Threat Enrichment

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive, so the safety burden is covered. The description adds valuable behavioral nuance beyond annotations: the meaning of 'grounded' vs 'threat_record' and the critical 'unmapped' warning that 'not mapplied ≠ not target'. This is genuinely useful, though some runtime details (e.g., error handling of invalid ID) could still be expanded.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences: the first structures the resource, the second gives the sibling-guidance, and the third gives an important caveat about the 'coverage' field. Each sentence carries weight without going too long; the description is dense but every inline list member affects what the agent needs to know about the response.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-ID, read-only, idempotent tool with an output schema present, the description covers the whole decision context: when to call it, what it returns, how to interpret coverage values, and the false-negative trap of 'unapped'. It grounds the awkward "empty array" case up front, giving an agent everything needed to make a correct call and correct interpretation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema description coverage is 100%, and the schema already says the id is a Threat ID with an example. The description merely repeats that it's by ID and adds no additional parameter syntax, constraints, or format. Therefore a baseline 3 is appropriate since the schema carries the parameter-semantic burden.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific resource and verb: 'Reference-grounded enrichment for one threat by ID', then enumerates exactly what is returned (malware families, tools, sectors, OS, campaigns, ATLAS techniques, mitigations). It also clearly separates this tool from get_threat by naming the difference between its full-fields view and get_threat's overview/MITRE/IOCs/detections. This leaves no ambiguity about what the tool does or how it differs from siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explicitly tells the agent when to call this tool: 'call this for the "what malware/tools were used and who was targeted" view', and names get_threatest as the complement. It also gives conditional guidance for reading the 'coverage' field, which is a direct interpretation rule that prevents misreading empty arrays.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.