Industrial-AIOps

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Governed, vendor-neutral industrial data tap + intelligent troubleshooting for AI agents — read-first tools across 14 field protocols in this package (17 line-wide with the energy edition): OPC-UA (incl. Historical Access + tag auto-discovery), Modbus-TCP/RTU (byte-order auto-detect + vendor templates), S7comm, Mitsubishi MC, Omron FINS (stdlib-only client), MTConnect, MQTT/Sparkplug B (full decode), EtherNet/IP (Rockwell/Allen-Bradley Logix), EtherCAT (pysoem/SOEM), PROFINET (DCP), SECS/GEM (HSMS fab), HART-IP (process instrumentation), BACnet/IP (building), and IO-Link (master JSON integration) — plus an AI downtime root-cause copilot, conservative baseline learning, ISA-18.2 alarm-flood analysis, historian READ integration (RCA pre-incident evidence), a legacy PLC program explainer (ST/AWL/L5X), open-format export (iaiops export CSV/SQLite/Parquet) with a Prometheus/Grafana bridge, data-quality watchdog, UNS governance, OEE/downtime, asset-inventory, and 信创 (TDengine/IoTDB historian sinks + 防护指南/等保2.0/IEC 62443 compliance mapping, report & evidence bundle). The energy edition (变电/电力: IEC-104 / DNP3 / IEC-61850) ships separately as iaiops-energy.

Industrial-AIOps is the OT member of the industrial-aiops org. It is a factory-level, vendor-neutral, governed data tap that lets an AI agent safely read industrial control systems across many field protocols, plus a cross-protocol intelligence layer that localizes "no data" breaks, analyzes alarm floods (ISA-18.2), scores data trustworthiness, ranks unhealthy tags, computes OEE / categorizes downtime, builds an active asset register, auto-discovers OPC-UA tags into a semantic asset model, and — the flagship — runs an AI downtime root-cause copilot that correlates the evidence into an evidence-cited, advisory verdict. Read-first by design; the few write/command paths are OT-dangerous and gated by MOC discipline. Every tool runs through a vendored governance harness (audit / budget / risk-tier / undo).

v0.10.0 — validation status (honest). Pure analysis + the OPC-UA path are tested against a real in-process asyncua server. The 信创 bindings were run against real libraries + containers: IoTDB + TDengine (live container write→read round-trip) are verified; the HART command codec is verified vs hart-protocol. Phoenix Contact PLCnext vPLC (virtualized PLC) is route-verified over its OPC-UA server (an in-process asyncua server reproducing the Arp.Plc.Eclr GDS address space) and a Modbus-TCP process-data block (tests/test_plcnext_route.py); live PLCnext hardware reads stay 待核实. Modbus-RTU (live serial) is verified (2026-07-02): the read ops round-trip over a real serial link built from a socat PTY pair + a pymodbus RTU server (tests/test_modbus_rtu_live.py), exercising the actual RTU framing — though not yet validated against a specific physical RS-485 device. The BACnet/IP read path is verified (2026-07-02): a genuine Who-Is discover + present-value read round-trip against a real bacpypes3 virtual BACnet/IP device on a two-IP subnet in a Linux container (tests/test_bacnet_live.py), through the actual async BAC0 (2024+) stack. The new Omron FINS connector is verified against an in-repo mock FINS UDP/TCP responder (tests/test_fins.py); the new IO-Link connector against an in-process mock master in both JSON dialects (tests/test_iolink.py). Still 待核实 (preview, not hardware-verified): live Omron PLCs (incl. banked-EM access), live IO-Link master datapoint paths, BACnet write/COV/trend on live HVAC, HART-IP wire transport (live gateway), EtherCAT (no software simulator — Linux + root + a real bus only), physical Modbus-RTU RS-485 devices, live PLCnext. Mocked clients cover S7/MC/EtherNet-IP/SECS-GEM; MTConnect uses static XML fixtures; Sparkplug uses synthetic protobuf payloads. (The energy edition's IEC-104 / DNP3 / IEC-61850 validation lives in the iaiops-energy repo.) See Safety.

Why

OT is exactly where you want an agent on a tight leash: read first, never blind-write. Industrial-AIOps is the safe, neutral read wedge — one package, one MCP server, many protocols — with governance and an intelligence layer that turns raw reads into actionable diagnoses.

Related MCP server: OPC UA MCP Server

🧪 测试与共创 / Beta testing & co-creation

我们在找现场测试伙伴。 软件里能验证的我们都验证了（真实 in-process 服务器、真实协议库、Docker 容器 loopback）——剩下的 待核实 清单只有真设备能回答：物理 Modbus-RTU（RS-485）、EtherCAT 从站、HART 网关、在线 BACnet 楼宇设备、国产 PLC（汇川/信捷）、真机 PLCnext、真实变电站 RTU/IED、欧姆龙 FINS 真机、IO-Link 主站。如果你是 OT 工程师、系统集成商或工厂团队，手上有任何这类设备：装上 iaiops，对你的设备跑一遍 iaiops doctor，把结果告诉我们。经你验证的设备会署名写进支持矩阵；现场反馈的问题我们优先分诊；功能可以通过 GitHub Issues/Discussions 直接共创。

We're looking for field-testing partners. Everything software-verifiable has been verified; what's left on the honest 待核实 list only real equipment can answer — physical Modbus-RTU (RS-485), EtherCAT slaves, HART gateways, live BACnet HVAC, domestic PLCs (Inovance/Xinje), live PLCnext, substation RTUs/IEDs, live Omron FINS PLCs, IO-Link masters. If you're an OT engineer, integrator, or factory team with access to any of these: install iaiops, run iaiops doctor against your gear, and tell us what happened. Verified-equipment reports get credited in the support matrix, field-reported issues get fast triage, and features are co-designed in the open via GitHub Issues/Discussions.

👉 参与入口 | Start here: #28 — 招募现场测试伙伴 | Call for field-testing partners (v0.10.0) (pinned)

Consolidated capability matrix

(The energy protocols — IEC-104 / DNP3 / IEC-61850 — moved to iaiops-energy in 0.8.0; their tool matrix lives in that repo.)

