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ryuxik
by ryuxik

gt_mechanism_optimal_auction_design

Compute revenue-optimal or welfare-maximizing auction mechanisms for asymmetric independent private values, with per-bidder reserve prices based on Myerson's theory.

Instructions

Myerson revenue-optimal mechanism for asymmetric IPV. Per-bidder reserves; collapses to second-price-with-reserve under symmetric IPV.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
bidder_priorsYes
seller_valuationYes
objectiveNorevenue
n_simulationsNo
seedNo
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description must carry the full burden. It mentions theoretical behavior (e.g., per-bidder reserves, collapses to second-price) but omits practical aspects like simulation, randomness, or side effects. The presence of n_simulations and seed parameters hints at simulation, but this is not disclosed in the description.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is very concise, consisting of only two sentences. While it avoids verbosity, it sacrifices completeness, especially regarding parameter usage. It is front-loaded with purpose but lacks structure for easy consumption.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the parameter count (5) and lack of output schema and annotations, the description is insufficiently complete. It does not explain inputs, outputs, or practical usage, leaving significant gaps for an agent to correctly invoke the tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters1/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, requiring the description to compensate. However, the description does not mention any of the 5 parameters (bidder_priors, seller_valuation, objective, n_simulations, seed), providing no additional meaning beyond the schema's minimal types.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool implements the Myerson revenue-optimal mechanism for asymmetric IPV. It distinguishes itself from siblings by specifying the mechanism type and the condition under which it collapses to a simpler format, making the purpose evident.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implies usage for asymmetric IPV settings and notes the special case of symmetric IPV, but does not explicitly state when to use alternatives or provide criteria for tool selection. Some guidance is present, but it is incomplete.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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