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kasireddy-sec

Tenable Security MCP

prioritize_vulnerabilities

Prioritize Nessus scan vulnerabilities using severity, CVSS, EPSS, CISA KEV, and public exploit evidence to produce a deterministic remediation score.

Instructions

Prioritize vulnerabilities from a Nessus scan using:

  • Nessus severity

  • CVSS

  • EPSS

  • CISA KEV exploitation status

  • public exploit evidence

The score is a deterministic prioritization score and should not be interpreted as an official vendor score.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
scan_idYes
max_itemsNo

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

B3.2/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It usefully discloses that the score is deterministic and warns it is not an official vendor score, which is genuine behavioral context. However, it does not state whether the operation is read-only, whether it requires auth, how it handles large scans, or anything about ordering/output limits.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the verb and resource, then uses a tight bullet list for the scoring inputs and a single caveat sentence. Efficient with no filler, though the formatting is slightly awkward and could front-load the scan input more clearly.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists so return values need not be explained, and the scoring factors plus the 'not an official vendor score' caveat cover the conceptual model. But with zero annotation coverage and zero parameter documentation, an agent still lacks the operational detail needed to invoke it confidently.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate, but it only vaguely implies a scan input via 'from a Nessus scan' and says nothing about max_items or its default of 25. Neither parameter's type, required status, or meaning is explained in the description.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource (prioritize vulnerabilities from a Nessus scan) and itemizes the exact signals used (Nessus severity, CVSS, EPSS, CISA KEV, public exploit evidence). This makes the operation's intent unmistakable, though it never explicitly distinguishes itself from siblings like list_nessus_vulnerabilities or get_nessus_vulnerability_details.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: an agent infers you call this when you want a ranked risk ordering rather than a raw list. There is no explicit when-to-use/when-not statement and no mention of the sibling tools that return unranked vulnerability data.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.