secretscan
secretscan-mcp-server
一个 MCP 服务器,用于扫描 diff、文件内容或粘贴的片段,以发现意外提交的机密——这样任何兼容 MCP 的代理都可以在提交、打开 PR 或粘贴日志摘录之前自我检查其更改。完全本地化:无需 API 密钥,无需网络调用,除了 MCP SDK 和 Zod 之外没有其他依赖。
为什么
泄露的凭据是导致账户和基础设施受损的最常见现实原因之一,也是在大规模 diff 中最容易犯的错误之一——调试用的 console.log 中带有真实的 API 密钥、意外提交的配置文件、在寻求帮助时粘贴到聊天中的 .env。即将提交、推送或分享文本的代理,如果有一种廉价的方式来检查,就完全有能力在发生之前捕获这一点。
Related MCP server: netallion-mcp-lite
工具
scan_for_secrets
根据一组固定的提供商格式签名以及一个通用的、基于熵的启发式规则扫描文本:
检测器 | 捕获内容 |
| AWS 访问密钥 ID( |
| AWS 秘密密钥,当上下文有标签时 |
| GitHub PAT( |
| Slack 令牌( |
| Stripe 秘密/可发布密钥 |
| Google API 密钥( |
| npm 发布令牌( |
| PEM 私钥块 |
| JSON Web 令牌 |
| 分配给听起来像机密的变量名( |
发现结果始终经过脱敏——AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE 会报告为 AKIA************MPLE (20 chars),绝不会完整显示。因此,该工具自身的输出可以安全地记录或显示,而不会进一步传播它发现的内容。
这是固定模式 + 启发式扫描,并非穷尽式。干净的结果意味着“没有已知模式匹配”,而不是“绝对安全”——应用内输出会明确说明这一点。
安装和配置
git clone https://github.com/wedo911/secretscan-mcp-server.git
cd secretscan-mcp-server
npm install
npm run build将其添加到您的 MCP 客户端配置中(例如 claude_desktop_config.json,或 Claude Code 项目的 .mcp.json):
{
"mcpServers": {
"secretscan": {
"command": "node",
"args": ["/absolute/path/to/secretscan-mcp-server/dist/index.js"]
}
}
}运行测试
npm run build
node --test tests/entropy.test.mjs tests/detectors.test.mjs24 个测试,包括针对每个命名检测器的测试、通用检测器的占位符和低熵过滤行为,以及一个显式检查,确保脱敏输出永远不会包含完整的秘密值。
无需客户端即可试用
npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector --cli node dist/index.js \
--method tools/call --tool-name scan_for_secrets \
--tool-arg text='aws_access_key_id = AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE'(这是 AWS 官方公开文档中的示例密钥 —— 不是真实凭据。)
许可证
MIT — 参见 LICENSE。
Available Tools
1 toolscan_for_secretsScan Text for Leaked SecretsARead-onlyIdempotent
Scan text (a git diff, a file's contents, a pasted snippet) for accidentally-committed secrets: cloud provider keys (AWS, Google), platform tokens (GitHub, Slack, npm), payment keys (Stripe), private key blocks, JWTs, and a generic entropy-gated check for anything assigned to a secret-sounding variable name. Use this before committing, opening a PR, or pasting logs/config anywhere -- a committed secret is one of the most common real-world causes of account and infrastructure compromise, and is easy to miss in a large diff.
Findings are always redacted (first/last few characters only) -- this tool never returns a full secret value, so its own output is safe to log or display.
Args:
text (string, 1-200000 chars): the text to scan.
Returns: For JSON format: { "found": boolean, "riskLevel": "none" | "medium" | "high" | "critical", "findings": [ { "detector": string, "category": string, "severity": "low"|"medium"|"high"|"critical", "line": number, "column": number, "redacted": string } ] }
Examples:
Use when: about to run "git commit" or "git push" -- scan the staged diff first
Use when: about to paste a config file, log excerpt, or error message into a chat or issue tracker
Don't use when: you need certainty nothing sensitive is present -- this is a fixed-pattern + heuristic scan, not exhaustive; a clean result means "no known pattern matched," not "definitely safe"
Error Handling:
Returns an error if text is empty or exceeds 200000 characters.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| text | Yes | The text to scan -- a git diff, a file's contents, or any pasted snippet. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare read-only, idempotent, and non-destructive behavior. The description adds critical behavioral context beyond this: findings are always redacted to the first/last few characters, output is safe to log, the scan is not exhaustive, and empty/oversized inputs produce errors. This meaningfully exceeds what annotations convey.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The definition is well-structured with clear sections (description, args, returns, examples, error handling), front-loads the core purpose and usage guidance, and every section carries useful information. Length is justified by the tool's security-critical nature and the need to explain redaction and limitations.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no output schema, the description fully specifies the return payload structure including found, riskLevel, and findings fields. It also covers error handling, length constraints, and usage examples. For a single-parameter tool with strong annotations, this is complete and leaves no critical gaps.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, and the input schema already describes text as 'a git diff, a file's contents, or any pasted snippet' with length constraints. The description repeats these details, adding little new semantic meaning beyond the schema, so the baseline score of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource ('Scan text ... for accidentally-committed secrets') and enumerates the exact detector categories (cloud keys, platform tokens, payment keys, private key blocks, JWTs, entropy-gated checks). This is precise and unambiguous even without sibling tools to differentiate from.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Provides explicit when-to-use scenarios ('before committing, opening a PR, or pasting logs/config anywhere') and an explicit don't-use case ('you need certainty nothing sensitive is present'). It also honestly frames the tool's limits as a fixed-pattern + heuristic scan, giving clear decision guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
1 tool update
v1.0.0- First observed
scan_for_secrets
TDQS
Scored across 1 tool
Only one tool exists, so there is zero ambiguity or risk of misselection. The tool's purpose is clearly singular.
The single tool uses a consistent verb_noun pattern ('scan_for_secrets'), which is clear and predictable.
With only one tool, the server feels thin, but for a narrow purpose like scanning text for secrets, a single comprehensive tool is reasonable. It borders on minimal but works.
The tool covers the full scanner domain: it detects a wide variety of secrets, provides redacted output, and handles error cases. There are no obvious missing operations for its stated purpose.
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
Scan configs, files, or text for leaked secrets and obvious misconfigurations. Nothing stored.
Scan text and git diffs for committed credentials using real vendor key formats plus entropy.
Deep security scans of repos you own from your editor: dependency CVEs, SAST, git-history secrets.
Risk-scan a diff, flag AI-generated-code tells, find secrets. 5 of 7 tools need no account.
Related MCP Servers
- AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceEnables scanning diffs or code blobs for leaked secrets, returning a verdict with severity and masked findings, all processed locally with no data sent externally.1MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceScans text and files for common secrets (AWS, GitHub, etc.) and redacts them to prevent credential leakage in AI-assisted development. Runs entirely locally with no telemetry.21 PyPIMIT
- AlicenseAqualityDmaintenanceScans projects for hardcoded secrets, unprotected .env files, and console.log leaks to prevent credential exposure.557 npmMIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables AI assistants to scan source code for secrets like API keys and passwords locally without network requests.2Apache 2.0