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Glama

Server Configuration

Describes the environment variables required to run the server.

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Instructions

Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.

This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.

Capabilities

Features and capabilities supported by this server

Protocol revision2025-11-25

CapabilityDetails
tools
{}

Tools

Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions

NameDescription
aeo_fetchA

Fetch the full AEO Protocol declaration at an origin's /.well-known/aeo.json. Returns the raw conforming JSON document.

aeo_inspectA

Return a structured summary of an AEO declaration: entity, source/verification counts, claim IDs, audit mode. Cheaper than aeo_fetch for context-window-constrained agents.

aeo_get_claimC

Extract a single AEO claim by ID. Returns the claim object or a not-found error listing available claim IDs.

aeo_well_known_urlA

Compute the canonical AEO well-known URL for an origin, without fetching.

prompt_provenance_validateA

Validate a Prompt Provenance JSON document against the v0.1 schema. Returns { valid, prompt_id, version } or { valid: false, reason }.

prompt_provenance_inspectC

Structured summary of a Prompt Provenance document: prompt identity, lineage, approval state, evaluation suites.

prompt_provenance_eval_resultC

Extract a single evaluation suite's result from a Prompt Provenance document.

agent_card_well_known_urlA

Compute the canonical Agent Card well-known URL for a given origin + agent_id (convention: /.well-known/agents/<agent_id>.json).

agent_card_inspectB

Structured summary of an Agent Card document. Pass EITHER url (the server fetches it) OR document_json (already-fetched).

agent_card_tool_disclosureB

Return the list of tools an agent declares, with side-effect class and (when present) MCP Tool Card URI for each tool.

agent_card_validateB

Validate an Agent Card JSON document against the v0.1 schema.

ai_evidence_validateC

Validate an AI Evidence object against the v0.1 schema.

ai_evidence_inspectC

Structured summary of an AI Evidence object: claim text, source metadata, retrieval method, synthesis role, hash, signed-or-not.

ai_evidence_verify_hashA

Compute SHA-256 over the canonical UTF-8 form of candidate_text (LF endings, no trailing newline) and compare against the evidence's verification.content_hash. Returns ok=true on match, or { error: hash_mismatch, expected, recomputed }.

tool_card_well_known_urlA

Compute the canonical MCP Tool Card well-known URL (convention: /.well-known/mcp-tools/<tool_name>.json).

tool_card_inspectC

Structured summary of an MCP Tool Card: tool identity, safety profile (side-effect class, PII/secrets exposure, approval requirement), test count, p99 latency.

tool_card_tested_withB

Return the tested-LLM entries for a tool, optionally filtered by a substring match on the LLM identifier.

tool_card_validateC

Validate an MCP Tool Card JSON document against the v0.1 schema.

tutor_card_well_known_urlB

Compute the canonical AI Tutor Card well-known URL (convention: /.well-known/tutors/<tutor_id>.json).

tutor_card_fetchB

Fetch a Tutor Card from a URL. Returns the parsed, schema-validated JSON.

tutor_card_validateA

Validate an AI Tutor Card JSON document against the v0.1 schema, including the COPPA conditional rule (age_range_min < 13 ⇒ coppa_compliant must be true).

tutor_card_inspectC

Structured summary of a Tutor Card: tutor identity, audience, pedagogy, subject scope counts, safety strength, FERPA/COPPA/GDPR posture, evaluation count, COPPA-rule check.

tutor_card_subject_checkC

Classify a topic against the tutor's subject scope. Returns one of: primary, included, excluded, unknown, with the matched term when applicable.

tutor_card_coppa_checkB

Enforce the spec's COPPA conditional rule: if audience.age_range_min < 13, data_privacy.coppa_compliant MUST be true. Returns { ok: true } or { error: coppa_violation, reason }.

disclosure_validateA

Validate a Student AI Disclosure JSON document against the v0.1 schema. Enforces conditional rules (ai_used true requires tools/roles/extent/prompt_mode; ai_used false forbids them; prompt mode gates prompts presence).

disclosure_inspectC

Structured summary of a Student AI Disclosure: assignment identity, AI usage facts, tools used (with back-refs to agent / tutor cards), role taxonomy, assistance extent, prompt-mode + count, artifact hash, policy posture, signature + acknowledgment.

disclosure_verify_artifact_hashA

Recompute SHA-256 over a candidate artifact and compare to disclosure.artifact_hash. Pass either candidate_text (canonical SHA-256: LF, no trailing newline) for text artifacts, or candidate_bytes_base64 (raw-bytes SHA-256) for binary artifacts like PDFs / images. Returns ok=true on match, otherwise { error: artifact_hash_mismatch, expected, recomputed }.

