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singlestore-mcp-server

by jonasliesas
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security_change_plan

Read-only

Preview a planned SingleStore security change without applying it: see exact statements, warnings, blockers, confirmation needs, and if the connected user may run it.

Instructions

Read-only preview of one change: the exact statements (any password masked), warnings, blockers (lock-out, last admin, missing objects) and whether the user must type the object's name to confirm. Runs nothing. Works without the change privileges (allowed says whether the connected user may run it).

Args:
    action: {"action": one of create_user, drop_user, grant, revoke, revoke_all, create_role, drop_role,
        create_group, drop_group, grant_role, revoke_role, grant_group, revoke_group, create_pool, alter_pool,
        drop_pool, set_default_pool, grant_pool, revoke_pool, plus its fields: user, host, role, group,
        grantee_type ("user"/"role"), privileges, database, table, with_grant_option, grant_option, pool,
        settings, default_pool}. Never a password.
    pending: The changes already in the script basket (same shape), for a change that needs objects they
        create (the plan then says ``needs_script``).

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
actionYes
pendingNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv0.10.1

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only assert readOnlyHint=true, but the description adds substantial behavior beyond that: passwords are masked, warnings and blockers (lock-out, last admin, missing objects) are surfaced, nothing is executed, it functions without change privileges, and the ``allowed`` flag indicates authorization. This is rich disclosure consistent with, not contradicting, the annotation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core behavior (preview, masks, blockers, confirm requirement) before the args detail, and every sentence earns its place given 0% schema coverage. The long enumeration of action values is necessary but heavy, keeping it just below maximum conciseness.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description must convey the return shape, and it does: exact statements, warnings, blockers, the confirm-by-name requirement, the ``allowed`` flag, and the ``needs_script`` signal. Combined with thorough parameter documentation, nothing needed to call or interpret it is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0% and both params are nested free-form objects, so the description carries the full burden and does: it enumerates all 19 action values, lists the action fields (user, host, role, group, grantee_type, privileges, database, table, with/without grant option, pool, settings, default_pool), specifies grantee_type values, and explains ``pending`` semantics including the ``needs_script`` outcome. Far more than the schema provides.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource: a read-only preview/dry-run of one security change. "Runs nothing" and "preview" clearly separate it from security_change_apply (which executes) and security_change_script (which emits a script), even without naming them. An agent can tell exactly what this tool is for.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear context: it previews a single change, works without change privileges, and reports whether the user may run it, which frames its use as a pre-flight check before applying. It stops short of explicitly naming the apply/script siblings or stating exclusions, so it lacks the explicit when-not guidance a 5 requires.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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