secretscan
secretscan-mcp-server
diff, 파일 내용, 또는 붙여넣은 스니펫에서 실수로 커밋된 비밀을 스캔하는 MCP 서버입니다. 따라서 MCP 호환 에이전트는 커밋, PR 열기, 또는 로그 발췌문을 어디에 붙여넣기 전에 자신의 변경 사항을 스스로 확인할 수 있습니다. 완전히 로컬에서 동작합니다: API 키가 필요 없고, 네트워크 호출이 없으며, MCP SDK와 Zod 외에는 의존성이 없습니다.
왜
유출된 자격 증명은 계정 및 인프라 침해의 가장 흔한 실제 원인 중 하나이며, 큰 diff에서 저지르기 쉬운 실수 중 하나입니다. 실제 API 키가 포함된 디버그 console.log, 실수로 커밋된 구성 파일, 도움을 요청하면서 채팅에 붙여넣은 .env 등이 그 예입니다. 커밋, 푸시, 또는 텍스트 공유를 앞둔 에이전트는 값싼 검사 방법이 있다면 이런 일이 발생하기 전에 잡아낼 수 있는 좋은 위치에 있습니다.
Related MCP server: netallion-mcp-lite
도구
scan_for_secrets
고정된 공급자 형식 시그니처 집합과 일반적인 엔트로피 기반 휴리스틱을 사용하여 텍스트를 스캔합니다:
탐지기 | 감지 내용 |
| AWS 액세스 키 ID ( |
| 컨텍스트상 레이블이 지정된 AWS 비밀 키 |
| GitHub PAT ( |
| Slack 토큰 ( |
| Stripe 비밀/공개 키 |
| Google API 키 ( |
| npm 게시 토큰 ( |
| PEM 개인 키 블록 |
| JSON 웹 토큰 |
| 비밀처럼 보이는 변수 이름( |
발견 결과는 항상 마스킹됩니다 -- AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE는 AKIA************MPLE (20 chars)로 보고되며, 전체가 표시되지 않습니다. 따라서 도구의 출력은 발견된 내용을 더 전파하지 않고 로그에 기록하거나 표시해도 안전합니다.
이것은 고정 패턴 + 휴리스틱 스캔이며, 완전하지 않습니다. 깨끗한 결과는 '알려진 패턴이 일치하지 않음'을 의미하지 '확실히 안전함'을 의미하지 않습니다. 앱 내 출력에 명시적으로 그렇게 표시됩니다.
설치 및 구성
git clone https://github.com/wedo911/secretscan-mcp-server.git
cd secretscan-mcp-server
npm install
npm run buildMCP 클라이언트 구성에 추가하세요 (예: claude_desktop_config.json, 또는 Claude Code의 프로젝트 .mcp.json):
{
"mcpServers": {
"secretscan": {
"command": "node",
"args": ["/absolute/path/to/secretscan-mcp-server/dist/index.js"]
}
}
}테스트 실행
npm run build
node --test tests/entropy.test.mjs tests/detectors.test.mjs24개의 테스트가 있으며, 각 명명된 탐지기에 대한 테스트, 일반 탐지기의 자리 표시자 및 낮은 엔트로피 필터링 동작, 그리고 마스킹된 출력에 전체 비밀 값이 절대 포함되지 않는지에 대한 명시적 확인이 포함됩니다.
클라이언트 없이 사용해 보기
npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector --cli node dist/index.js \
--method tools/call --tool-name scan_for_secrets \
--tool-arg text='aws_access_key_id = AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE'(이것은 AWS가 공식 문서에 공개한 예제 키입니다. 실제 자격 증명이 아닙니다.)
라이선스
MIT — LICENSE 참조.
Available Tools
1 toolscan_for_secretsScan Text for Leaked SecretsARead-onlyIdempotent
Scan text (a git diff, a file's contents, a pasted snippet) for accidentally-committed secrets: cloud provider keys (AWS, Google), platform tokens (GitHub, Slack, npm), payment keys (Stripe), private key blocks, JWTs, and a generic entropy-gated check for anything assigned to a secret-sounding variable name. Use this before committing, opening a PR, or pasting logs/config anywhere -- a committed secret is one of the most common real-world causes of account and infrastructure compromise, and is easy to miss in a large diff.
