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awslabs

Threat Modeling MCP Server

Official
by awslabs

list_threat_actors

List all threat actors in a threat model, with optional filters for type and relevance, to aid in structured STRIDE-based threat analysis.

Instructions

List all threat actors.

This tool lists all threat actors in the threat model.

Args: ctx: MCP context for logging and error handling type: Optional type to filter threat actors relevant_only: Whether to only show relevant threat actors

Returns: A markdown-formatted list of threat actors

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
typeNoOptional type to filter threat actors
relevant_onlyNoWhether to only show relevant threat actors

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description must carry behavioral transparency. It states the return format (markdown-formatted list) and mentions the filtering parameters, which gives some transparency about scope. However, it does not explicitly state that the operation is read-only, nor does it disclose any potential side effects, ordering, or pagination behavior. The inclusion of a non-existent 'ctx' argument in the description also creates confusion about the expected call signature.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description has a clear structure with Args and Returns sections, but the first two sentences are redundant ('List all threat actors.' and 'This tool lists all threat actors in the threat model.'). This redundancy wastes space. The inclusion of the phantom 'ctx' argument adds unnecessary noise. Overall, it is not a model of conciseness.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a simple list tool, the description covers the core purpose, parameters, and return type. However, it lacks explicit confirmation that this is a non-destructive read operation, and the misleading 'ctx' argument introduces uncertainty about invocation. The description does not mention error conditions or how the output is ordered, but for a straightforward listing tool, these gaps are moderate.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema already provides full descriptions for both parameters (type and relevant_only), and the description merely repeats these without adding new meaning. Moreover, the description introduces an 'ctx' parameter that is absent from the schema, which could mislead the agent into passing an invalid argument. This is a net negative for parameter semantics.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool's function: 'List all threat actors.' It identifies the specific resource (threat actors) and the action (list), distinguishing it from sibling list tools like list_components or list_data_stores. The additional sentence 'This tool lists all threat actors in the threat model' reinforces the scope.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives. It does not mention that for individual threat actor details one should use get_threat_actor, or that analyze_threat_actors might be more appropriate for analysis. There are no when-not-to-use conditions or references to sibling tools.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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