bearer—Authorization: Bearer <value>basic_user— HTTP Basic Auth (secret as username)basic_password— HTTP Basic Auth (secret as password)header— Custom header (specifyheader_name)query_param— URL query parameter (specifyparam_name)
shell_exec template
The command must contain exactly one {SECRET} placeholder:
git clone https://user:{SECRET}@github.com/org/repo.gitThe server replaces {SECRET} with the actual value, runs the command, and scrubs the output.
Quick start
Prerequisites
Python 3.10+
pip install -e ".[dev]"
Add secrets (CLI)
export SAFE_KEY_MASTER_PASSWORD="your-strong-password"
# Interactive (password prompt, value never shown)
python -m safe_key_mcp add github_token -d "GitHub Personal Access Token" -t "ci,github"
python -m safe_key_mcp add openai_key -d "OpenAI API key" -t "llm"
# List (values never shown)
python -m safe_key_mcp listRun the server
export SAFE_KEY_MASTER_PASSWORD="your-strong-password"
python -m safe_key_mcp serve --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8500Docker
cp .env.example .env
# Edit SAFE_KEY_MASTER_PASSWORD in .env
docker compose up -d
# Server available at http://localhost:8500/sseConnect to your AI agent
Add to your MCP client config (e.g. OpenCode, Claude Desktop):
{
"mcpServers": {
"safe-key": {
"url": "http://localhost:8500/sse"
}
}
}Project structure
src/safe_key_mcp/
├── __init__.py # Package docstring
├── __main__.py # CLI: serve / add / list / delete
├── config.py # Configuration via environment variables
├── vault.py # AES-256-GCM encrypted storage
├── sanitizer.py # Output scrubbing
└── server.py # MCP server with 4 tools
tests/
├── conftest.py
├── test_vault.py # 8 tests — encryption, persistence, auth
├── test_sanitizer.py # 6 tests — scrubbing, edge cases
└── test_server.py # 3 tests — tool integrationEnvironment variables
Variable | Default | Description |
| (required) | Master password for vault encryption |
|
| Path to the encrypted vault file |
|
| SSE server host |
|
| SSE server port |
Status
This project is under active development and has not been tested in production.
Core vault encryption: working (17/17 tests passing)
MCP tools: implemented, not yet tested with real services
Docker deployment: ready, not yet deployed
Sanitizer: functional, basic pattern matching
What's next — evolution toward a Service Gateway
During development, we realized that this "vault + secret names" approach still has a conceptual flaw: the AI knows that secrets exist. It manipulates secret names, chooses auth styles, and builds authenticated requests — it's just one abstraction layer away from the values.
The next evolution of this project will be a Service Gateway where:
The AI doesn't know secrets exist at all
It just calls services:
service_call("github", "GET", "/repos/owner/repo")Auth is resolved entirely server-side by config mapping
The AI's mental model is "use this service", not "use this secret"
This is a fundamentally different approach — closer to how a browser handles cookies than how a developer handles API keys. That work will happen in a separate repository.
License
MIT
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Loading tool schema changelog…
This server cannot be deployed
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
MCP server connecting AI agents to 100+ apps (Gmail, Slack, Notion, GitHub) via one-click OAuth.
MCP server for secureFlows: token-free URL builders and integration-linting tools for AI agents.
MCP server for your apps' tools and custom tools, plus hosted AI agents and approval-gated workflows
MCP server for building and testing AI agents with multi-model experimentation and insights.
Related MCP Servers
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceMCP server that lets AI agents call APIs without ever seeing the credentials, using a local encrypted vault and per-secret allowlist policies for HTTP requests and subprocess environment variables.1AGPL 3.0
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceSecrets management MCP server that injects credentials into API requests for AI agents, enforcing policies and logging all activity without exposing raw keys.58 npm30MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEncrypted secrets management MCP server for AI agents, enabling secure storage, retrieval, rotation, and auditing of API keys and credentials with AES-128 encryption.MIT
- FlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceMCP server for end-to-end encrypted secret storage and retrieval, enabling LLM agents to fetch secrets by name via one-time URLs while keeping plaintext out of model context and logs.1-