OpenWorkProof
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| OWP_TEAM_TOKEN | No | Shared secret for AgentTeams network authentication | |
| OWP_TEAM_TIMEOUT | No | Timeout in seconds for AgentTeams network operations, e.g. 5.0 | |
| OWP_TEAM_ENDPOINT | No | Endpoint for AgentTeams network connection, e.g. 127.0.0.1:18742 |
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {
"listChanged": false
} |
| prompts | {
"listChanged": false
} |
| resources | {
"subscribe": false,
"listChanged": false
} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| owp_soc_sample_alertsA | Return synthetic Slips JSONL and scope for the reference SOC workflow. No host scanning, external connections or real remediation is performed. This does not activate Guard or protect other MCP tool calls. |
| owp_soc_analyze_slipsA | Review supplied Slips JSONL locally and return cases plus a signed evidence bundle. Accepts up to 128 KiB, 500 lines and 50 source windows. Uses a synthetic-trained model, a deterministic investigation stub and in-memory simulated actions. Does not control real hosts, push to AiSOC or upload telemetry. Returned keys and checkpoints are self-supplied evidence, not an independent trust anchor. |
| owp_soc_verify_bundleA | Verify a reference SOC bundle using separately acquired expected trust pins. Inputs are JSON strings, each at most 8 MiB. Omitted external keys or checkpoint pins yield UNKNOWN, not trusted acceptance. Copying pins from the same bundle only tests consistency; caller-supplied pins do not prove organizational independence. A FAILED/UNKNOWN status is not acceptance. No filesystem writes. |
| owp_generate_keypairA | Generate an Ed25519 signing key pair; this tool takes no input parameters. Returns the private key as a hex string and the public key as
base64url, along with the derived |
| owp_compute_key_idA | Compute the OpenWorkProof Args: public_key_b64url: The raw public key bytes encoded as unpadded base64url (43 characters). |
| owp_sign_payloadA | Sign a canonical OpenWorkProof payload with an Ed25519 private key. Args:
object_type: One of the allowed signed domains (call
Returns:
The signed payload dict with |
| owp_verify_signatureA | Verify an Ed25519 signature on a signed OpenWorkProof payload. Args:
object_type: The canonical domain of the object.
signed_payload: JSON string of the signed payload (must
contain Returns:
|
| owp_compute_digestA | Compute the canonical SHA-256 digest of an OpenWorkProof payload. The digest is computed over the RFC 8785 JCS canonicalisation of
Args: object_type: One of the allowed canonical domains. payload: JSON string of the payload object. |
| owp_verify_work_orderA | Verify a WorkOrder's identity bindings and maintainer signature. Args: work_order_json: JSON string of the WorkOrder object. Returns:
|
| owp_verify_nested_claimA | Verify a nested claim (AgentRequest or HumanDecision) against a WorkOrder. This checks that:
Args: claim_json: JSON string of the AgentRequest or HumanDecision. work_order_json: JSON string of the parent WorkOrder. Returns:
|
| owp_list_domainsA | List canonical OpenWorkProof domains; this tool takes no input parameters. Returns:
A dict with |
| owp_validate_profileC | Validate a signed Evidence Lifecycle v0.2, v0.3, or v0.5 profile. |
| owp_integrity_observation_validateA | Assess one v0.5 population observation set against its contracts. This read-only tool never signs, commits, accepts, or settles anything.
Signer authority is reported as |
| owp_control_observation_validateA | Assess one v0.5 control observation set against its contracts. This read-only tool never signs, commits, accepts, or settles anything.
Signer authority is reported as |
| owp_scope_validateA | Intrinsically validate a v0.3 scope without checking authority. This read-only tool does not accept a ledger, private key, or signature instruction. Full Manager authority is checked only by the non-MCP commit boundary. |
| owp_scope_compareB | Compare a signed v0.3 scope with one verifier observation. |
| owp_statusA | Replay an OpenWorkProof ledger and return its authoritative state. Args: ledger: Path to the SQLite ledger file. |
| owp_run_testsB | Run tests, write an execution receipt to the ledger, and save test evidence files. The ledger coordinator checks the signed request before execution. The configured executor writes execution artifacts under the runtime and evidence roots supplied in the payload. Args:
ledger: SQLite ledger file that receives the execution receipt.
payload: JSON string of the run-tests execution payload (must
include the signed |
| owp_repo_readB | Forward a repo-read execution to the ledger coordinator. Args: ledger: Path to the SQLite ledger file. payload: JSON string of the repo-read execution payload. |
| owp_run_verificationA | Write verification results or signed decisions to the ledger, or prepare a draft.
|
| owp_get_decisionB | Prepare, but do not sign or commit, a versioned decision draft. |
| owp_build_delivery_packageC | Export a public, diagnostic, or customer-private delivery package. |
| owp_verify_surface_bundleB | Verify and replay one surface bundle without writing or signing. |
| owp_render_surface_reportC | Return the verified derived report, never payment or acceptance. |
| owp_get_settlement_readinessB | Derive readiness only; this does not prove payment or settlement. |
| owp_get_schemaA | Get the authoritative JSON Schema for an OpenWorkProof object type. Args:
object_type: One of |
| owp_get_schema_digestA | Get the frozen SHA-256 digest of an authoritative JSON Schema. This digest is a protocol-review anchor: changing it requires an explicit version-bump decision. Args:
object_type: One of the five schema-bearing object types.
version: Schema version (default |
| owp_analyze_repoA | Analyse a repository's structure: file count, languages, dependencies. Args:
source: Local path or remote Git URL to the repository.
clone_enabled: If Returns: Repository analysis including file entries, language stats, line counts, and dependency information. |
| owp_validate_judgment_commitmentA | Validate one signed JudgmentCommitment (read-only, no authority). Without a ledger or trusted key context the authority is reported as
|
| owp_validate_action_binding_manifestB | Validate one signed ActionBindingManifest (read-only, no authority). |
| owp_get_binding_statusC | Read the current binding decision head from a ledger (read-only). |
| owp_explain_binding_decisionB | Verify and explain one BindingDecision (read-only). |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 32 tools
Most tools are distinguishable by object type plus action (sign vs. verify vs. validate a given artifact), but several boundaries blur: `owp_get_decision` overlaps with `owp_run_verification`'s prepare_decision mode, and `owp_validate_profile` sits awkwardly beside the scope/observation validators. The verification family (`verify_signature`, `verify_work_order`, `verify_nested_claim`, `verify_surface_bundle`, `soc_verify_bundle`) is large and requires careful description reading to pick correctly.
Nearly all names use an `owp_` prefix with consistent snake_case verb_noun structure (validate_profile, verify_signature, compute_digest, get_schema). Minor deviations exist: `owp_status` and `owp_repo_read` are noun-first, and the SOC tools insert a namespace segment (`owp_soc_*`), but the pattern remains readable and predictable.
At 32 tools this is well past the range where an agent can hold the surface in mind, and the breadth comes partly from many narrow, near-duplicate read-only validators (profile, scope, integrity observation, control observation, judgment commitment, action binding manifest). The protocol is genuinely broad, but the set could be consolidated considerably.
The surface covers signing primitives, key management, canonical digests, schema retrieval, ledger replay/status, decision drafting and commit, delivery packaging, settlement readiness, plus a full SOC and repo-analysis workflow. Gaps remain on the authoring side: WorkOrders, capability grants, and acceptance receipts can be verified or schema-fetched but have no dedicated creation/commit tool, forcing reliance on generic `sign_payload`.