agent-passport-system-mcp

Verify Mutual-Auth Attest

mutualAuthVerifyAttest

Read-onlyIdempotent

Runs all 10 verification checks on a MutualAuthAttest against policy and trust anchors, returning success or a rejection reason.

Instructions

Verify a MutualAuthAttest against policy and trust anchors. Runs all 10 verification checks: signature, version negotiation, nonce match, timestamp freshness, certificate validity, issuer anchor check, binding constraints, downgrade detection, attestation grade policy, capability policy. Returns ok:true on success or a failure reason on rejection.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "attest": "<attest>",
      "expected_peer_nonce_b64": "<expected_peer_nonce_b64>",
      "expected_own_nonce_b64": "<expected_own_nonce_b64>",
      "policy": "<policy>",
      "trust_anchors": "<trust_anchors>"
    },
    "name": "mutualAuthVerifyAttest"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`attest`	Yes	MutualAuthAttest to verify
`now_ms`	No	Current unix ms — defaults to Date.now()
`policy`	Yes	MutualAuthPolicy (accepted_versions, min_agent_grade, required_capabilities, max_clock_skew_ms, max_session_ms)
`trust_anchors`	Yes	TrustAnchor[] — local trusted roots
`revoked_anchor_ids`	No	IDs of anchors revoked since the bundle was issued
`expected_own_nonce_b64`	Yes	The nonce we sent in our own prior hello or attest
`expected_peer_nonce_b64`	Yes	The nonce the peer sent in their prior hello or attest

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed4 schema fields changedv4.0.0Aug 1, 2026

changedInput schema / $schema

Previous value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"

removedInput schema / additionalProperties
```
Removed value: -false
```
addedInput schema / properties / trust_anchors / items
```
Added value: +{}
```

changedInput schema / required

Previous value: -[
-  "expected_peer_nonce_b64",
-  "expected_own_nonce_b64",
-  "trust_anchors"
-]New value: +[
+  "attest",
+  "expected_peer_nonce_b64",
+  "expected_own_nonce_b64",
+  "policy",
+  "trust_anchors"
+]

Addedv2.8.0May 1, 2026

TDQS

A3.5/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint/idempotentHint/destructiveHint=false and closed-world, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds real value beyond that by disclosing the exact verification surface (10 named checks) and the outcome contract (ok:true or a failure reason), which matters since there is no output schema.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences with the core action front-loaded and no filler. The 10-check list is long but each item is a distinct verification step and earns its space; it could be compressed slightly but is not wasteful.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a verification tool with no output schema, no nested objects, and full annotation coverage, the description supplies the missing return contract and the check inventory an agent needs to call it correctly. It stops short of permission/prerequisite or failure-taxonomy detail, but nothing essential is absent.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so every parameter is already documented in the schema and the baseline is 3. The description mentions 'policy and trust anchors' generically but adds no parameter-level semantics (e.g., what triggers each failure, nonce orientation, revoked_anchor_ids handling) beyond what structured fields already carry.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (Verify) and resource (MutualAuthAttest) and isolates the scope: against policy and trust anchors. The enumerated 10 checks sharpen what 'verify' covers, but the description never references the close siblings (mutualAuthVerifyTrustBundle, mutualAuthDeriveSession, mutualAuthBuildCertificate), so an agent must infer the boundary from the resource name alone.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No when-to-use, when-not, or alternative guidance is given. Nothing tells the agent when to call this versus mutualAuthVerifyTrustBundle or when a prior attest step is a prerequisite. Usage is only implied by the required-parameter set in the schema, not by the text.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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