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gokulapap

BugBounty MCP Server

by gokulapap

Discover common web paths

web_directory_scan
Read-onlyIdempotent

Probe a bounded path list on an authorized web origin to discover directories and files for security assessments.

Instructions

Probe a bounded path list on one authorized web origin.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
urlYes
pathsNo

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultsYes
requestsYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv2.2.0

TDQS

B3/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly, idempotent, openWorld, and non-destructive, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds two useful behavioral facts beyond them: that only a single origin is touched and that the probe set is bounded, plus an authorization precondition. It still omits rate/volume behavior, concurrency, and what a probe result looks like.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single front-loaded sentence with no filler. It is efficient, though arguably so terse that it stops short of carrying the load the 0%-coverage schema demands.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need no explanation, and annotations cover the safety posture. Still missing for an open-world network scanner are the when-to-use decision, the semantics of the optional path list and its default, and any notion of scope or volume limits.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description carries the full burden for both parameters. It only loosely maps "path list" to `paths` and "web origin" to `url`, adding no format guidance (e.g. leading slash, absolute vs relative), and says nothing about what happens when the optional `paths` argument is omitted.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ("Probe") and resource ("path list on one authorized web origin"), and the scope caveat "authorized" is meaningful for a scanner. It does not, however, differentiate itself from nearby siblings such as web_crawler, sensitive_file_exposure_scan, or gau_url_discovery, so the agent must still infer the boundary.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No when-to-use, when-not-to-use, or alternative is given. The only implicit guidance is the word "authorized," which hints at a prerequisite but does not tell the agent how to choose this tool over the many other web-discovery siblings.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.