writ-mcp
OfficialThis MCP server lets an agent gate consequential writes through Writ's allow/deny/step-up policy engine and audit every decision.
Run pre-write policy checks (
writ_check) returning ALLOW, DENY, or STEP_UP with an audit receipt.Verify ALLOW auth tokens immediately before executing a write (
writ_verify_token).Convert ALLOW tokens into single-use leases and execute gated upstream HTTP requests (
writ_lease,writ_execute).Approve step-up actions with one-time grants (
writ_grant) and use kill-switch controls (writ_revoke,writ_reinstate).Read and explain audit receipts (
writ_receipts,writ_explain_receipt).View tenant policy, principals, verbs, and API key metadata (
writ_policy,writ_principals,writ_verbs,writ_keys).Try a keyless 90-second sandbox grant (
writ_sandbox).Manage GitHub App installations, check-run thresholds, and PR-comment settings.
List scanned repos and risk manifests, and configure step-up notifications.
Integrates with the Writ GitHub App to list connected installations, configure per-installation check-run failure thresholds for ungated write sites, and enable or disable the PR-comment bot.
pywrit
Find the dangerous writes in your Python agent's code, then gate it. pywrit is the Python
client and writ CLI for Writ: an allow/deny gate that sits
in front of your agent's consequential writes (database, HTTP, files, email, queues,
AWS) and records a hash-chained receipt for every decision.

writ scan is local, deterministic, and free: it parses your code with Python's
ast module, makes no network calls, and needs no API key.
Install
pip install pywritRequires Python 3.9+. Installs the writ command and the pywrit Python client.
JavaScript/TypeScript devs: run the scanner with no Python setup via npm:
npx writ-scan .The writ-scan package wraps the same scanner (including TS/JS support). On
first run it installs pywrit[polyglot] from PyPI using your Python 3.9+
(one-time); afterwards it starts instantly. See npm/ for details,
environment overrides (WRIT_PYTHON, WRIT_SCAN_NO_INSTALL), and the
install test.
Related MCP server: Vorim AI — Agent Identity & Trust
Language coverage
Language |
|
| Notes |
Python | Yes | Yes, inserts | Parsed with the stdlib |
TypeScript / JavaScript | Yes, with | No, scan only | Needs the extra: |
Go | Yes, with | No, scan only | First detection family plus request-pipeline detection: database/sql Exec/ExecContext, GORM Create/Save/Update/Updates/Delete, HTTP client writes and http.NewRequest with a write method, generated-client ..<New|Update|Delete|Create>, request-pipeline X.Call/X.RawRequest with a write method; package-level generated clients not yet covered. Without the extra, the report names the unscanned Go files in the same warning block as TS/JS |
60-second quickstart: scan → wrap → gate
1. Scan. See which functions write, and how many of them are gated.
writ scan .writ scan: /path/to/support-agent
files scanned: 4 skipped: 0
write sites: 4 in 3 function(s)
gated: 0/4 (0%)
verbs discovered: 3
crm.update
payments.refund
tickets.closeIt also prints a risk report (0-100, weighted by risk tier), writes the discovered
verbs to writ-policy.json, and shows the instrumentation it would add as a unified
diff. Nothing in your code changes yet. writ scan . --score prints just the risk report.
2. Wrap. One command takes the repo from unwrapped to wrapped: scan, show the diff, ask for explicit approval, apply the gates, and report before/after coverage.
writ wrap . # interactive approval
writ wrap . --yes # no prompt (e.g. in CI)--dry-run previews the plan and exits before prompting; --diff-only prints the
unified diff for review tools. Each gated function now asks Writ before it writes, and
fails closed:
def issue_refund(charge_id, amount_cents):
if _writ_check("payments.refund") != "ALLOW":
raise PermissionError("writ denied payments.refund")
...writ scan . --apply is still available as the manual alternative. Re-run writ scan .
and you'll see gated: 4/4 (100%).
