BugBounty MCP Server
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| GITHUB_TOKEN | No | GitHub token for repository search | |
| CENSYS_API_ID | No | Censys API ID for certificate/host search | |
| SHODAN_API_KEY | No | Shodan API key for device discovery | |
| CENSYS_API_SECRET | No | Censys API secret | |
| HUNTER_IO_API_KEY | No | Hunter.io API for email discovery | |
| BINARYEDGE_API_KEY | No | BinaryEdge API for internet scanning | |
| VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY | No | VirusTotal API key for threat intelligence | |
| SECURITYTRAILS_API_KEY | No | SecurityTrails API for DNS history |
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {
"listChanged": false
} |
| prompts | {
"listChanged": false
} |
| resources | {
"subscribe": false,
"listChanged": false
} |
| completions | {} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| scope_checkB | Validate and explain whether a target is authorized; performs no network request. |
| batch_scope_checkC | Canonicalize and evaluate up to 100 targets without network activity. |
| domain_variation_generatorA | Generate a bounded typo-oriented candidate list for one authorized domain without resolving or contacting any candidate. |
| url_parameter_analysisA | Classify security-relevant query parameters locally while hashing, rather than returning, their values. |
| secret_pattern_analysisA | Inspect supplied text locally for common credential formats and return only redacted fingerprints and locations. |
| cloud_asset_reference_analysisA | Extract AWS S3, Google Cloud Storage, Azure Blob, and Firebase references from supplied text without accessing them. |
| cvss_v31_calculatorA | Validate a CVSS v3.1 base vector and calculate its score, rating, impact, and exploitability locally. |
| openapi_security_analysisA | Analyze supplied JSON or alias-free YAML for operations, authentication coverage, deprecated endpoints, and security signals. |
| dns_enumerationB | Resolve selected DNS record types for one authorized domain. |
| dnssec_posture_analysisA | Inspect DNSKEY, DS, and RRSIG publication for an authorized domain without claiming full resolver validation. |
| wildcard_dns_analysisA | Resolve up to five random, authorized labels beneath a domain to identify wildcard DNS behavior. |
| dangling_dns_analysisA | Inspect CNAME targets and report unresolved aliases as takeover indicators requiring manual verification. |
| email_security_analysisA | Inspect MX, SPF, DMARC, MTA-STS, and SMTP TLS reporting records for an authorized domain. |
| subdomain_enumerationB | Query certificate-transparency logs and optionally resolve a bounded candidate list. |
| http_probeA | Fetch one authorized URL with bounded redirects/body size and return metadata, not body data. |
| batch_http_probeA | Fetch metadata for up to 20 authorized HTTP(S) URLs with bounded concurrency and per-target errors. |
| headers_analysisB | Analyze security and disclosure headers on one authorized HTTP endpoint. |
| csp_analysisA | Fetch an authorized endpoint and assess CSP directives for unsafe, missing, duplicate, and deprecated controls. |
| robots_txt_analysisA | Fetch and summarize the RFC 9309 robots.txt file for an authorized origin without crawling disclosed paths. |
| sitemap_analysisB | Fetch a same-origin sitemap, inventory bounded URLs, and distinguish authorized from external entries. |
| technology_fingerprintB | Fingerprint likely frameworks, platforms, servers, and generators using bounded response evidence. |
| web_metadata_discoveryC | Probe a bounded set of standardized and conventional metadata paths on an authorized origin. |
| javascript_endpoint_discoveryA | Inspect one authorized page or script plus a bounded set of same-scope scripts for literal URL and path references. |
| source_map_discoveryA | Inspect a bounded set of authorized JavaScript files for sourceMappingURL references and check map availability without returning map contents. |
| oauth_oidc_discoveryA | Probe conventional same-origin discovery documents and summarize endpoints, grants, response types, and PKCE support. |
| graphql_endpoint_discoveryA | Send bounded read-only __typename probes to conventional or supplied same-origin paths; optional introspection checks remain read-only. |
| sensitive_file_exposure_scanB | Issue HEAD requests for a small curated set of high-risk paths and report candidates without reading their contents. |
| cache_policy_analysisA | Assess Cache-Control, Vary, validators, CDN signals, and sensitive-path caching on one authorized response. |
| sri_analysisB | Inventory external script and stylesheet resources and measure Subresource Integrity coverage. |
| favicon_fingerprintA | Fetch a discovered or conventional same-scope favicon and return stable hashes and metadata, never image bytes. |
| http_method_analysisA | Send one OPTIONS request and assess advertised methods without attempting state-changing methods. |
| cors_scanC | Send bounded cross-origin probes and identify permissive CORS responses. |