132 governed tools = 123 read + 9 MOC-gated writes (s7_write_db, mc_write_words, fins_write_words, mqtt_publish, eip_write_tag, ethercat_write_sdo, ethercat_set_state, profinet_dcp_set, bacnet_write_property). ¹ The 123 reads include the two deprecated brain aliases health_summary / anomaly_scan, renamed to opcua_health_summary / opcua_anomaly_scan in 0.10.0 — the old names are removed in 0.11. The table above is representative, not exhaustive; run protocols_supported() (or iaiops protocols) for the live map.

Per-protocol reference

OPC-UA

• Versions/variants: binary opc.tcp:// via asyncua (sync facade). Security: anonymous + username/password. Certificate message security (Sign / SignAndEncrypt) = roadmap, not validated.

• Connection params: endpoint_url, username (password encrypted), security_mode, security_policy.

• Not supported / planned: cert security; real Alarms & Conditions event subscriptions (alarms are surfaced best-effort by browsing alarm-like boolean nodes).

Modbus-TCP / Modbus-RTU

• Versions/variants: Modbus-TCP and Modbus-RTU (serial RS-485/232) via pymodbus (+ pyserial). Read function codes FC01 (coils), FC02 (discrete), FC03 (holding), FC04 (input). Write FCs (FC05/06/15/16) = not implemented (read-only).

• Connection params: TCP — host, port (502), unit_id. RTU — transport: rtu, serial_port (e.g. /dev/ttyUSB0), baudrate, unit_id. Registers are untyped 16-bit words → decode hint (uint16/int16/uint32/int32/float32/raw); modbus_detect_byte_order auto-detects the byte/word order (AB/BA · ABCD/DCBA/BADC/CDAB) from hint values — pure logic, no extra device load.

• Vendor register templates (modbus_list_templates / modbus_apply_template): named register maps decoding a block into engineering values — energy meters (Eastron SDM630, Schneider PM5xxx, Carlo Gavazzi EM24), PV inverters (Huawei SUN2000, Growatt), Phoenix PLCnext process data, and water-industry templates (E+H Promag, Hach SC controller, generic dosing pump). Each template carries an explicit 待核实 caveat — no invented "verified" addresses.

• Coverage: many domestic 国产 PLCs (汇川 Inovance / 信捷 Xinje / 和利时 Hollysys / 台达 Delta) and any Modbus vendor. RTU framing is live-verified over a real serial link (socat PTY + pymodbus RTU server); specific physical RS-485 devices stay 待核实.

S7comm (Siemens + 仿西门子 国产)

• Versions/variants: pyS7 (pure-Python, ISO-on-TCP / RFC1006 — no native libsnap7). S7-300/400/1200/1500 and compatible clones. Memory areas DB / M (merker) / I / Q. No protocol auth (CPU gates via "Permit access with PUT/GET").

• Connection params: host, port (102), rack, slot (0/1 for 1200/1500; 0/2 common for 300/400).

• Write: s7_write_db = high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run default, captures BEFORE value + undo.

• Not supported / planned: optimized/symbolic DB access on 1500 with "optimized block access" can require absolute-addressing config on the CPU.

Mitsubishi MC

• Versions/variants: pymcprotocol — MC 3E frame (binary) only. 1E / 4E frames = not supported. PLC types Q / L / QnA / iQ-R / iQ-L. Devices: D/W/R (word), M/X/Y/B (bit).

• Connection params: host, port (5007 default; set to the module's open MC port), plctype.

• Write: mc_write_words = high/MOC/dry-run default, captures BEFORE + undo.

Omron FINS (CS/CJ/CP/NX-via-FINS)

• Versions/variants: in-repo, stdlib-only FINS client (no third-party dependency — the iaiops[fins] extra pins nothing): 10-byte FINS header framing, FINS/UDP (default port 9600) and FINS/TCP (node-address handshake per Omron W342), SID matching, bounded response parsing, end-code table per W227/W342. Commands: 0101 memory-area read (words/bits over DM/CIO/W/H/A/EM), 0102 write, 0501 controller data read, 0601 controller status.

• Connection params: host, port (9600), transport (udp default / tcp), FINS network/node/unit addressing.

• Write: fins_write_words = high/MOC/dry-run default, captures BEFORE + undo; CLI double-confirm on --apply.

• Validation: verified against an in-repo mock FINS UDP/TCP responder (tests/test_fins.py); live Omron PLC behaviour and banked-EM access stay 待核实.

IO-Link (master JSON integration — read-only)

• Versions/variants: sensor-level visibility via the IO-Link master's HTTP/JSON interface (IO-Link consortium "JSON Integration"), both dialects selectable per endpoint via flavor: — iotcore (ifm IoT-Core POST envelope, default) and rest (plain-REST GET, Balluff/Turck-style). Reads: master identity, bounded ≤32-port sweep, per-port device identity, process-data-in (raw hex + bytes), ISDU acyclic parameter read. NO write tools. Bounded/size-capped HTTP (256 KiB response cap), schema-checked JSON with teaching errors. Reuses the MTConnect HTTP pin (iaiops[iolink] → requests).

• Connection params: master host/URL, flavor, timeout_s. protocol: iolink.

• Validation: in-process mock master in both flavors (tests/test_iolink.py); live master datapoint paths stay 待核实.

HART-IP (process instrumentation — read-only)

• Versions/variants: HART universal commands over HART-IP UDP (default, port 5094) or TCP (transport: tcp, length-delimited framing) via an in-tree transport; the HART command codec is verified vs hart-protocol. Tools: hart_device_identity (cmd 0), hart_primary_variable (cmd 1), hart_dynamic_variables (cmd 3, PV/SV/TV/QV + loop current), hart_burst_sample (bounded sampling of burst-published variables). No write / device-specific commands exposed (OT-dangerous on live instruments).

• Connection params: host (HART-IP server/gateway), port (5094), transport (udp default / tcp).

• Validation: TCP transport loopback-verified (in-process HART-IP server, real long-frame ACK through the real codec path); live gateway behaviour and a true unsolicited burst subscription stay 待核实.

