DevVault MCP
Click on "Install Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@DevVault MCPRun my deployment script with the vault secrets"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
DevVault MCP
Your AI can use your secrets. It can never read them.
DevVault is a local-first secrets vault that any MCP-aware client (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code) can talk to. The AI assistant can store, list, rotate, and operate your secrets — but the plaintext values never enter the model's context, so a prompt-injection attack has nothing to steal.
The problem
AI agents now touch real infrastructure — they deploy, call APIs, run migrations. That means they need credentials. Today you have three bad options:
Paste the key into chat — it's now in a transcript, a log, maybe a training set.
Leave it in
.env— plaintext on disk, onegit add .away from a public repo.Use an existing MCP vault — better, but they expose a
getSecrettool that drops the plaintext into the model's context. The OWASP MCP Top 10 lists prompt injection as the #1 threat: a hidden instruction in a web page or README that the agent obeys. If the agent can read the secret, an injection can make it leak the secret.
DevVault removes the agent's ability to read the secret in the first place.
Analogy: a hotel safe where the bellhop (the AI) can carry the locked box to your room and use what's inside on your behalf — but can never open it. The combination stays with you.
Related MCP server: Agentic Vault
How it works
MCP Client (Claude, Cursor)
│ sees: names, metadata, exit codes, REDACTED output
│ never sees: plaintext secret values
▼
DevVault MCP Server ──► Crypto core (AES-256-GCM, one IV per secret)
│ │ master key
▼ ▼
Child process ◄── secrets OS keychain (or passphrase fallback)
(npm deploy, injected as
curl, etc.) env varsThe one line that is the whole product: plaintext flows from the crypto core into the child process's environment, and never travels back up to the AI.
The tools
Tool | Can the AI see the value? | Notes |
| No (write-only) | Confirms by name; value never echoed. |
| No (metadata only) | Names, project, timestamps. |
| No (write-only) | Replaces a value in place. |
| No | Soft-delete (recoverable). |
| No — injected into child env | Returns exit code + redacted stdout/stderr. This is the headline feature. |
| Yes — escape hatch | Off by default. Only registers if you set |
Every call is recorded in a hash-chained, tamper-evident audit log (names + outcomes — never values).
Install
npx devvault-mcpConnect to Claude Desktop
Add to your Claude Desktop MCP config (claude_desktop_config.json):
{
"mcpServers": {
"devvault": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "devvault-mcp"]
}
}
}Restart Claude Desktop. The DevVault tools will appear. Try: "Store my Stripe test key as STRIPE_KEY, then list my secrets."
Master key
On macOS / Windows / Linux with a desktop keychain, DevVault stores its master key there automatically. In headless environments (CI, containers) set a passphrase instead:
export DEVVAULT_PASSPHRASE="a-long-random-passphrase"Security model (the short version)
The model is an untrusted operator. Every tool assumes the AI's context may be hijacked at any moment.
Plaintext has exactly one exit, and it isn't the model — the environment of a child process you asked to run.
Tools are risk-tiered. Safe tools never return values.
getSecretis off by default.deleteSecretis soft + recoverable.Every access is on the record — hash-chained audit log; alter one entry and the chain visibly breaks.
Fail closed. Wrong key, tampered data, unknown secret, corrupt vault → error, never a partial or plaintext fallback.
Note on concurrency: writes are serialized with an in-process lock so parallel calls can't clobber the vault file. DevVault does not impose ordering between two independent concurrent tool calls — an MCP client should await each tool's result before issuing the next (which is how the model behaves normally).
Crypto disclaimer: the encryption uses only Node's built-in
crypto(no hand-rolled primitives), but this code has not yet had an independent security review. Do not rely on it for high-value production secrets until that review is done (see the launch brief).
Configuration
Env var | Purpose | Default |
| Vault file location |
|
| Master key fallback when no OS keychain | (none — keychain used) |
| Audit log location |
|
| Config file location |
|
To enable the getSecret escape hatch, create ~/.devvault/config.json:
{ "allowPlaintextReads": true }Development
npm install
npm test # 19 tests incl. tamper, wrong-key, redaction, no-leak, concurrency
npm run buildLicense
Apache-2.0. The free local vault is open source — that's the distribution engine, not lost revenue. Paid collaboration (encrypted team sync, audit export, policy) is the roadmap.
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