dnssec_posture_analysisInspect DNSKEY, DS, and RRSIG records for an authorized domain to assess DNSSEC publication and identify configuration gaps without full resolver validation.
Inspect DNSKEY, DS, and RRSIG publication for an authorized domain without claiming full resolver validation.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | Yes |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | Yes | ||
| signed | Yes | ||
| records | Yes |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
v2.2.0Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already cover the safety profile (read-only, idempotent, non-destructive, open-world), so the description earns credit for the one thing they cannot express: the explicit limitation that it does not perform full resolver validation, which prevents the agent over-claiming a validating-resolver result. It still omits anything about rate limits, resolver selection, or failure modes on unsigned zones.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
One sentence, front-loaded with the action and the inspected record types, ending with the scope caveat. Every clause carries information and nothing is padded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With a rich annotation set and an output schema, the description only needs to define scope and limits, which it largely does; the 'no full resolver validation' caveat closes the biggest risk of misinterpretation. The remaining gap is the missing prerequisite/routing to scope_check for the 'authorized domain' claim.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% for the single 'domain' parameter, so the description must carry the meaning; 'for an authorized domain' implies an authorization/scope prerequisite that the bare string schema does not convey. That is useful but thin, and no format, zone-apex, or subdomain expectations are given.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (inspect) and the exact record types examined (DNSKEY, DS, RRSIG), which is far more precise than the generic 'DNSSEC posture' title and cleanly separates it from dns_enumeration or email_security_analysis. It does not name a sibling tool or explicitly contrast scope, so it stops short of a 5.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no statement of when to run this versus alternatives (ssl_scan, email_security_analysis, dns_enumeration), nor any when-not condition. The only usage signal is the implicit 'authorized domain' prerequisite, which hints at a scope check but never tells the agent to perform one.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.