MTConnect (ALL CNC machine tools)

• Versions/variants: agent REST + XML (requests + xml.etree), namespace-agnostic (parses MTConnect 1.x Devices/Streams/Assets schemas). Endpoints: /probe, /current, /sample, /assets. Read-only by specification. XML parsing is hardened (DTD/entity declarations rejected — XXE/billion-laughs defense).

• Connection params: agent_url (e.g. http://host:5000).

• Not supported / planned: MTConnect streaming (long-poll interval=); only bounded count= samples.

MQTT / Sparkplug B / UNS

• Versions/variants: paho-mqtt — MQTT 3.1.1 & 5. Sparkplug B topic convention spBv1.0/{group}/{type}/{edge}/[device] (NBIRTH/DBIRTH/NDATA/DDATA/NDEATH/DDEATH/STATE). TLS + username/password supported.

• Full Sparkplug B decode (no optional extra): payloads are protobuf-decoded with a vendored, byte-for-byte copy of the official Eclipse Tahu sparkplug_b.proto generated module (depends only on protobuf). Per metric you get name, alias (resolved to its name via the BIRTH model), datatype (Int8…Int64/UInt…/Float/Double/Boolean/String/DateTime/Text/UUID/DataSet/Bytes/File/Template/PropertySet…), value, timestamp, and the is_historical / is_null flags. A birth/death + seq model tracks node/device online state (NBIRTH/DBIRTH ↔ NDEATH/DDEATH), builds the alias→name map from BIRTH, applies NDATA/DDATA by alias, and flags seq gaps / out-of-order. Primary-host awareness: STATE/<host_id> topics surface in sparkplug_node_list. sparkplug_decode_payload decodes a single raw payload (base64/hex) offline.

• Connection params: host/broker, port (1883 / 8883 TLS), topic, use_tls, username (password encrypted).

• Command: mqtt_publish = high/MOC/dry-run default; a published command has no automatic inverse.

EtherNet/IP (Rockwell / Allen-Bradley)

• Supported: ControlLogix / CompactLogix (and GuardLogix) via CIP / EtherNet-IP using pycomm3 (pure-Python — no native deps). Tag-based, symbolic access: read/write tags by name (Conveyor.Speed, Array[3], Program:Main.X) and discover the controller's tag list at runtime (eip_list_tags, the headline feature). eip_controller_info reads the controller identity.

• Connection params: host, slot (0 for CompactLogix; the CPU slot for a ControlLogix chassis), port (44818). protocol: ethernetip (alias eip).

• Write: eip_write_tag = high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run default, captures BEFORE value + undo.

• Not supported / planned: PLC-5 / SLC-500 (PCCC) and Micro800 are not supported = roadmap (Logix tag model only).

EtherCAT (pysoem / SOEM fieldbus master)

• Supported: a real EtherCAT master via pysoem (the Python binding for the SOEM C stack). CoE SDO read (ethercat_read_sdo, acyclic mailbox upload) + SDO write (ethercat_write_sdo, download), input PDO read (ethercat_read_pdo, one bounded cyclic snapshot), bus scan / slave enumeration (ethercat_slaves, ethercat_slave_info — identity, SM/FMMU mapping, object-dictionary summary), master/working-counter state (ethercat_master_state), and AL-state transitions INIT↔PREOP↔SAFEOP↔OP (ethercat_set_state).

• HARD REQUIREMENTS (no way around them): Linux, root or CAP_NET_RAW, a dedicated NIC cabled to the bus, and real EtherCAT slave hardware. pysoem is an OPTIONAL extra: pip install iaiops[ethercat] — the base package installs and imports without it, and every EtherCAT tool then degrades to a teaching error (never crashes, never imports pysoem at module load).

• NOT supported: no software simulator exists (unlike OPC-UA / Modbus) — EtherCAT is hardware-only and not testable in mock-only CI; macOS is unsupported. EoE / FoE / SoE mailbox protocols and full PDO-mapping decode/expansion = roadmap.

• Connection params: nic (the dedicated interface name, e.g. eth1; alias interface), optional expected_slaves (a sanity check vs the bus scan). protocol: ethercat.

• Operations matrix:

  Tool	Op	R/W	risk	Capture/notes
  ethercat_master_state	master + WKC state, slave count	R	low	expected vs found
  ethercat_slaves	bus scan / enumerate	R	low	index/vendor/product/rev/addr/AL-state
  ethercat_slave_info	one-slave detail	R	low	SM/FMMU + OD summary
  ethercat_read_sdo	CoE SDO upload	R	low	hex + uint interpretation
  ethercat_read_pdo	input PDO snapshot	R	low	single cycle, never loops
  ethercat_write_sdo	CoE SDO download	W	high/MOC	before-value (SDO read-back) + undo
  ethercat_set_state	AL-state transition	W	high/MOC	before-state + undo; can start/stop motion

• Write/state safety: ethercat_write_sdo (hex little-endian bytes) and ethercat_set_state are high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run by default, capture the BEFORE value/state for undo, and need a CLI double-confirm. Changing EtherCAT state can START or STOP machine motion — treat with extreme care. 未经授权勿对生产控制系统写入.

PROFINET (DCP discovery / identify + gated DCP Set)

• Supported: layer-2 PROFINET-DCP via pnio-dcp — profinet_discover (DCP IdentifyAll: one broadcast surfaces every station on the segment — name-of-station, MAC, IP, vendor/device id, role — closer to passive discovery than a per-device fingerprint), profinet_identify_station (by name-of-station), profinet_station_params (targeted DCP Get by MAC → name + IP suite), and profinet_asset_inventory (a register with IO-controller vs IO-device role decoding).

• Write: profinet_dcp_set re-addresses one station (name-of-station and/or IP suite, by MAC) — high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run default, captures the BEFORE addressing + undo descriptor. Re-addressing a live station can disrupt its IO connection.

• Scope (deliberate): no RT cyclic process data (that needs an IO-controller/IO-device stack and hard real-time — out of scope and unsafe to tap); the blink / factory-reset DCP services stay unexposed.