disclosure_verify_prompt_hashA

Verify a single prompt hash in a hashed-mode disclosure. Looks up prompt_id and compares canonical SHA-256 of candidate_text. Returns ok=true on match or { error: prompt_hash_mismatch, expected, recomputed }. Errors with wrong_prompt_mode if prompt_evidence_mode is not 'hashed'.

disclosure_aup_checkA

Surface the disclosure's declared policy posture and any aup_uri reference. Status is one of: declared_compliant, declared_non_compliant, aup_referenced_but_unclaimed, no_aup_reference. This does not verify compliance; aup_check_compliance evaluates eight declared AUP/Disclosure checks only.

aup_well_known_urlC

Compute the canonical Classroom AI AUP well-known URL: /.well-known/ai-aup.json.

aup_fetchB

Fetch a Classroom AI AUP from a URL. Returns the parsed, schema-validated JSON document.

aup_validateB

Validate a Classroom AI AUP JSON document against the v0.1 schema. Enforces conditional rules: course scope requires non-empty course_ids; assignment scope requires non-empty assignment_ids; assistance_extent_max=none forbids any permitted_roles; expires_at must follow effective_at; roles cannot be both permitted and prohibited.

aup_inspectB

Structured summary of a Classroom AI AUP: policy identity, scope, permitted-use counts, prohibited-use counts, disclosure requirements, supervision level, vendor requirements posture, parent-consent gating.

aup_check_complianceA

Compare an AUP with a Student AI Disclosure on eight declared checks: policy effective window, signature, artifact_hash, teacher acknowledgment, prompt evidence mode, permitted/prohibited roles, assistance-extent ceiling, and assistance_extent_max=none vs ai_used=true. Returns { allowed, policy_id, disclosure_id, violations[] }; allowed=true means only these checks passed. It does not verify policy scope, tool/vendor requirements, parent consent, Tutor Cards, or legal compliance, and is not an enforcement decision.

clinical_ai_well_known_urlB

Compute the canonical Clinical AI Card well-known URL: /.well-known/clinical-ai/<system_id>.json.

clinical_ai_fetchA

Fetch a Clinical AI Card from a URL. Returns the parsed, schema-validated JSON document.

clinical_ai_validateA

Validate a Clinical AI Card JSON document against the v0.1 schema. Enforces the headline rules: autonomy ⇔ medical device, SaMD completeness, FDA-clearance documentation, PHI ⇒ explicit HIPAA + BAA posture, and bias_audit_uri requirement for SaMD class II+ / autonomous / pre-authorization use.

clinical_ai_inspectC

Structured summary of a Clinical AI Card: system identity, clinical context (indication / care settings / patient population), regulatory posture (FDA / SaMD), clinical role, evidence (validation studies + bias audit + performance metrics), HIPAA + BAA posture, EHR integration (FHIR / SMART / CDS Hooks), safety + mandated reporting.

incident_well_known_urlA

Compute the canonical AI Incident Card well-known URL: /.well-known/ai-incidents/.json.

incident_fetchA

Fetch an AI Incident Card from a URL. Returns the parsed, schema-validated JSON document.

incident_validateA

Validate an AI Incident Card JSON document against the v0.1 schema. Enforces conditional rules: status=resolved requires resolved_at; status=withdrawn requires withdrawal block; non-empty regulatory.reported_to requires non-empty regulatory_filing_uris; root_cause.category=other and categories containing 'other' both require the corresponding _other_text fields.

incident_inspectC

Structured summary of an AI Incident Card: incident identity (id, title, severity, categories, status, timeline), affected products + versions + Agent/Tutor/Tool Card cross-references, root cause, harm, mitigation, regulatory filings, withdrawal posture, revision metadata.

incident_index_fetchA

HEADLINE TOOL, fetch a vendor's /.well-known/ai-incidents.json index and return a procurement-friendly summary: total count, breakdown by severity, breakdown by status, IDs sorted by disclosed_at descending. The cheapest way for a CISO or procurement reviewer to scan a vendor's incident history.

decision_card_well_known_urlB

Compute the canonical AI Procurement Decision Card well-known URL: /.well-known/decisions/<decision_id>.json.

decision_card_fetchA

Fetch an AI Procurement Decision Card from a URL. Returns the parsed, schema-validated JSON document.

decision_card_validateA

Validate an AI Procurement Decision Card JSON document against the v0.1 schema. Enforces conditional rules: status=approved-with-conditions and status=rejected-with-remediation require at least one entry in conditions; status=withdrawn requires a withdrawal block; publication.is_public=true requires publication_uri.

decision_card_inspectC

Structured summary of an AI Procurement Decision Card: buyer identity, decision status + scope, vendor + documents reviewed (by type and URL), rubric pass/partial/fail counts, conditions count, signatures count, publication posture, history event count, withdrawal flag.

