secretscan
secretscan-mcp-server
diff、ファイルの内容、または貼り付けられたスニペットをスキャンして、誤ってコミットされたシークレットを検出する MCP サーバーです。これにより、MCP互換のエージェントは、コミット、PRの開始、またはログの抜粋をどこかに貼り付ける前に、自身の変更を自己チェックできます。完全にローカルで動作し、APIキーもネットワーク呼び出しも不要で、MCP SDKとZod以外の依存関係はありません。
なぜ
漏えいした認証情報は、アカウントやインフラの侵害の最も一般的な原因の1つであり、大きなdiffの中で犯しやすいミスの1つです。実際のAPIキーを含むデバッグ用のconsole.log、誤ってコミットされた設定ファイル、助けを求めるためにチャットに貼り付けられた.envなどです。コミット、プッシュ、またはテキスト共有をしようとしているエージェントは、手軽にチェックする方法があれば、その前にこれを検出するのに適した位置にあります。
Related MCP server: netallion-mcp-lite
ツール
scan_for_secrets
固定されたプロバイダー形式のシグネチャに加えて、一般的なエントロピーでゲートされたヒューリスティックを使用してテキストをスキャンします:
検出器 | 検出内容 |
| AWSアクセスキーID( |
| AWSシークレットキー(文脈上ラベル付けされている場合) |
| GitHub PAT( |
| Slackトークン( |
| Stripeのシークレットキー/公開可能キー |
| Google APIキー( |
| npm公開トークン( |
| PEM秘密鍵ブロック |
| JSON Webトークン |
| シークレットらしい変数名( |
検出結果は常にマスクされます -- AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE は AKIA************MPLE (20 chars) として報告され、完全な形では決して報告されません。したがって、ツール自体の出力は、見つかったものをさらに拡散することなく、ログや表示に安全に使用できます。
これは固定パターン+ヒューリスティックスキャンであり、網羅的ではありません。クリーンな結果は「既知のパターンに一致しなかった」という意味であり、「絶対に安全」という意味ではありません。アプリ内の出力にはその旨が明示されています。
インストールと設定
git clone https://github.com/wedo911/secretscan-mcp-server.git
cd secretscan-mcp-server
npm install
npm run buildMCPクライアントの設定に追加します(例:claude_desktop_config.json、またはClaude Codeのプロジェクトの.mcp.json):
{
"mcpServers": {
"secretscan": {
"command": "node",
"args": ["/absolute/path/to/secretscan-mcp-server/dist/index.js"]
}
}
}テストを実行する
npm run build
node --test tests/entropy.test.mjs tests/detectors.test.mjs24のテストがあり、名前付きの各検出器、汎用検出器のプレースホルダーおよび低エントロピーフィルタリング動作、そしてマスクされた出力に完全なシークレット値が含まれないことを明示的にチェックするテストが含まれています。
クライアントなしで試す
npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector --cli node dist/index.js \
--method tools/call --tool-name scan_for_secrets \
--tool-arg text='aws_access_key_id = AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE'(これはAWSの公式公開ドキュメントに記載されている例のキーであり、実際の認証情報ではありません。)
ライセンス
MIT — LICENSEを参照してください。
Available Tools
1 toolscan_for_secretsScan Text for Leaked SecretsARead-onlyIdempotent
Scan text (a git diff, a file's contents, a pasted snippet) for accidentally-committed secrets: cloud provider keys (AWS, Google), platform tokens (GitHub, Slack, npm), payment keys (Stripe), private key blocks, JWTs, and a generic entropy-gated check for anything assigned to a secret-sounding variable name. Use this before committing, opening a PR, or pasting logs/config anywhere -- a committed secret is one of the most common real-world causes of account and infrastructure compromise, and is easy to miss in a large diff.
Findings are always redacted (first/last few characters only) -- this tool never returns a full secret value, so its own output is safe to log or display.
Args:
text (string, 1-200000 chars): the text to scan.
Returns: For JSON format: { "found": boolean, "riskLevel": "none" | "medium" | "high" | "critical", "findings": [ { "detector": string, "category": string, "severity": "low"|"medium"|"high"|"critical", "line": number, "column": number, "redacted": string } ] }
Examples:
Use when: about to run "git commit" or "git push" -- scan the staged diff first
Use when: about to paste a config file, log excerpt, or error message into a chat or issue tracker
Don't use when: you need certainty nothing sensitive is present -- this is a fixed-pattern + heuristic scan, not exhaustive; a clean result means "no known pattern matched," not "definitely safe"
Error Handling:
Returns an error if text is empty or exceeds 200000 characters.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| text | Yes | The text to scan -- a git diff, a file's contents, or any pasted snippet. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare read-only, idempotent, and non-destructive behavior. The description adds critical behavioral context beyond this: findings are always redacted to the first/last few characters, output is safe to log, the scan is not exhaustive, and empty/oversized inputs produce errors. This meaningfully exceeds what annotations convey.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The definition is well-structured with clear sections (description, args, returns, examples, error handling), front-loads the core purpose and usage guidance, and every section carries useful information. Length is justified by the tool's security-critical nature and the need to explain redaction and limitations.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no output schema, the description fully specifies the return payload structure including found, riskLevel, and findings fields. It also covers error handling, length constraints, and usage examples. For a single-parameter tool with strong annotations, this is complete and leaves no critical gaps.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, and the input schema already describes text as 'a git diff, a file's contents, or any pasted snippet' with length constraints. The description repeats these details, adding little new semantic meaning beyond the schema, so the baseline score of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource ('Scan text ... for accidentally-committed secrets') and enumerates the exact detector categories (cloud keys, platform tokens, payment keys, private key blocks, JWTs, entropy-gated checks). This is precise and unambiguous even without sibling tools to differentiate from.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Provides explicit when-to-use scenarios ('before committing, opening a PR, or pasting logs/config anywhere') and an explicit don't-use case ('you need certainty nothing sensitive is present'). It also honestly frames the tool's limits as a fixed-pattern + heuristic scan, giving clear decision guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
1 tool update
v1.0.0- First observed
scan_for_secrets
TDQS
Scored across 1 tool
Only one tool exists, so there is zero ambiguity or risk of misselection. The tool's purpose is clearly singular.
The single tool uses a consistent verb_noun pattern ('scan_for_secrets'), which is clear and predictable.
With only one tool, the server feels thin, but for a narrow purpose like scanning text for secrets, a single comprehensive tool is reasonable. It borders on minimal but works.
The tool covers the full scanner domain: it detects a wide variety of secrets, provides redacted output, and handles error cases. There are no obvious missing operations for its stated purpose.
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
Scan configs, files, or text for leaked secrets and obvious misconfigurations. Nothing stored.
Scan text and git diffs for committed credentials using real vendor key formats plus entropy.
Deep security scans of repos you own from your editor: dependency CVEs, SAST, git-history secrets.
Risk-scan a diff, flag AI-generated-code tells, find secrets. 5 of 7 tools need no account.
Related MCP Servers
- AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceEnables scanning diffs or code blobs for leaked secrets, returning a verdict with severity and masked findings, all processed locally with no data sent externally.1MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceScans text and files for common secrets (AWS, GitHub, etc.) and redacts them to prevent credential leakage in AI-assisted development. Runs entirely locally with no telemetry.24 PyPIMIT
- AlicenseAqualityDmaintenanceScans projects for hardcoded secrets, unprotected .env files, and console.log leaks to prevent credential exposure.526 npmMIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables AI assistants to scan source code for secrets like API keys and passwords locally without network requests.2Apache 2.0