Threat Modeling MCP Server
OfficialRelated Servers
Alternatives to Threat Modeling MCP Server
No user-submitted related servers found.
Related Servers
- FlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceMCP server for automated architectural mapping, security vulnerability detection, ML asset tracking, and code metrics in local repositories.-
- AlicenseAqualityDmaintenanceUnified MCP server integrating NIST and OWASP security frameworks with live vulnerability data, enabling security searches, compliance mapping, threat modeling, and checklist generation.4114MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceA lightweight MCP server for security reviews that injects security requirements before code generation, scans dependencies for CVEs, and verifies generated code without disrupting workflow.68MIT

Precogly MCPofficial
AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceMCP server for Precogly threat modeling, enabling users to integrate threat modeling capabilities into AI assistants.1Apache 2.0- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceServes any STRIDE threat model to MCP-capable LLMs, enabling natural language querying of threat registers and export to the Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool.MIT
- FlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceA Model Context Protocol server for automated security vulnerability assessment, combining OWASP Dependency-Check dependency scanning with custom code vulnerability detection, and generating detailed HTML and JSON reports.-
TDQS
Scored across 107 tools
Most tools are cleanly separated by resource type (components, connections, data stores, threats, etc.) with clear CRUD patterns. However, several code-validation tools (validate_security_controls, validate_threat_remediation, validate_threat_model_against_code, execute_code_validation_step) have overlapping purposes and could confuse an agent.
The naming generally follows a verb_noun pattern (e.g., add_component, list_threats, delete_flow), and batch modifiers are consistent. Deviations exist: some entity types lack a get_* counterpart (components, connections, data stores), and a mix of validate_*, execute_*, and get_* plan/guidance tools introduces minor inconsistency.
With 107 tools, this server far exceeds the 50+ threshold for an extreme mismatch. While the domain is broad, the sheer number is overwhelming and suggests the tool surface should be consolidated or broken into smaller servers.
The server covers the full threat modeling lifecycle: business context, architecture elements, trust boundaries, threat actors, assets, flows, threats, mitigations, code validation, and exports. Minor gaps exist (e.g., no get_component, get_connection, or get_data_store), but they are workable.