OpenWorkProof
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TDQS
Scored across 32 tools
Most tools are distinguishable by object type plus action (sign vs. verify vs. validate a given artifact), but several boundaries blur: `owp_get_decision` overlaps with `owp_run_verification`'s prepare_decision mode, and `owp_validate_profile` sits awkwardly beside the scope/observation validators. The verification family (`verify_signature`, `verify_work_order`, `verify_nested_claim`, `verify_surface_bundle`, `soc_verify_bundle`) is large and requires careful description reading to pick correctly.
Nearly all names use an `owp_` prefix with consistent snake_case verb_noun structure (validate_profile, verify_signature, compute_digest, get_schema). Minor deviations exist: `owp_status` and `owp_repo_read` are noun-first, and the SOC tools insert a namespace segment (`owp_soc_*`), but the pattern remains readable and predictable.
At 32 tools this is well past the range where an agent can hold the surface in mind, and the breadth comes partly from many narrow, near-duplicate read-only validators (profile, scope, integrity observation, control observation, judgment commitment, action binding manifest). The protocol is genuinely broad, but the set could be consolidated considerably.
The surface covers signing primitives, key management, canonical digests, schema retrieval, ledger replay/status, decision drafting and commit, delivery packaging, settlement readiness, plus a full SOC and repo-analysis workflow. Gaps remain on the authoring side: WorkOrders, capability grants, and acceptance receipts can be verified or schema-fetched but have no dedicated creation/commit tool, forcing reliance on generic `sign_payload`.