decision_card_infer_statusA

Validate each rubric row, then infer a preview decision.status. Mirrors procurement-decision-api's rubric engine: any 'fail' -> 'rejected-with-remediation'; any 'partial' or 'pass-with-condition' -> 'approved-with-conditions'; all 'pass' -> 'approved'; empty or all 'n/a' -> 'pending'. An unsupported result returns an error, never an approval.

decision_card_to_policy_bundleA

Read-only deny preview for rejected, withdrawn, expired, or pending Decision Cards; returned bundles carry preview_only=true and enforceable=false. Approved statuses return an MCP error: only the live policy engine can check buyer identity and trusted attestation, vendor scope, allowed action, and effective window before producing an enforceable bundle. Do not use this tool output as an access grant.

decision_card_signature_checkA

Structural check on a Decision Card's signatures[] block: count signers, show their method/key/timestamp, and return the canonical-JSON hash of the card body (excluding signatures) so a caller can pair this with attestation_verify for cryptographic checking.

incident_affected_walkA

Walk an Incident Card's affected block and return every referenced Suite document as { uri, kind }. Useful as the seed list for incident-correlation-rs or fan-out validation via aeo-validator-service.

incident_remediation_planC

Map each affected URI in an Incident Card to a recommended Action + Urgency. Single-hop preview of what incident-correlation-rs.correlate() would produce: agent/tutor/tool-card -> revalidate; vendor/product -> request_review. Urgency follows severity.

attestation_canonical_hashA

Compute the SHA-256 canonical-JSON hash of an arbitrary value (sorted keys, no whitespace). This is the structural hash convention used by procurement-decision-api, aeo-validator-service, aeo-graph-explorer-rs, and hash-attestation-rs. Identical JSON values produce identical hashes regardless of original whitespace or key order.

attestation_verifyA

Verify an ed25519 Attestation envelope against a body and caller-supplied public key. Recomputes the canonical hash and verifies the signature over the hash string. Does not verify that the supplied key belongs to the claimed key_url or signer. Public key accepted as 64-char hex or base64.

attestation_inspectA

Pretty-print an Attestation envelope with structural validation: confirms every required field is present, reports the decoded signature byte-length (should be 64), and surfaces the key_url + signed_at fields a caller would use to find the matching public key.

audit_event_composeA

Build a ready-to-POST audit-stream-py GovernanceEvent: assigns event_id, computes the canonical hash, links to prev_hash (defaults to 64 zeros for event #1). Kind must be one of the 19 declared event kinds (decision_card_drafted, watch_drifted, request_denied, etc., plus 'other').

audit_chain_verifyA

Walk an array of GovernanceEvents top-to-bottom and verify the hash chain: monotonic event_id, prev_hash linkage, self-consistency of each event's hash. Returns { valid, checked, first_break_at, reason }, the same shape audit-stream-py's GET /verify endpoint emits.

audit_event_inspectA

Pretty-print one GovernanceEvent with structural validation: required fields, known/unknown kind, payload key list, and self-consistency check (does the event's hash match the recomputed canonical hash of the body?).

audit_event_emitA

POSTs a governance event to the audit-stream-py instance configured by AUDIT_STREAM_URL and AUDIT_STREAM_TOKEN. This sends kind, caller-asserted source, and payload to that service. The bearer token authenticates this MCP process, not the claimed producer or tenant. Obtain the user's approval before recording an event; omit secrets and personal data unless the service is approved for them. The server assigns event_id/timestamp/prev_hash/hash. Returns a validated service event receipt or a structured error; receipt does not prove durable storage or event completeness.

audit_events_queryA

GET recent governance events from a running audit-stream-py instance (AUDIT_STREAM_URL and AUDIT_STREAM_TOKEN), optionally filtered by kind or source. The service does not combine both filters. Returns the events array plus a count field; recorded source labels are caller-asserted. Returns a structured error when unconfigured.

audit_chain_verify_liveA

Ask the configured audit-stream service to check its full server-side hash chain. This checks chain continuity, not whether events are truthful, authorized, complete, or legally compliant. Returns valid, checked, first_break_at, and reason. Requires AUDIT_STREAM_URL and AUDIT_STREAM_TOKEN; returns a structured error otherwise.

suite_doc_detect_specA

Detect which Kinetic Gain Suite spec a JSON document is by sniffing its top-level *_version field. Returns { spec, version_field, version }. Recognises all 12 specs; returns spec='unknown' for anything else.

suite_doc_driftB

Structural diff between two versions of the same Suite document. Returns { drifted, spec_before, spec_after, spec_changed, content_hash_before, content_hash_after, added_fields, removed_fields, changed_fields }, mirrors the DriftReport shape aeo-validator-service emits for watch rechecks.

defensetech_vault_resolve_3axisB

Deterministic preview of a DefenseTech 3-axis vault contract: intersect allowed_actions and OR requires_* flags. Unknown or incomparable human-user requirements return ok=false for an authorized policy owner to resolve. This does not verify identity, classification, licenses, or enforce access.