3. Gate. Get a free API key, load the discovered policy, and run your agent.
writ key --email you@example.com # free API key + tenant
export WRIT_API_KEY=writ_... # read by the inserted gate
export WRIT_SPONSOR=acme WRIT_AGENT=support-agent # optional: who is acting
writ scan . --push-policy --key "$WRIT_API_KEY" # upload the discovered verb policyEvery gated write now gets ALLOW, DENY, or STEP_UP (a human sponsor must
approve), and every decision is written to your tenant's tamper-evident audit log:
writ receipts --key "$WRIT_API_KEY" # latest receipts
writ verify-chain --key "$WRIT_API_KEY" # verify the receipt hash chain
writ stream --key "$WRIT_API_KEY" # tail decisions live
writ report --key "$WRIT_API_KEY" # Agent Action ReportWhat writ scan detects
Python (.py) files, parsed with the stdlib ast (no extra dependencies):
Category | Examples |
Database |
|
HTTP |
|
Files |
|
| |
Queues |
|
AWS SDK |
|
Each write is mapped to a verb such as
payments.refundorcrm.update, inferred from the file path and function name.A function that already calls
writ_check(...)/_writ_check(...)counts as gated.Skipped: tests, hidden directories, virtualenvs,
node_modules,dist,build. Use--exclude SUBSTR(repeatable) to skip more.Not covered (review by hand): writes behind dynamically built SQL, third-party SDK calls such as
stripe.Refund.create(...), deferred task queues, or shared clients several layers down. The risk report lists these gaps every time.
TypeScript / JavaScript (scan-only)
writ scan also finds write sites in TypeScript and JavaScript. It needs the
optional extra (tree-sitter based):
pip install 'pywrit[polyglot]'
writ scan .Without the extra, the scanner prints a prominent warning block naming the unscanned TS/JS files and keeps going — Python scanning never needs it.
Findings from non-product paths (docs/, scripts/, sandbox/, examples/,
benchmark/, demo/, and build-tooling files such as gulpfile.js or
webpack.config.*) are suppressed by default: the report counts them per
class and names every suppressed path instead of listing them as findings.
Pass --include-non-product to report them like any other finding.
Every scan report ends with a one-line pointer to the Writ GitHub App
(install: https://github.com/apps/writ-scanner, guide:
https://docs.withwrit.com/git-hub-app), which runs the scan on every push
and pull request; the JSON report (--format json) carries the same
pointer under github_app.
TS/JS is scan-only: findings are listed with verbs for your policy file,
but writ scan --apply never rewrites TS/JS files — gate those by hand.
Covered patterns: fetch/axios writes, fs writes, SQL through knex-style
clients, Prisma writes, JS SDK calls such as stripe.refunds.create(...), and
generated REST resource clients: create / update / patch / remove
methods (plus their ...WithHttpInfo variants) that build request options
with an explicit write HTTP method and route them through the client request
pipeline (twilio-style generated clients, e.g. twilio-node).
(Still not covered: the Python SDK equivalents like stripe.Refund.create(...)
— see "Not covered" above.)

Go (scan-only)
writ scan also finds write sites in Go. It needs the optional extra (tree-sitter based):
pip install 'pywrit[polyglot]'Covered in this first family plus request-pipeline detection: database/sql Exec / ExecContext, GORM Create / Save / Update / Updates / Delete, HTTP client Post / Put / Patch / Delete and http.NewRequest / NewRequestWithContext with a write method, generated-client calls shaped <client>.<Resource>.<New|Update|Delete|Create> with an uppercase resource segment (the stripe-go shape), and request-pipeline calls X.Call(method, ...) / X.RawRequest(method, ...) where argument 0 is a write method (the stripe.Backend shape, e.g. c.B.Call(http.MethodPost, "/v1/accounts", ...)). GET/HEAD requests, db.Query / QueryRow, bare constructors, and pipeline calls with a variable method or a non-method first argument are not flagged. _test.go files and vendor/ trees are skipped. Go is scan-only: writ scan --apply never rewrites .go files, gate those by hand. Not yet covered: package-level generated clients (charge.New(...), the pre-v87 stripe-go shape), GORM raw-SQL helpers, and other Go write patterns.
GitHub Action
Scan every pull request for ungated write sites. Findings land as check
annotations on the exact file and line, plus a Markdown risk report in the
job summary. The check fails when an ungated finding meets your
fail-on-risk threshold (default: high).
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: withwrit/pywrit@v0
with:
fail-on-risk: high # high | medium | low | neverNo API key needed. Full reference: docs/github-action.md · example workflow: examples/github-action/writ-scan.yml
GitHub App
Install the Writ GitHub App on selected repositories: every push and pull request is scanned for ungated write-sites, with results as a check run on the PR and in the portal, where you manage policy, keys, and the audit log. Setup and data handling: GitHub App docs.
