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echelongraph

EchelonGraph MCP Server

Official
by echelongraph

search_cves

Search and filter CVEs from NVD, MITRE, CISA KEV, EPSS, and GitHub GHSA feeds by severity, minimum CVSS, or keyword, and sort results by score, published date, or exploit likelihood.

Instructions

Search/list CVEs from EchelonGraph's CVE feed (NVD + MITRE-CNA pre-NVD + CISA-KEV + EPSS + GitHub GHSA, each polled on a schedule). Filter by severity, minimum CVSS, free text, and sort. Returns CVEs with the EchelonGraph multi-source score, severity, CVSS, EPSS, and KEV status.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
sortNosort order (default: published)
limitNopage size (default 20, max 50)
searchNofree-text search (product, vendor, or keyword, e.g. 'tomcat')
min_cvssNominimum CVSS score
severityNofilter to one severity

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv1.0.3

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden, and it does meaningful work: it discloses data provenance (five sources), that each is polled on a schedule (freshness implication), and the shape of the returned records (score, severity, CVSS, EPSS, KEV). It omits pagination behavior, result caps, and any auth/rate-limit notes, which is what keeps it from a 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, zero waste, and front-loaded: identity and source scope first, filtering and return fields second. Every clause earns its place by adding information an agent can act on.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, and the description compensates by naming the fields returned (EchelonGraph score, severity, CVSS, EPSS, KEV status), which is exactly what an agent needs. The remaining gap is operational detail — pagination beyond the schema's limit, default sort confirmation, and behavior on empty results.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so every parameter (sort, limit, search, min_cvss, severity) is already fully documented in the schema. The description restates the filter categories generically without adding syntax, defaults, or format detail beyond what the schema provides. Baseline 3 is appropriate when the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource — 'Search/list CVEs from EchelonGraph's CVE feed' — and even names the upstream sources (NVD, MITRE-CNA, CISA-KEV, EPSS, GHSA). An agent immediately knows this is the multi-source CVE search endpoint. It does not, however, differentiate itself from siblings like get_cve or cve_summary, so it falls short of a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implies usage by enumerating available filters (severity, min CVSS, free text, sort), which tells an agent this is the browse/filter tool. But it never states when to prefer it over get_cve (single lookup) or cve_summary (aggregate view), so routing guidance must be inferred from the names alone.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.