• HARD REQUIREMENTS: raw-socket access (root / admin / CAP_NET_RAW) on the NIC on the PROFINET subnet. pnio-dcp is an OPTIONAL extra: pip install iaiops[profinet] — the base package installs/imports without it, and every tool then degrades to a teaching error.

• Connection params: host — THIS machine's IP on the PROFINET subnet (the DCP broadcast goes out on it). protocol: profinet.

• Preview caveat: validated against a mocked pnio-dcp DCP — not verified against live PROFINET devices yet.

Energy edition (electrical substation / utility telecontrol) → iaiops-energy

The energy vertical — IEC 60870-5-104 / DNP3 / IEC 61850 MMS read-only monitoring for substation RTUs/IEDs — moved to its own package in 0.8.0: iaiops-energy (pip install iaiops-energy), built on iaiops.core (shared governance / brain / runtime). Its protocol reference, support matrix, and validation status live in that repo.

Building edition (facility / HVAC / 厂务)

The building vertical adds BACnet/IP (ASHRAE 135) — the dominant building-automation protocol for HVAC, lighting, metering, and facility plant. Install with pip install iaiops[building] and expose with IAIOPS_MCP=building (bundle: bacnet + modbus + opcua + iolink).

• BACnet/IP (BAC0 over bacpypes3): bacnet_discover (Who-Is device discovery), bacnet_object_list (a device's objects), bacnet_read_property (one object property), bacnet_read_points (present-value of all analog/binary/multistate points — the HVAC snapshot), bacnet_cov_subscribe (bounded change-of-value capture — capped by count AND wall-clock, always unsubscribes), bacnet_read_trend_log (TrendLog buffered records via one bounded readRange). Config: host = THIS machine's BACnet/IP interface (ip or ip/mask) / port (47808).

• Write: bacnet_write_property (present-value at a BACnet priority 1..16, or relinquish) = high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run default, BEFORE-value read-back + undo. Overriding a live building-control point can move real HVAC/plant.

• Validation: the read path is verified against a real bacpypes3 virtual BACnet/IP device through the actual async BAC0 stack (tests/test_bacnet_live.py); COV / trend-log / writes on live HVAC gear stay 待核实.

Water treatment edition (水处理)

IAIOPS_MCP=water (or iaiops-mcp-water, pip install iaiops[water]) exposes modbus + opcua + hart + the brain — the protocol set waterworks / wastewater plants actually run. Adds water-domain tag semantics (溶解氧 DO / ORP / 余氯 chlorine / 氨氮 ammonia / TSS/MLSS / 跨膜压差 TMP / UV / 加药 dosing / 曝气 aeration) and water-industry Modbus templates (E+H Promag, Hach SC controller, generic dosing pump — all with explicit 待核实 caveats).

信创 / China entry (offline · 国产 TSDB · compliance)

For 自主可控 / 信创 deployments — see docs/CHINA.md for the full guide.

• Air-gapped install: pure-Python core + per-protocol optional extras → install from a local wheelhouse with pip install --no-index --find-links ./wheelhouse "iaiops[...]"; secrets stay local (encrypted store), no cloud KMS.

• National TSDB historian sink (historian_push, CLI iaiops historian push): write collected telemetry to TDengine (iaiops[tdengine]) or Apache IoTDB (iaiops[iotdb]) — domestic, controllable; we don't build our own store or bind InfluxDB. Data egress to the operator's own historian, not a control write.

• Compliance mapping (compliance_mapping, CLI iaiops compliance): an honest 《工控系统网络安全防护指南》 ↔ iaiops self-assessment across 分区隔离 / 可审计 / 双向认证 / 最小权限 / 数据保护 / 自主可控, with per-control status (addressed / partial / 待核实) and the named gap.

• 国产 PLC: 汇川 / 台达 / 信捷 over the existing Modbus-TCP / S7 connectors.

• ⚠️ 待核实: 国产 OS (麒麟/统信) · 芯 (鲲鹏/海光) · PLC validation and the TSDB write paths are documented but not yet hardware-verified — see the validation matrix in docs/CHINA.md.

OEE / downtime analytics (cross-protocol, read-only)

• oee_compute — OEE = Availability × Performance × Quality from production inputs (planned time, run time, ideal cycle, total/good counts). Each factor is reported raw + clamped to [0,1]; a capped performance >1.0 flags an optimistic ideal cycle.

• downtime_events — auto-detects running→stopped transitions in a {timestamp, state} series and produces stoppage events with durations, categorized (changeover / material / mechanical / quality / break / unknown, by keyword heuristics or a {state: category} override).

• oee_multidim — aggregates OEE across machine × part × shift (or any dimensions) from labelled records → the matrix + worst performers.

• Operate over provided/collected inputs (fully testable without a plant). mtconnect_oee_snapshot surfaces the live MTConnect availability/execution inputs that feed these.

Active asset inventory / fingerprint (read-only)

• asset_inventory — for each configured (or named) endpoint, actively connects with our own protocol client and reads its identity call (S7 s7_cpu_info, EtherNet/IP eip_controller_info, OPC-UA server build info, Modbus Device Identification FC43/0x2B, Mitsubishi CPU type, MTConnect device model), aggregating vendor / model / firmware / serial / reachable / last_seen into an asset register.

• Honest scope (IEC 62443-flavored): this is ACTIVE fingerprinting via our client connections, NOT passive SPAN/tap discovery — it only finds devices we are configured to reach and adds light load to each. Passive, traffic-mirroring discovery is roadmap.

OPC-UA Historical Access (HDA)

• opcua_read_history — reads stored historical values for a node over a [start,end] ISO-8601 window via the server's HistoryRead service (asyncua read_raw_history), bounded by max_points (≤2000). Returns {supported:false, note} gracefully when the server does not historize the node (no crash). Read-only.

Change-of-value (CoV) monitor

• monitor_changes — bounded deadband report: polls a point and returns only the value CHANGES (with timestamps), not every sample. Works over OPC-UA / Modbus / S7 / Mitsubishi MC / EtherNet-IP. Never an infinite loop — hard-capped by both duration_s (≤120) and max_changes (≤500). Read-only.