MCP server (writ-mcp)
Give any MCP-compatible agent point-of-action policy checks. writ-mcp is a
Model Context Protocol server (stdio transport,
built on the MCP Python SDK) that exposes the Writ gate as 17 MCP tools:
the agent calls writ_check before a consequential write and gets back ALLOW,
DENY, or STEP_UP — with a tamper-evident, hash-chained audit receipt for
every decision.
uvx writ-mcp # no install — runs on demand
# or
pip install writ-mcp # then run `writ-mcp`Tool | What it does |
| The gate: |
| Validate an |
| Human-sponsor approval for the |
| The kill switch |
| Read the tenant's audit log |
| Manage the verb policy |
| Keyless 90-second demo grant — no API key needed |
| List connected GitHub App installations |
| Set the check-run fail threshold per install |
| Enable/disable the PR-comment bot |
| List repos with risk profiles or fetch one manifest |
| Explain a receipt in plain language |
| Get or update step-up notification settings |
| List the tenant's principals |
| List the tenant's verb vocabulary |
| List API key metadata |
The gate tools need a free Writ API key (WRIT_API_KEY): 10,000 receipts/month
free, no credit card. writ_sandbox works with no key at all.
The server implementation lives in mcp/ (MIT). Also published on the
official MCP Registry as io.github.withwrit/writ and listed on
Glama.
Python client
from pywrit import WritClient
client = WritClient(api_key="writ_...")
result = client.check(
sponsor_id="acme",
agent_id="agent-7",
verb="db.write",
target="prod.customers",
purpose="backfill region field",
)
if result.decision == "ALLOW":
# result.auth_token is a short-lived token bound to this exact write
perform_write(...)
elif result.decision == "STEP_UP":
# a human sponsor must approve first: client.grant(...), then re-check
...
else:
# DENY
...No API key yet? Try the keyless sandbox:
client = WritClient()
client.sandbox({
"sponsorId": "acme",
"agentId": "agent-7",
"verb": "demo_write", # sandbox only allows demo_write ...
"target": "demo-customers", # ... on targets starting with demo-
"purpose": "trying the gate",
})What's covered:
check(...): the gate.ALLOW/DENY/STEP_UP, plus a receipt every timeverify_token(...): validate anALLOWauth token (catches purpose drift)grant(...): human-sponsor approval for theSTEP_UPpathget_policy()/set_policy(...): manage the tenant policyrevoke(...)/reinstate(...)/revoked(): the kill switchreceipts()/receipt(id)/verify_chain()/stream_receipts(): the audit logsandbox(...): keyless trial, no API key required
CLI reference
writ wrap . # scan, diff, approve, apply, verify coverage
writ wrap . --dry-run # preview only
writ wrap . --yes # non-interactive CI mode
writ check --key writ_... --sponsor acme --agent agent-7 \
--verb db.write --target prod.customers --purpose "backfill region field"
writ policy --key writ_... --set payments.refund require_grant
writ revoke --sponsor acme --agent agent-7 --reason "runaway loop" # kill switch (sponsor token)
writ grant --sponsor acme --agent agent-7 --verb payments.refund \
--target ch_123 --purpose "approved refund" # STEP_UP approval (sponsor token)Sponsor-token commands (revoke, reinstate, revoked, grant) read
--sponsor-token or WRIT_SPONSOR_TOKEN. Run writ --help for the full command list.
README badge
Show that your agent's writes are gated by Writ. Two flavors:
Static (works today, no API key) — same design, no live count:
[](https://withwrit.com)Dynamic (live 30-day gated-write count from your audit log) — mint a badge token, then embed the snippet the API returns:
curl -s https://api.withwrit.com/v1/badge/tokens \
-H "Authorization: Bearer writ_..." \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{}'The dynamic endpoint ships with the gate — until it's live, POST /v1/badge/tokens
returns 404 and the static badge above is the one to use.
See badge/ for embed docs and the verification model (what the
badge proves — and what it doesn't).
Docs
Full docs: docs.withwrit.com · Quickstart: docs.withwrit.com/quickstart · Site: withwrit.com
License
MIT
Available Tools
19 toolswrit_checkA
Ask Writ whether an action may proceed. CALL THIS BEFORE any consequential write.
A consequential write is anything hard to undo: sending money or messages, changing access or identity records, deleting data, calling an external API that acts in the world.
