security_admin_capabilities

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, so 'Read-only' is redundant, but the description does add useful behavioral context: it explains the tool answers what the user may change and why not, and returns picker lists. It stops short of describing response shape or how 'why not' is expressed.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single tight sentence that front-loads the primary purpose before the ancillary picker-list content. The trailing 'for the pickers' clause is slightly cryptic but does not bloat the text.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description is the only place to convey return content, and it does so only at a high level. For a read-only, no-param capability tool it is adequate, but the exact relationship to sibling security tools (e.g. security_change_plan) is left unstated.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Zero parameters with a fully covered schema, so there is nothing for the description to disambiguate; the baseline of 4 applies. No syntax or format concerns exist for a parameterless call.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description identifies the resource (Security view capabilities for the connected user) and the specific content returned: change permissions with reasons, plus privilege and pool-setting lists. It is distinguishable from the mutation siblings (security_change_plan/script/apply) and from security/who_can_access, though the phrasing is noun-heavy rather than a clean verb+resource statement.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It labels itself 'Read-only' but gives no explicit when-to-use condition or routing against the many security_* siblings (security, security_change_plan, security_who, user_privileges). The agent must infer that this is the capability-discovery call versus the plan/apply or listing tools.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.