| cookie_security_analysisA | Inspect Set-Cookie attributes without sending authentication material. |
| security_txt_analysisB | Discover and validate RFC 9116 security.txt metadata on an authorized origin. |
| openapi_discoveryB | Probe a bounded list of conventional paths and summarize OpenAPI/Swagger documents without returning their full contents. |
| ssl_scanB | Inspect certificate identity, validity, protocol, cipher, and trust for an authorized host. |
| tls_configuration_analysisB | Test TLS 1.0 through 1.3 support against scope-pinned addresses and identify obsolete protocols. |
| port_scanB | Perform a bounded TCP connect scan against one authorized host. |
| web_crawlerB | Crawl a bounded number of same-host HTML pages and inventory links and forms. |
| web_directory_scanB | Probe a bounded path list on one authorized web origin. |
| jwt_security_testA | Decode JWT metadata locally and flag unsafe algorithms or claim timing; does not verify a signature. |
| nuclei_scanB | Run the locally installed Nuclei scanner against one authorized target when explicitly enabled. |
| subfinder_discoveryB | Run the explicitly enabled Subfinder binary for one authorized domain and retain only in-scope subdomains. |
| amass_passive_discoveryB | Run the explicitly enabled Amass passive enumeration mode and retain only in-scope subdomains. |
| assetfinder_discoveryB | Run the explicitly enabled Assetfinder binary and retain only in-scope subdomains. |
| gau_url_discoveryB | Run the explicitly enabled gau archive discovery binary and retain only authorized HTTP(S) URLs. |
| create_findingC | Persist a structured security finding in the local finding store. |
| add_finding_evidenceC | Store a private, hashed text evidence artifact and link it to a finding. |
| list_findingsB | List locally persisted findings with optional filters. |
| update_findingB | Update status, remediation, and audit history for a local finding. |
| generate_vulnerability_reportB | Export current findings as JSON, Markdown, escaped HTML, or SARIF 2.1.0. |
| assessment_summaryA | Summarize finding severity/status, targets, scope readiness, and runtime metrics. |
| server_healthA | Report safe configuration and optional dependency status without exposing secrets. |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| assessment-plan | Build a low-impact plan from scope and program constraints. |
| passive-recon | Sequence the server's passive and bounded tools safely. |
| finding-triage | Assess evidence, confidence, impact, duplication, and severity. |
| disclosure-draft | Turn one stored finding into a concise program-ready report. |
| remediation-validation | Create a minimal, non-destructive retest plan for one finding. |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| getting-started | Bundled operational guidance for authorized security testing. |
| methodology | Bundled operational guidance for authorized security testing. |
| finding-quality | Bundled operational guidance for authorized security testing. |
| evidence-handling | Bundled operational guidance for authorized security testing. |
| scope-safety | Bundled operational guidance for authorized security testing. |
| web-assessment | Bundled operational guidance for authorized security testing. |
| api-assessment | Bundled operational guidance for authorized security testing. |
| dns-asset-discovery | Bundled operational guidance for authorized security testing. |
| external-integrations | Bundled operational guidance for authorized security testing. |
| tool-catalog | Exact MCP tool definitions and JSON Schemas. |
| config-schema | Validated server configuration structure; contains no values. |
| assessment-state | Safe scope readiness, finding summary, and runtime metrics. |
| findings | Finding records and evidence metadata, without evidence bodies. |
TDQS
Scored across 53 tools
Most tools target a clearly distinct security check, and descriptions carefully separate actions like http_probe vs batch_http_probe or csp_analysis vs headers_analysis. However, several clusters overlap in purpose—subdomain_enumeration/subfinder/amass/assetfinder all discover subdomains, while web_directory_scan/sensitive_file_exposure_scan/web_metadata_discovery/openapi_discovery all probe paths—so some misselection is possible.
All tools use snake_case with descriptive, domain-specific names, and CRUD tools follow a verb_noun pattern. Suffix conventions vary (_analysis, _scan, _discovery, _enumeration, _probe), but there is no casing or style mixing, so names remain predictable.
53 tools far exceeds the practical 3–15 range and clearly passes the 50+ extreme threshold. While many tools are individually distinct security checks, the sheer number burdens tool selection and increases overlap in an agent-facing MCP server.
The surface covers scope validation, broad reconnaissance (DNS, subdomains, ports, web paths), specialized analyses, external scanners, and a finding/reporting lifecycle. Minor gaps include no delete_finding and no manual HTTP request, fuzzing, or exploitation tool, but core bug-bounty workflows are well supported.