Args: sponsor_id: The human sponsor accountable for this action (e.g. a user id or email). agent_id: The agent or workflow performing the action. verb: What is being done (e.g. "verify_human", "send_payment"). target: What it acts on (e.g. "benefit-case-123"). purpose: Why, in plain words. Be specific — the approval is bound to this purpose. environment: Optional policy environment: "dev", "staging", or "prod". The check runs against that environment's policy override (verbs it doesn't override inherit the tenant default). Omit for the tenant default. An unknown name denies fail-closed — never silently falls back.
Returns a decision: ALLOW — proceed. You get an authToken valid 90 seconds, bound to this exact sponsor/agent/verb/target/purpose. Call writ_verify_token against the intended write immediately before executing it. DENY — do NOT perform the action. Explain the receipt reason to the user. STEP_UP — a human sponsor must approve first. Tell the user what needs approval; they can approve via writ_grant (or the dashboard), then call writ_check again. Every outcome creates an audit receipt with a receiptId.
Inputs: verb (required), target (required), purpose (required), agent_id (required), +2 more. Returns: result
writ_executeA
Run one gated upstream request with a lease or ALLOW token.
Pass exactly one of lease_id (from writ_lease) or auth_token (from a writ_check ALLOW). Pass the SAME method, path, and body as the lease: the gate compares the request bytes against the lease, and on any mismatch it fails closed: no upstream call is made and the answer is {"ok": false, "reason": ..., "upstreamCalled": false}.
Args: lease_id: The leaseId from writ_lease. Mutually exclusive with auth_token. auth_token: An ALLOW authToken from writ_check. Mutually exclusive with lease_id. system_id: The registered upstream system: "stripe" (default), "github", or "salesforce". method: HTTP method of the upstream request (required, e.g. "POST"). path: Upstream path (required, e.g. "/v1/refunds"). body: Optional JSON object. Must be byte-identical to the leased body. idempotency_key: Optional key passed through to the upstream system. Use it so retries are safe.
On success the gate returns the upstream system's status and body verbatim. Every outcome writes a receipt. On {"ok": false} report the reason to the user and do NOT retry with a different request: the lease is spent or invalid.
Inputs: body, path, method, lease_id, +3 more. Returns: result
writ_explain_receiptA
Fetch a receipt and explain it in plain language.
Use this to understand why a writ_check returned ALLOW, DENY, STEP_UP, or REVOKED. Returns the receipt with a human-readable breakdown.
Inputs: receipt_id (required). Returns: result
writ_github_installationsA
List the GitHub App installations for this tenant.
Returns each installation's id, status, PR-comment bot setting, and the per-installation check-run fail threshold (checkFailUngated). Use this to discover installation ids before calling writ_github_set_threshold or writ_github_toggle_pr_comments.
Inputs: no named parameters. Returns: result
writ_github_set_thresholdA
Set the per-installation check-run fail threshold.
A positive number N makes the GitHub check run fail when the ungated-site count is greater than N; a zero-ungated scan passes. Omit threshold (or set it to None) to clear the override and restore neutral-only check runs.
Inputs: installation_id (required), threshold. Returns: result
writ_github_toggle_pr_commentsA
Enable or disable the optional PR-comment bot for a GitHub App installation.
Default is OFF. No TOTP step-up is required. Use writ_github_installations to find installation_id.
Inputs: enabled (required), installation_id (required). Returns: result
writ_grantA
SPONSOR ONLY. Mint a one-time grant approving a specific action.
Use this when writ_check returned STEP_UP and the human sponsor approves. The grant is single-use: the next writ_check consumes it and returns ALLOW. The grant is scoped to your tenant. Requires WRIT_SPONSOR_TOKEN.
Inputs: verb (required), target (required), purpose (required), agent_id (required), +2 more. Returns: result
writ_keysA
List API key metadata for the tenant (never raw keys).
Inputs: no named parameters. Returns: result
writ_leaseA
Convert an ALLOW token into a single-use gated-execution lease.
Call this AFTER writ_check returns ALLOW, passing that ALLOW's authToken. The lease is bound to the exact upstream request you intend to run: the same method, path, and body bytes you will later pass to writ_execute. A lease is single-use; once executed (or expired) it is spent.
Args: auth_token: The authToken from a writ_check ALLOW decision. system_id: The registered upstream system: "stripe", "github", or "salesforce". A vaulted credential must be active for this system or the gate answers ok:false. method: HTTP method of the upstream request (e.g. "POST"). path: Upstream path (e.g. "/v1/refunds"). Must match the system's allowed path patterns. body: Optional JSON object (at most 1 MB). Sent only when provided; if you lease a body you must execute the identical body. ttl_seconds: Optional lease TTL in seconds. The gate caps it at 90 and at the token's remaining life.