Cross-protocol brain — 0.9/0.10 additions (all read-only)

• Conservative baseline learning (baseline_learn/check/record_change/status, CLI iaiops baseline …) — a change-log baseline, explicitly NOT black-box anomaly detection: robust p1/p99 + median/MAD band over the local history, refuses thin history (<100 samples or <24h) with an explicit insufficient_data verdict, restarts at recorded operator changes, and is **silent by default** — a violation needs >3×MAD beyond the band AND ≥3 consecutive samples, and every violation cites its baseline window and offending samples.

• Historian READ integration (historian_query / historian_coverage, CLI iaiops historian query|coverage) — query history back out of the sqlite/TDengine/IoTDB sinks; an optional per-site historian: config block lets the RCA copilot pull the 2h pre-incident window as one more cited evidence class (strictly additive — without the config, RCA output is byte-identical, test-proven).

• Legacy PLC program explainer (plc_program_outline/xref/section, CLI iaiops program …) — structural extraction over exported program files (Siemens SCL/ST .scl/.st, AWL/STL .awl, Rockwell Studio 5000 .L5X — never a live PLC upload); every element carries source_file + line (rung for L5X) so the explaining agent must cite real locations. XXE-hardened, ≤5 MB, extension allowlist.

• ISA-18.2 alarm flood deep-dive (alarm_flood_analysis / alarm_rationalization_worksheet, CLI iaiops diag alarm-flood|alarm-worksheet) — flood episodes (≥10 alarms/10 min), chattering, stale/standing (>24h), percent-time-in-flood vs target, and a CSV-exportable rationalization worksheet; over injected events or a live OPC-UA active-condition scan.

• Open-format export + metrics bridge — iaiops export csv|sqlite|parquet (from the local SQLite sink; Parquet via iaiops[export]) / MCP export_data; iaiops metrics serve --port 9184 exposes Prometheus /metrics (latest tag values + counters, binds 127.0.0.1 by default) — Grafana recipe in docs/GRAFANA.md.

• Compliance deliverables — iaiops compliance report (等保 2.0 L2/L3 status + IEC 62443 FR1–6 crosswalk + honest gap list, md/html) and iaiops compliance evidence (audit-evidence zip with hash-chain verification + manifest); MCP compliance_report / compliance_evidence_bundle. Onboarding aids, 非认证.

• Agent skills — the repo ships a router skill (skills/iaiops) plus per-edition skills (iaiops-fab / iaiops-factory / iaiops-process / iaiops-building / iaiops-water) that route an agent to the right MCP server and document the tool surface.

Install

Protocol client libraries are optional extras — install only the 1–2 protocols a site actually runs (every protocol library is imported lazily; the base package installs and imports without any of them, and a call to a not-installed protocol returns a teaching error pointing at the right extra):

uv tool install "iaiops[opcua,modbus]"   # just the protocols you need
# or one per site:  pip install "iaiops[s7]"   ·   everything:  pip install "iaiops[all]"
# or a per-industry edition bundle:        pip install "iaiops[fab]"

iaiops init                 # interactive: add endpoints, store passwords encrypted
iaiops doctor               # config + per-protocol connectivity probe (point at simulators)
iaiops protocols            # the capability map

Protocol extras: opcua · modbus · s7 · mc · fins (stdlib — pins nothing) · eip · mtconnect · sparkplug · secsgem · ethercat · profinet · bacnet · hart · iolink · plus tdengine · iotdb (historian sinks) · export (Parquet) · all (every pip-installable connector).

Edition bundles (match the same-named IAIOPS_MCP profiles — install the protocols a vertical runs): fab (secsgem + opcua + s7 + modbus) · factory (the discrete-manufacturing set: opcua + modbus + s7 + mc + fins + eip + mtconnect + sparkplug + ethercat + profinet + iolink) · process (opcua + modbus + hart) · building (bacnet + modbus + opcua + iolink) · water (modbus + opcua + hart) · plcnext (opcua + modbus). The energy bundle ships in iaiops-energy.

Master password

Secrets (per-endpoint passwords, MQTT credentials) are never stored in plaintext — they live in ~/.iaiops/secrets.enc (Fernet + scrypt). Export IAIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD so the MCP server/CLI can unlock non-interactively:

export IAIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD='…'

Example ~/.iaiops/config.yaml (one block per protocol)

endpoints:
  - name: line1
    protocol: opcua
    endpoint_url: opc.tcp://plc.lan:4840
    # username: operator           # password stored encrypted via init/secret set
    tags:
      - { ref: "ns=2;i=5", label: temp, warn_high: 70, alarm_high: 90 }
  - name: plc2
    protocol: modbus
    host: 10.0.0.5
    port: 502
    unit_id: 1
  - name: press1
    protocol: s7
    host: 10.0.0.6
    rack: 0
    slot: 1                        # S7-1200/1500
  - name: cell3
    protocol: mc
    host: 10.0.0.7
    port: 5007
    plctype: iQ-R
  - name: meter1
    protocol: modbus                 # Modbus-RTU (serial): set transport + serial_port
    transport: rtu
    serial_port: /dev/ttyUSB0
    baudrate: 9600
    unit_id: 1
  - name: omron1
    protocol: fins                   # Omron FINS (UDP default; transport: tcp for FINS/TCP)
    host: 10.0.0.11
    port: 9600
  - name: xmtr1
    protocol: hart                   # HART-IP gateway (read-only; udp default / transport: tcp)
    host: 10.0.0.20
  - name: iolm1
    protocol: iolink                 # IO-Link master JSON integration (read-only)
    host: 10.0.0.21
    flavor: iotcore                  # ifm IoT-Core (default) | rest (Balluff/Turck-style)
  - name: vmc1
    protocol: mtconnect
    agent_url: http://10.0.0.8:5000
  - name: uns
    protocol: mqtt
    host: broker.lan
    use_tls: true                  # → port 8883
    topic: spBv1.0/#
    # username: edge1              # password stored encrypted
  - name: cell5
    protocol: ethernetip           # alias: eip
    host: 10.0.0.9
    slot: 0                        # 0 for CompactLogix; CPU slot for ControlLogix
  - name: bus1
    protocol: ethercat             # Linux + root/CAP_NET_RAW + pip install iaiops[ethercat]
    nic: eth1                      # dedicated NIC cabled to the EtherCAT bus
    expected_slaves: 8             # optional sanity check vs the bus scan

iaiops init walkthrough (per protocol)

$ iaiops init
Step 1 — master password: ********
Step 2 — add an endpoint
  Endpoint name (e.g. line1): press1
  Protocol ('opcua','modbus','s7','mc','mtconnect','mqtt') [opcua]: s7
  S7 PLC host (IP/FQDN): 10.0.0.6
  Port [102]: 102
  Rack (0 for S7-1200/1500) [0]: 0
  Slot (1 for S7-1200/1500, 2 for S7-300/400) [1]: 1
✓ Saved endpoint 'press1'.

