Skip to main content
Glama
kasireddy-sec

Tenable Security MCP

get_complete_cve_intelligence

Combine NVD, CISA KEV, EPSS, and public exploit intelligence for a single CVE to support threat intelligence enrichment and remediation planning.

Instructions

Combine NVD, CISA KEV, EPSS and public exploit intelligence for one CVE.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cve_idYes

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

B3.2/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden, but it does disclose meaningful behavioral context: it merges four distinct sources (NVD, CISA KEV, EPSS, exploit intel) into one result. It says nothing about read-only nature, permissions, rate limits, or how conflicts between feeds are resolved, so gaps remain.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

One efficient sentence that front-loads the combined-source behavior. Nothing is wasted, though the near-total brevity leaves useful routing information unwritten.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be described, and the aggregation behavior is stated. But given a crowded sibling set with overlapping CVE tools, the description is too thin to let an agent confidently select this tool over get_cve_intelligence or the individual feed tools.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. It states 'for one CVE', which conveys that the single parameter is a single CVE identifier rather than a list or range. That is a small but real addition over the bare 'cve_id' field, though it adds no format details (e.g., CVE-YYYY-NNNN).

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific resource (CVE intelligence) and scope ('for one CVE') plus the aggregation behavior, naming the exact feeds combined (NVD, CISA KEV, EPSS, exploit intel). However, it never distinguishes itself from the near-identical sibling get_cve_intelligence, leaving the agent to guess which to call.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no when-to-use guidance, no indication of when this aggregated tool is preferred over the individual get_cisa_kev_status/get_epss_score/get_exploit_intelligence siblings, and no mention of prerequisites or exclusions. Usage must be fully inferred.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.