On success the gate answers 201 with leaseId, expiresAt, ttlSeconds, verb, target, purpose, and systemId. On failure it answers {"ok": false, "reason": ...} (token invalid or expired, or no active vaulted credential for the system). On ok:false do NOT execute.
Inputs: path (required), method (required), system_id (required), auth_token (required), +2 more. Returns: result
writ_manifestsA
List scanned repos and their risk profiles, or fetch one manifest.
With no repo_id, returns a table of repos with writScore, scanStatus, and riskDigest (counts per risk class). With repo_id, returns the full signed manifest for that repo.
Inputs: repo_id. Returns: result
writ_policyA
Read the tenant's verb policy: which verbs allow, deny, require a grant, or step up.
Inputs: no named parameters. Returns: result
writ_principalsB
List the tenant's principals (identity directory).
Inputs: no named parameters. Returns: result
writ_receiptsB
List recent decision receipts (audit trail). Newest first.
Inputs: limit. Returns: result
writ_reinstateA
SPONSOR ONLY. Undo writ_revoke: the principal is evaluated by policy again.
Scoped to your tenant. Requires WRIT_SPONSOR_TOKEN.
Inputs: agent_id (required), sponsor_id (required). Returns: result
writ_revokeA
SPONSOR ONLY. Kill switch: immediately deny all future checks for this principal.
Revocation overrides live grants and tenant policy. Use when a principal is compromised, misbehaving, or its task is done. Scoped to your tenant. Requires WRIT_SPONSOR_TOKEN.
Inputs: agent_id (required), sponsor_id (required). Returns: result
writ_sandboxB
Get a free 90-second sandbox grant for a demo write. No API key needed.
Issues a live grant for verb "demo_write" on a target starting with "demo-", then runs writ_check so you get back an ALLOW decision plus auth token to practice the verify-before-write flow end to end.
Inputs: target (required), purpose (required), agent_id (required), sponsor_id (required). Returns: result
writ_tenant_notifyB
Get or update step-up notification settings.
With no arguments, returns the current settings. With arguments, updates them: step_up_email enables/disables step-up emails; step_up_webhook_url sets a generic or Slack webhook URL; use an empty string to clear.
Inputs: step_up_email, step_up_webhook_url, step_up_webhook_type. Returns: result
writ_verbsA
List the tenant's verb vocabulary, including custom verbs.
Inputs: no named parameters. Returns: result
writ_verify_tokenA
Verify a Writ auth token against the write you are about to execute.
Call this IMMEDIATELY before executing an ALLOWed write, with the exact verb/target/purpose you intend. If valid is false — expired, tampered, or bound to a different purpose — do NOT execute the write; call writ_check again.
This is the point-of-action enforcement: the check authorizes, the token proves the authorization still matches what you are actually doing.
Inputs: verb (required), target (required), purpose (required), auth_token (required). Returns: result
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
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TDQS
Scored across 19 tools
The core governance pipeline (writ_check → writ_lease → writ_execute → writ_verify_token) is well differentiated by explicit ordering cues and mutually exclusive arguments, and the GitHub/admin tools each target a distinct resource. Minor overlap remains: writ_lease and writ_execute both accept an authToken and near-identical method/path/body arguments, and writ_receipts vs writ_explain_receipt could be momentarily confused (list vs. explain one).
All 19 tools share a consistent writ_ prefix and snake_case, and most read as verb_noun (writ_check, writ_revoke, writ_github_set_threshold). The deviation is a cluster of noun-only names for list operations (writ_receipts, writ_policy, writ_manifests, writ_principals, writ_verbs, writ_keys), which is readable but breaks the verb-first pattern.
19 tools is slightly above the ideal band but each maps to a real step in the authorize/lease/execute/audit lifecycle or a concrete GitHub/admin operation. It tips toward heavy because of five-plus read-only listing tools (principals, verbs, keys, manifests, receipts) that could arguably be consolidated.
The authorization lifecycle is complete: check, lease, execute, point-of-action verify, step-up grant, revoke/reinstate, plus audit receipts and a sandbox demo path. Gaps: policy and API keys are read-only (no policy write or key create/rotate tools), and GitHub PR-comment/threshold settings are covered while broader installation administration is not.
Maintenance
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