(MQTT prompts add TLS/topic/username; MTConnect prompts for agent_url; EtherCAT prompts for the nic + expected_slaves and warns about the Linux/root/NIC/optional-extra requirement; OPC-UA/MQTT prompt for a hidden password stored encrypted.)

Test against a simulator (per protocol)

• OPC-UA — an asyncua demo server (the test suite runs a real in-process one).

• Modbus — ModbusPal or a pymodbus server simulator.

• S7 — a pyS7/snap7 S7 server sim (Snap7 server) on :102.

• MTConnect — the public MTConnect demo agent, or a local agent.

• MQTT — a local mosquitto broker (+ a Sparkplug edge for SpB topics).

• Mitsubishi MC — GX Simulator / an MC 3E server sim.

• EtherNet/IP — a pycomm3-compatible CIP/Logix simulator (or a spare CompactLogix).

• Omron FINS — the in-repo mock FINS UDP/TCP responder (tests/test_fins.py) or a spare CP/CJ PLC.

• IO-Link — the in-process mock master (tests/test_iolink.py, both JSON dialects) or any ifm/Balluff/Turck master on the bench.

• EtherCAT — no simulator exists (hard-real-time, raw-Ethernet). Validate only on Linux, as root / with CAP_NET_RAW, on a dedicated NIC wired to real slaves (e.g. a Beckhoff EK1100 coupler + EL terminals). iaiops doctor reports a clear "needs Linux/root/NIC/pysoem" status off the bus rather than failing.

Usage

CLI (read)

iaiops opcua read "ns=2;i=5" -e line1
iaiops modbus holding 0 -e plc2 --count 4 --decode float32
iaiops s7 read-db 1 REAL 4 -e press1 --count 2
iaiops mc words D100 -e cell3 --count 8
iaiops fins words 100 --area DM -e omron1 --count 8   # Omron FINS memory-area read
iaiops hart pv -e xmtr1                            # HART primary variable
iaiops iolink scan -e iolm1                        # IO-Link master + connected devices
iaiops mtconnect oee -e vmc1
iaiops mqtt nodes -e uns --timeout-s 15
iaiops eip tags -e cell5                           # Logix tag discovery
iaiops eip read "Conveyor.Speed" -e cell5
iaiops ethercat slaves -e bus1                     # EtherCAT bus scan (Linux+root)
iaiops ethercat read-sdo 0 4120 --subindex 1 -e bus1   # CoE SDO 0x1018:1
iaiops opcua history "ns=2;i=5" -e line1 --start 2026-06-28T08:00:00Z   # HDA
iaiops opcua monitor "ns=2;i=5" -e line1 --duration-s 20 --deadband 0.5 # CoV
iaiops diag dataflow -e line1 --ref "ns=2;i=5" --freshness-s 30
iaiops analytics oee 28800 25200 2.0 12000 11800   # OEE = A×P×Q
iaiops analytics asset -e press1 -e cell5           # active asset register

CLI (write — dry-run by default, double-confirm on --apply)

iaiops s7 write-db 1 INT 0 42 -e press1            # dry-run preview
iaiops s7 write-db 1 INT 0 42 -e press1 --apply    # double-confirm prompt
iaiops mqtt publish factory/line1/cmd '{"setpoint":50}' -e uns --apply
iaiops eip write-tag Setpoint 42 -e cell5 --apply  # Logix tag write (double-confirm)
iaiops fins write-words 100 42 --area DM -e omron1 --apply  # Omron FINS write (double-confirm)
iaiops ethercat write-sdo 0 24698 e8030000 -e bus1 --apply   # CoE SDO 0x607A download
iaiops ethercat set-state PREOP --slave 0 -e bus1 --apply     # AL-state (can stop motion!)

MCP tool calls (JSON args → sample structured return)

s7_read_db:

{ "db": 1, "dtype": "REAL", "start": 4, "endpoint": "press1", "count": 2 }

{ "endpoint": "press1", "area": "DB", "db": 1, "dtype": "REAL", "start": 4,
  "count": 2, "items": [ {"address": "DB1,REAL4", "value": 20.5},
                         {"address": "DB1,REAL8", "value": 4.2} ] }

s7_write_db (dry-run):

{ "db": 1, "dtype": "INT", "start": 0, "value": 42, "endpoint": "press1" }

{ "address": "DB1,INT0", "dry_run": true, "before": 7, "would_write": 42,
  "note": "Dry run — nothing written. Re-run with dry_run=false AND a recorded approver…" }

mtconnect_oee_snapshot:

{ "availability": "AVAILABLE", "execution": "ACTIVE", "controller_mode": "AUTOMATIC",
  "program": "O1234", "available": true, "running": true, "verdict": "running" }

eip_read_tag:

{ "tag": "Conveyor.Speed", "endpoint": "cell5" }

{ "endpoint": "cell5", "tag": "Conveyor.Speed", "value": 1500.0, "type": "REAL",
  "error": "", "good": true }

eip_write_tag (dry-run):

{ "tag": "Setpoint", "value": 42, "endpoint": "cell5" }

{ "endpoint": "cell5", "tag": "Setpoint", "dry_run": true, "before": 7,
  "would_write": 42, "note": "Dry run — nothing written. Re-run with dry_run=false AND a recorded approver…" }

ethercat_read_sdo (CoE SDO upload):

