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kasireddy-sec

Tenable Security MCP

search_security_intelligence

Look up a CVE across NVD, CISA KEV, EPSS, and public exploit intelligence to enrich vulnerability context and support prioritized remediation.

Instructions

Unified security intelligence lookup.

Searches:

  • NVD

  • CISA KEV

  • EPSS

  • public exploit intelligence

  • normalized security context

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cve_idYes

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

C2.7/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. It lists data sources but says nothing about how the aggregation behaves, whether all sources are always queried, failure/partial-result handling, auth or rate-limit requirements, or latency.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

It is short and front-loaded with the core purpose, and the source list is quick to scan. The bulleted breakdown is slightly more verbose than necessary but wastes little space.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists so return values need not be explained, but for an aggregation tool with zero annotations and heavily overlapping siblings, the description should at minimum state when to use it versus the single-source alternatives. That routing information is absent.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% and the description says nothing about parameters. While cve_id is largely self-evident, the description fails to compensate for the coverage gap by giving any accepted format (e.g., CVE-YYYY-NNNN) or noting that a single identifier is required.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description gives a clear verb ('lookup') plus the specific resources it aggregates (NVD, CISA KEV, EPSS, exploit intelligence, normalized context), so an agent can grasp that this is an aggregator. However, it does not differentiate itself from overlapping siblings such as get_complete_cve_intelligence or build_security_context, so it falls short of a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no when-to-use guidance, no prerequisites, and no mention of when to prefer this aggregated lookup over the many single-source siblings (get_cve_intelligence, get_epss_score, get_cisa_kev_status). The agent must infer the choice entirely.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.