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threadlinqs-cmd

Intel Threadlinqs MCP

Export STIX 2.1 Bundle

export_stix
Read-onlyIdempotent

Export threats, actors, or CVEs as STIX 2.1 bundles for ingestion into TIP/SIEM platforms. Optionally includes community OSINT sightings.

Instructions

Export a threat, actor, or CVE as a STIX 2.1 bundle for ingestion into a TIP/SIEM. Provide at least one of threat_id, actor, or cve_id. Returns a {type:"bundle", objects:[...]} with indicator (per IOC), attack-pattern (per MITRE technique), intrusion-set (actor), vulnerability (CVE), malware/threat-actor, and relationship objects. Set include_osint=true to add sighting SROs for indicators the community independently reported (TL_OSINT_Scan / tweetfeed.live, CC0) — community-sourced and heavily concentrated, so they carry x_threadlinqs_trust="community-unverified". The bundle is capped (≤200 objects / ≤80KB); a note object is appended if truncated.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
actorNoThreat-actor name or alias to export (e.g. "APT29")
cve_idNoCVE identifier to export (e.g. CVE-2024-3400)
threat_idNoThreat ID to export (e.g. TL-2026-0042)
include_osintNoAdd community `sighting` objects for corroborated indicators (default false)

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idNo
typeYesAlways 'bundle'.
objectsYes
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, and destructiveHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds meaningful behavioral context: the 200-object/80KB cap with a note object on truncation, the trust flag 'community-unverified' for OSINT data, and the return structure with specific object types. It doesn't detail auth/permission requirements, but annotations cover the mutation-safety aspect well.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is a single, information-dense paragraph with no wasted words. Every sentence carries meaningful content: purpose, parameter requirement, output structure, OSINT option semantics, and truncation behavior. It could be slightly more structured (e.g., separating return format from option behavior), but it is appropriately compact for the richness it conveys.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the output schema exists and annotations are strong (readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive), the description fully covers the remaining contextual needs: return object structure, option semantics with trust implications, truncation limits, and the at-least-one-input requirement. This is complete for a moderately complex tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all 4 parameters are documented in the schema. The description adds context that 'at least one' identifier is needed and explains the include_osint side-effect (adds sighting SROs with a community trust flag), which goes slightly beyond the schema. This is a solid baseline-plus scenario where schema handles most of the lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the verb+resource (export a threat/actor/CVE as STIX 2.1 bundle) and the audience purpose (ingestion into TIP/SIEM). It distinguishes from siblings like export_detection and get_threat_bundle by specifying the STIX 2.1 format and detailed object composition, which are unique.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It states the requirement of 'provide at least one of threat_id, actor, or cve_id' and explains the optional include_osint behavior with its caveats. However, it does not explicitly say when NOT to use this tool versus alternatives like export_detection or get_threat_bundle, though the STIX format and TIP/SIEM ingestion purpose imply differentiation.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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