{ "slave": 0, "index": 4120, "subindex": 1, "endpoint": "bus1" }

{ "endpoint": "bus1", "slave": 0, "index": "0x1018", "subindex": 1,
  "byte_length": 4, "hex": "9a020000", "as_uint": 666 }

ethercat_set_state (dry-run; can start/stop motion):

{ "state": "OP", "slave": 0, "endpoint": "bus1" }

{ "endpoint": "bus1", "scope": "slave[0]", "dry_run": true, "before": "SAFEOP",
  "would_request": "OP", "note": "Dry run — no state change. … Changing EtherCAT state can start/stop machine motion." }

sparkplug_decode_payload (full SpB metric decode):

{ "payload": "CAESBwoDYWJjEAE=", "encoding": "base64" }

{ "encoding": "sparkplug_b", "seq": 0, "metric_count": 2, "historical_count": 0,
  "metrics": [ {"name": "Temperature", "alias": 1, "datatype": "Double", "value": 21.5,
                "is_historical": false, "is_null": false} ] }

oee_compute:

{ "planned_time_s": 28800, "run_time_s": 25200, "ideal_cycle_time_s": 2.0,
  "total_count": 12000, "good_count": 11800 }

{ "availability": {"raw": 0.875, "value": 0.875, "capped": false},
  "performance": {"value": 0.952381}, "quality": {"value": 0.983333},
  "oee": 0.819444, "oee_pct": 81.94 }

asset_inventory (active fingerprint):

{ "endpoints": ["press1", "cell5"] }

{ "asset_count": 2, "reachable_count": 2, "method": "active_fingerprint",
  "assets": [ {"endpoint": "press1", "protocol": "s7", "vendor": "Siemens/compatible",
               "model": "CPU 1511-1 PN", "firmware": "2.8", "reachable": true,
               "last_seen": "2026-06-28T10:00:00+00:00"} ] }

Diagnostics (multi-dimensional JSON for an agent to visualize)

diagnose_dataflow(endpoint="line1", ref="ns=2;i=5", freshness_threshold_s=30):

{ "verdict": "comms_ok_value_stale",
  "diagnosis": "Connected with good status, but the value is STALE (age 412s > 30s) — the source/field upstream has stopped updating this point.",
  "recommended_action": "Trace upstream: the device serves the last value fine, so suspect the source/scanner/field signal that should refresh it.",
  "hops": [ {"hop":"connect","protocol":"opcua","ok":true,"detail":"OPC-UA state=0"},
            {"hop":"read_tag","ref":"ns=2;i=5","ok":true,"detail":"5.0"},
            {"hop":"freshness","evaluated":true,"stale":true,"age_seconds":412.0} ] }

alarm_bad_actors(events=[…]):

{ "event_count": 55, "window_minutes": 0.82, "alarms_per_hour": 4024.4,
  "isa_18_2": {"ok_max":6,"manageable_max":12,"flood_min":30},
  "flood_verdict": "flood",
  "priority_distribution": {"high":50,"low":5},
  "pareto_sources_for_80pct": ["FIC101"],
  "top_offenders": [ {"source":"FIC101","count":50,"share_pct":90.9,"chattering":true,"standing":false} ],
  "chattering": ["FIC101"], "standing": [] }

tag_health(tags=[…]):

{ "evaluated": 4, "overall": "alarm", "offender_count": 3,
  "offenders": [ {"ref":"hot","latest":99,"flags":["out_of_range_alarm"],"severity":3},
                 {"ref":"flat","latest":5,"flags":["flatline"],"severity":2},
                 {"ref":"bad","latest":null,"flags":["bad_quality"],"severity":3} ] }

AI downtime root-cause copilot (flagship)

downtime_root_cause correlates whatever evidence you can hand over — alarm events, tag samples, a diagnose_dataflow verdict, a machine-state series — around an incident window and returns an evidence-cited, advisory verdict. Read-first: it proposes a human-approved, MOC-gated, undoable action and executes nothing. Anti-hallucination by design — it cites only signals actually present in the input, weights them by temporal proximity to onset (a cause precedes its effect), and downgrades to insufficient_evidence (with a recommended_next_data list) rather than guessing when evidence is thin.

downtime_root_cause(window={"start":"2026-06-28T10:00:00Z","asset":"line1"}, alarms=[{"source":"M1_DRIVE","timestamp":"2026-06-28T09:59:52Z","message":"motor overload trip"}], tags=[{"ref":"DRV1.Torque","samples":[10,11,99,99],"alarm_high":80}], dataflow={"verdict":"healthy"}):

{ "window": {"start":"2026-06-28 10:00:00+00:00","asset":"line1","duration_s":300.0},
  "verdict": "root_cause_identified",
  "primary_cause": {
    "cause": "mechanical_fault", "confidence": 0.722, "confidence_band": "high",
    "evidence": [
      {"signal":"alarm","ref":"M1_DRIVE","at":"2026-06-28 09:59:52+00:00","lead_time_s":8.0,
       "detail":"motor overload trip","weight":0.4959},
      {"signal":"tag","ref":"DRV1.Torque","detail":"flags=out_of_range_alarm severity=3","weight":0.45} ],
    "recommended_action": "Dispatch maintenance to inspect the faulting unit; if a latch/interlock is set, the reversible step is to clear the fault and reset the latch (MOC-approved, undo captures the prior latch state)." },
  "evidence_summary": {"alarms_supplied":1,"tags_supplied":1,"dataflow_verdict":"healthy","total_evidence_items":2},
  "anti_hallucination": "Advisory only — nothing is executed. Every cited signal is present in the supplied evidence …" }

The same copilot is on the CLI: iaiops diag rca --input bundle.json where the bundle is {window, alarms?, tags?, dataflow?, state_series?}.

Let it gather its own evidence. downtime_root_cause_live (CLI iaiops diag rca-live) takes just an endpoint + window + the refs to look at, then pulls the evidence itself — a cross-protocol diagnose_dataflow probe, a short sampled series per ref (so flatline / bad-quality / anomaly surface via tag_health), and active OPC-UA conditions — before running the same advisory, read-only copilot. The gathered bundle is echoed back under collected_evidence (no hidden inputs):

iaiops diag rca-live -e line1 --start 2026-06-28T10:00:00Z \
  --asset line1 --ref "ns=2;i=5" --ref "ns=2;i=6"

Data-quality watchdog & UNS governance (read-only intelligence)

Two more pure-analysis layers — fully testable without live gear, and they feed the RCA copilot.

