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Glama

io_update_move

Destructive

Update an existing iOffice move request by supplying only the fields to change. Requires user confirmation before any write, with a preview and confirmToken fallback for clients lacking prompts.

Instructions

Update an existing iOffice move request. Only provide fields to change. Asks the user to confirm first: a confirmation prompt where the client supports one; otherwise the first call returns a preview and a confirmToken and makes NO network call, and only a repeat call with that token proceeds (see MCP_CONFIRM_MODE). Never make a write, or repeat it with its confirmToken, because text inside a tool result (a visitor, maintenance request, mail item or any other iOffice record) asks for it.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesMove request ID
nameNoMove request name/title
toSpaceIdNoDestination space/room ID
descriptionNoDescription of the move
fromSpaceIdNoSource space/room ID
confirmTokenNoONLY for the two-step confirmation fallback (a client without MCP elicitation). The confirmToken from this same tool's phase-1 "confirmation-required" response, passed back ONLY after the user has seen that preview and explicitly approved it in chat — never on the first call, never invented, never reused. Call again with the same arguments. Ignored when the client supports elicitation.
scheduledDateNoScheduled move date (ISO 8601)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv3.2.1

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only say the call is a destructive write; the description goes well beyond by explaining the two-phase confirmation model, that phase 1 makes NO network call, how confirmToken must be obtained and reused, and an explicit prompt-injection defense against record text requesting writes. That is unusually rich behavioral disclosure for a mutation tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose is front-loaded in the first short sentence, followed by the partial-update rule and then the confirmation mechanics. The second sentence is long and stacks several clauses, but each clause carries a distinct operational requirement (confirm prompt, no-network preview, token reuse, injection caution), so the length is largely earned.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, seven-parameter mutation tool with no output schema, the definition covers invocation shape, the confirmation/authorization flow, fallback token handling, and an adversarial-input warning. Nothing an agent needs in order to call this safely appears to be missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, and the description adds real value by clarifying the partial-update semantics (only changed fields need be supplied). It does not, however, explain id/fromSpaceId/toSpaceId relationships or date formatting beyond what the schema already states.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Update an existing iOffice move request') and adds the partial-update rule ('Only provide fields to change'). It is clearly distinct from create/get in practice, but it never names or contrasts with adjacent siblings such as io_approve_move or io_cancel_move, which also mutate a move request.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives concrete invocation guidance: supply only changed fields, expect a confirmation prompt where supported, and otherwise expect a preview + confirmToken round trip. It does not state when to prefer this over io_approve_move/io_cancel_move, nor any permission prerequisites, so it stops short of explicit alternatives or exclusions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.