defensetech_audit_event_check_invariantsA

Run three deterministic DefenseTech event checks: CUI distribution-statement presence, ITAR status with tokenized license for an authorized foreign person, and a 72-hour discovery-to-filing interval. The last check requires event.discovered_at; event.timestamp is not a substitute. Returns ok + errors + passed, not a legal compliance determination.

defensetech_check_dfars_72h_clockA

Calculate the DFARS 252.204-7012 discovery-to-filing 72-hour interval from supplied timezone-qualified timestamps. Requires discovered_at, not occurred_at. Invalid or pre-discovery filing timestamps return valid=false and within_window=false. This arithmetic preview does not establish a reporting duty or prove filing.

defensetech_check_cui_distribution_statementB

Check that a CUI-Specified+ tier event carries the required distribution_statement (DoDI 5230.24). For PUBLIC / CUI-BASIC tiers reports applicable=false.

defensetech_check_itar_us_personB

Check that an ITAR resource event has US-PERSON-VERIFIED (or AUTHORIZED-FOREIGN-PERSON-WITH-LICENSE + DDTC license number tokenized) on the agent. Per 22 CFR 120.62 / 22 CFR 120.50 deemed-export rule.

defensetech_incident_classify_event_typeA

Given a freeform description of a defense-AI incident, classify it into one of the 22 DefenseTech Incident Card event_type values (DFARS cyber / CUI spillage / ITAR violation / foreign-person breach / classified misuse / NISPOM insider-threat / CMMC POA&M / AI-tool supply-chain / etc.). Returns top 3 candidates with token-match scoring.

defensetech_summarize_cmmc_evidence_bundleA

Summarize a CMMC L2/L3 readiness evidence bundle: target level, assessment mode, evidence count, family coverage count, outcome distribution, orphan-failure count (not-satisfied without poam_ref), SPRS evidence presence, and quick invariant checks for POA&M traceability + SPRS-when-7019/7020-in-scope.

defensetech_vault_contract_cross_binding_checkA

Verify the cross_binding_refs block on a DefenseTech vault contract is syntactically valid: all referenced repos are HTTPS URLs. Returns valid_refs + errors. Does NOT fetch remotely (syntactic check only).

claims_card_validateA

Validate an AI Claims Decision Card against the bundled v0.1 structural schema, including required fields, enums, ranges, and attestation field shapes. Returns the first schema issue or { valid, claims_card_id, version }. This does not verify signatures, evidence authenticity, the coverage decision, or legal compliance.

claims_card_inspectB

Structured summary of an AI Claims Decision Card: claim type, outcome, coverage, evidence count, model, jurisdiction, human-in-loop, chain position, and attestation status. Cheaper than reading the full card.

claims_card_signA

Compute the canonical SHA-256 hash of an AI Claims Decision Card for ed25519 signing. Sorts object keys recursively and excludes attestation.card_hash + attestation.signature before hashing. Returns the 64-char lowercase hex card_hash; caller signs it offline.

claims_card_chainA

Link a new AI Claims Decision Card to its predecessor: sets attestation.chain_index (prev + 1) and attestation.prev_card_hash. Validates the predecessor hash is 64-char hex and its index is a non-negative integer. Call claims_card_sign next.

Prompts

Interactive templates invoked by user choice

NameDescription

No prompts

Resources

Contextual data attached and managed by the client

NameDescription

No resources

TDQS

B3/5.0

Scored across 75 tools

Disambiguation3/5

The tool set has a clear spec-prefix convention (e.g., clinical_ai_validate, tutor_card_inspect), so many tools are distinguishable. However, 75 tools repeat the same validate/inspect/fetch/check actions across a dozen similar document schemas, so an agent can easily select the wrong spec's validator or inspector without careful reading.

Naming Consistency4/5

Names are overwhelmingly snake_case with a consistent subject-prefix + action pattern (ai_evidence_validate, tutor_card_coppa_check, audit_chain_verify). Minor deviations exist, such as aeo_get_claim using 'get' instead of fetch/inspect, audit_events_query using a plural subject, and defensetech_* tools adding an extra domain prefix, but the overall convention is readable and stable.

Tool Count1/5

At 75 tools, this server is far beyond the 3-15 range appropriate for a single MCP server, and exceeds the 50+ threshold for extreme mismatch. The functionality spans many independent specs and services that would be better split into separate servers.

Completeness3/5

The surface covers validation, inspection, fetching, hashing, and compliance checks for many Suite specs, but coverage is uneven: AEO lacks a validate tool, several specs lack fetch tools, and signing/hashing support is inconsistent (e.g., claims_card_sign exists but no equivalent sign tool for most other cards). There are also no update/delete operations, though immutability may justify that for attestation documents.

Maintenance

ActivityMaintained
ResponsivenessNo issues