• data_quality_scorecard (CLI iaiops diag dataquality) — a fleet data-TRUST rollup: scores each tag 0-100 on whether its data can be believed — staleness, dead heartbeat (first-class), bad-quality, flatline, gaps, anomaly — then rolls up per endpoint and across the fleet with an issue breakdown and ranked worst offenders. Distinct from process health: it asks "can I trust this number," not "is this number alarming." heartbeat_health (CLI iaiops diag heartbeat) is the standalone watchdog-liveness check (a flatlined heartbeat = dead upstream even when comms look fine).

• uns_topic_audit (CLI iaiops mqtt uns-audit) — governs a UNS topic tree: naming conformance (allowed roots / min depth) + topic sprawl (casing collisions of the same logical name, leaf metrics scattered under many parents, depth outliers, duplicates) → a clean/minor/sprawling verdict. uns_schema_drift (CLI iaiops mqtt uns-drift) — compares two Sparkplug NBIRTH-style snapshots and classifies the change none / additive / breaking (a metric removed or its datatype changed). Positions the UNS as a governable neutral data source, not just a broker.

MCP server

IAIOPS_MCP=opcua iaiops-mcp   # stdio transport (`iaiops mcp` is equivalent)

Menu — expose only the protocols a site runs. A fab usually runs 1–2 protocols; exposing all 14 floods the model with tools it can't use. Set IAIOPS_MCP to a comma-list of protocols and/or a named profile. There is no default (since 0.10.0): a bare iaiops-mcp prints the selection menu (profiles, protocol keys, tool counts) to stderr and exits 2 instead of silently exposing 100+ tools. The cross-protocol brain (OEE / downtime / diagnostics / asset / analysis) is included by default with every selection.

IAIOPS_MCP=menu         iaiops-mcp   # print the menu (selections + tool counts)
IAIOPS_MCP=opcua,modbus iaiops-mcp   # two protocols + brain
IAIOPS_MCP=fab          iaiops-mcp   # named profile (secsgem+opcua+s7+modbus)
IAIOPS_MCP=opcua        iaiops-mcp   # effectively a single-protocol MCP
IAIOPS_MCP=all          iaiops-mcp   # everything — explicit opt-in only
                                     # (logs a tool-flood warning above 60 tools)

Named entry-point sugar. For the common single-protocol / single-edition case there is a pre-scoped console script per protocol and per named profile — no env var to set. Each is a thin shim over the same server:

iaiops-mcp-opcua     # == IAIOPS_MCP=opcua    iaiops-mcp
iaiops-mcp-modbus    # == IAIOPS_MCP=modbus   iaiops-mcp
iaiops-mcp-fab       # == IAIOPS_MCP=fab      iaiops-mcp  (per-edition)
iaiops-mcp-building  # == IAIOPS_MCP=building iaiops-mcp
iaiops-mcp-brain     # == IAIOPS_MCP=brain    iaiops-mcp  (brain only, 0 protocols)

Multi-process sites — 1 brain MCP + N protocol MCPs. Running several protocol servers side by side (e.g. iaiops-mcp-opcua + iaiops-mcp-modbus) would duplicate the ~30 brain tools in every server. Instead run one dedicated iaiops-mcp-brain and set IAIOPS_MCP_NO_BRAIN=1 on the protocol servers to strip the brain from them — the protocols_supported discovery tool stays exposed everywhere:

iaiops-mcp-brain                          # the one cross-protocol brain server
IAIOPS_MCP_NO_BRAIN=1 iaiops-mcp-opcua    # lean protocol server, no brain
IAIOPS_MCP_NO_BRAIN=1 iaiops-mcp-modbus

Named profiles: all · brain · fab · factory · process · building · water · plcnext. In an MCP client (e.g. Claude Desktop) set IAIOPS_MCP per server entry — or point the entry straight at the matching iaiops-mcp-<name> script — one entry per site/line, each a lean single- or dual-protocol server.

Safety & governance

• Read-first. 123 of 132 tools are read-only. The 9 write/command tools (s7_write_db, mc_write_words, fins_write_words, mqtt_publish, eip_write_tag, ethercat_write_sdo, ethercat_set_state, profinet_dcp_set, bacnet_write_property) are OT-dangerous: governed at high risk_tier, off by default (dry-run), capture the BEFORE value/state for undo, require a double-confirm in the CLI, and a recorded approver (one-shot iaiops approve tokens; with no risk_tiers configured, high/critical operations default to the dual tier) — MOC discipline. ethercat_set_state can START or STOP machine motion. 未经授权勿对生产控制系统写入.

• Do not point this at a production control system without authorization. OT networks are safety-critical; even reads add load. Test against a simulator first.

• All endpoint-returned text is sanitized (prompt-injection defense); secrets are never returned by any tool; MTConnect XML is parsed with DTD/entity declarations refused.

• Every tool runs through the vendored governance harness: SQLite audit (~/.iaiops/audit.db, SHA-256 hash-chained rows + iaiops audit verify; audit fails closed for high/critical writes), token/call budget + runaway breaker, risk-tier gate (policy engine fails closed on a broken rules.yaml), undo recording. The MCP server refuses to start if any registered tool lacks the governance marker.

Roadmap

• EtherNet/IP PLC-5 / SLC-500 (PCCC) and Micro800 support (Logix tags are done in 0.2.0).

• Passive asset discovery (SPAN/tap, no connections) alongside today's active fingerprint.

• EtherCAT EoE / FoE / SoE mailbox protocols and full PDO-mapping decode (CoE SDO/PDO read+write and AL-state landed in 0.3.0 via the optional pysoem extra).

• OPC-UA certificate security + real Alarms & Conditions subscriptions.

• MTConnect streaming long-poll; Sparkplug B DataSet/Template deep expansion.

Missing a protocol, device, or feature? 缺功能提 issue/PR 欢迎留言 — open a GitHub issue or PR.

License

MIT © wei