cve_exposure

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so richly: it discloses the data source (Shodan), the 12h refresh cadence and credit limits, the 21-day staleness drop, the crucial caveat that last_seen is port-liveness rather than vulnerability confirmation, that counts are banner-version inferences over a sample rather than exploit tests or a census, and that it is aggregate, host-redacted, free and keyless.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core purpose is front-loaded in the first clause, which is good, but the single dense paragraph runs long and includes material of questionable necessity (the Shodan copyright/ownership aside) alongside genuinely valuable caveats. Each caveat earns its place; the legal aside and some redundancy do not.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, so the description must describe the return shape, and it does: exposed_hosts count with the double-counting rule, country/product breakdown, and a ransomware flag. Combined with the scope and methodology caveats, an agent has everything needed to interpret the result correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The single cve_id parameter is fully documented in the schema (100% coverage), so the schema does the heavy lifting. The description adds meaning about which CVE values are actually assessed (tracked set vs NOT ASSESSED), but no syntax or format detail beyond the schema's own example.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource: 'internet-exposure footprint for one CVE', and immediately defines the unit (distinct ip:port, exposed_hosts) and the scoping to a single CVE, which cleanly separates it from aggregate siblings like exposure_radar and lookup siblings like get_cve. An agent knows exactly what this returns without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear context for when the tool is informative versus not: it only assesses a tracked set of CVEs, and for anything outside that set the result says NOT ASSESSED and its 0 is not a measurement. It does not, however, explicitly route the agent to a named alternative (e.g., exposure_radar or cve_summary) for cases where a per-CVE view is the wrong choice.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.