Create Attribution Receipt

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare the safety profile (readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive, closed-world), so the bar is lower, yet the description adds substantive context beyond them: parties must be self-certifying multibase did:aps DIDs, bare public keys or did:web identifiers will fail verification, and the output is invalid until a consent signature exists. It does not, however, explain what is returned or whether anything is persisted, leaving a mild tension with readOnlyHint for a tool named 'create'.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, front-loaded with the core action and then constraints and follow-up. The opening label 'Representation boundary:' is opaque jargon that costs a few words without orienting the agent, but the rest is dense and free of padding.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a nine-parameter cryptographic tool with no output schema, the description covers the semantic model, DID constraints, and the consent prerequisite well. It never states what the call returns (a receipt object, an id — a sibling aps_attribution_receipt_id exists) or what ttl_ms/gateway_id affect, which is a real gap when no output schema exists.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all nine parameters, including the DID/key commitment requirement per party. The description restates the cross-parameter constraint (DID must commit to the key beside it) and the failure mode for bare keys, but adds little that is not already in the schema text, so the baseline of 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Names a specific verb and resource ('build a citer-signed AttributionReceipt') and scopes it to 'attributing a claim to a third-party principal', which separates it from siblings like aps_sign_attribution_consent and aps_check_artifact_citations. It does not explicitly distinguish itself from other receipt-constructing siblings (aps_construct_attribution_primitive, aps_create_provisional), so it stops short of a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The final sentence supplies real workflow context: the receipt is 'not yet valid' until the cited principal signs via aps_sign_attribution_consent, and checkArtifactCitations gates acceptance. That is post-condition guidance rather than an explicit when-to-use-this-vs-alternative rule, and no exclusions are given, so it is implied usage at best.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.