Findings are always redacted (first/last few characters only) -- this tool never returns a full secret value, so its own output is safe to log or display.
Args:
text (string, 1-200000 chars): the text to scan.
Returns: For JSON format: { "found": boolean, "riskLevel": "none" | "medium" | "high" | "critical", "findings": [ { "detector": string, "category": string, "severity": "low"|"medium"|"high"|"critical", "line": number, "column": number, "redacted": string } ] }
Examples:
Use when: about to run "git commit" or "git push" -- scan the staged diff first
Use when: about to paste a config file, log excerpt, or error message into a chat or issue tracker
Don't use when: you need certainty nothing sensitive is present -- this is a fixed-pattern + heuristic scan, not exhaustive; a clean result means "no known pattern matched," not "definitely safe"
Error Handling:
Returns an error if text is empty or exceeds 200000 characters.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| text | Yes | The text to scan -- a git diff, a file's contents, or any pasted snippet. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare read-only, idempotent, and non-destructive behavior. The description adds critical behavioral context beyond this: findings are always redacted to the first/last few characters, output is safe to log, the scan is not exhaustive, and empty/oversized inputs produce errors. This meaningfully exceeds what annotations convey.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The definition is well-structured with clear sections (description, args, returns, examples, error handling), front-loads the core purpose and usage guidance, and every section carries useful information. Length is justified by the tool's security-critical nature and the need to explain redaction and limitations.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no output schema, the description fully specifies the return payload structure including found, riskLevel, and findings fields. It also covers error handling, length constraints, and usage examples. For a single-parameter tool with strong annotations, this is complete and leaves no critical gaps.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, and the input schema already describes text as 'a git diff, a file's contents, or any pasted snippet' with length constraints. The description repeats these details, adding little new semantic meaning beyond the schema, so the baseline score of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource ('Scan text ... for accidentally-committed secrets') and enumerates the exact detector categories (cloud keys, platform tokens, payment keys, private key blocks, JWTs, entropy-gated checks). This is precise and unambiguous even without sibling tools to differentiate from.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Provides explicit when-to-use scenarios ('before committing, opening a PR, or pasting logs/config anywhere') and an explicit don't-use case ('you need certainty nothing sensitive is present'). It also honestly frames the tool's limits as a fixed-pattern + heuristic scan, giving clear decision guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
1 tool update
v1.0.0- First observed
scan_for_secrets
TDQS
Scored across 1 tool
Only one tool exists, so there is zero ambiguity or risk of misselection. The tool's purpose is clearly singular.
The single tool uses a consistent verb_noun pattern ('scan_for_secrets'), which is clear and predictable.
With only one tool, the server feels thin, but for a narrow purpose like scanning text for secrets, a single comprehensive tool is reasonable. It borders on minimal but works.
The tool covers the full scanner domain: it detects a wide variety of secrets, provides redacted output, and handles error cases. There are no obvious missing operations for its stated purpose.
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
Scan configs, files, or text for leaked secrets and obvious misconfigurations. Nothing stored.
Scan text and git diffs for committed credentials using real vendor key formats plus entropy.
Deep security scans of repos you own from your editor: dependency CVEs, SAST, git-history secrets.
Risk-scan a diff, flag AI-generated-code tells, find secrets. 5 of 7 tools need no account.
Related MCP Servers
- AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceEnables scanning diffs or code blobs for leaked secrets, returning a verdict with severity and masked findings, all processed locally with no data sent externally.1MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceScans text and files for common secrets (AWS, GitHub, etc.) and redacts them to prevent credential leakage in AI-assisted development. Runs entirely locally with no telemetry.24 PyPIMIT
- AlicenseAqualityDmaintenanceScans projects for hardcoded secrets, unprotected .env files, and console.log leaks to prevent credential exposure.557 npmMIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables AI assistants to scan source code for secrets like API keys and passwords locally without network requests.2Apache 2.0