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threadlinqs-cmd

Intel Threadlinqs MCP

Threat Simulations

get_threat_simulations
Read-onlyIdempotent

Retrieve adversary-emulation playbooks for a threat by passing its threat ID. Narrow results by platform (windows, linux, python) and limit. Note: deprecated; use get_attack_flow for current attack graphs.

Instructions

DEPRECATED (generation stopped 2026-08-03; ~5,362 archived rows still served, no new ones are produced) — the response carries deprecated:true and the caveat inline. Adversary-emulation playbooks attached to a threat. Most were synthetic-telemetry generators against local mocks rather than real execution, so they could not trigger the platform's own detections. One threat's playbooks can run 30 KB+ of command text: narrow with platform (see available_platforms) and limit. An empty result carries a reason distinguishing "this threat never had any" from "none for that platform". Prefer get_attack_flow, which returns the analyst-authored causal DAG that replaced them.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
limitNoMax playbooks to return (max 50). Omit for all — bodies are large.
platformNoReturn only this platform: windows, linux, python (also aws, macos, multi on a few rows). Omit for all.
threat_idYesThreat ID (e.g. TL-2026-0042)

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
caveatNoWhy these do not prove your detections fire.
reasonNoPresent only on an empty result: no_simulations_for_threat | no_simulations_for_platform.
matchedNo
returnedNo
platformsNo
threat_idYes
truncatedNo
deprecatedNo
simulationsNo
total_simulationsNoAll archived playbooks for this threat, before platform/limit.
generation_stoppedNoDate generation stopped (2026-08-03).
available_platformsNo
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond annotations (readOnlyHint, idempotentHint), the description discloses substantive data-behavior nuances: generation stopped, only archived rows remain, playbooks are synthetic and won't trigger detections, and an empty result distinguishes 'this threat never had any' from 'none for that platform'. That is enrichment annotations do not capture.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the most important arc (DEPRECATED) and elevides every detail: status, data volume, quality caveat, performance trigger, response semantics, and replacement., the one-sentence structure is effectively a compact CLI-style summary with no inerous commentary.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a read-only getter with a schema and output schema already present, the description is complete—youth provide and exact dark context, a response caveat (§empty reason), size/vacceptility constraint, and a migration path. There is nothing an agent would need to know to safely invoke or interpret this tool that is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema already covers 100% of parameter descriptions. The description adds justification for using limit/platform ('30 KB+ of command text'), but does not explain new parameter semantics—it reinforces rather than defines. Baseline of 3 applies because the schema handles the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names the exact resource ('adversary-emulation playbooks attached to a threat') and clearly identifies its scope and relationship. It also differentiates from the replacement tool get_attack_flow, so an agent can tell this tool apart from relevant siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explicitly marks the tool as deprecated, names the preferred alternative (get_attack_flow), and advises how to narrow results when they could be huge ('narrow with platform (see available_platforms) and limit'). This-level of when-to-use and when-not-to-use guidance is unambiguous.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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