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TypeScript

Verify Attribution Consent

aps_verify_attribution_consent
Read-onlyIdempotent

Verify an AttributionReceipt end-to-end by checking its ID, citer and consent signatures, expiry, and party key bindings. Returns whether the receipt is valid and why if not.

Instructions

Representation boundary: verify an AttributionReceipt end-to-end (id, citer signature, consent signature, expiry) and bind each named party to the key beside it. What a valid result establishes: the receipt is intact, unexpired, and signed by the keys its party DIDs commit to. What it does not establish: that either party is authorized for your relying-party decision, or who they are outside the protocol. A party named by an identifier that does not self-certify is refused as unresolved rather than assumed. Returns {valid, reason?}.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nowNoOptional HybridTimestamp to pin the evaluation moment
receiptYesAttributionReceipt JSON

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed3 schema fields changedv4.0.0
    • changedInput schema / $schema
      Previous value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
    • removedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Removed value: -false
    • addedInput schema / required
      Added value: +[
+  "receipt"
+]
  2. Addedv2.8.0

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the safety profile (readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive), and the description goes well beyond them: it discloses the failure mode for self-certifying identifiers ('refused as unresolved rather than assumed'), the expiry check, and an explicit statement of what a valid result does and does not prove. It also gives the return shape, {valid, reason?}.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action and tightly written at roughly five sentences with no filler. The opening 'Representation boundary:' label is jargon-heavy relative to the plain statements that follow, costing a little immediate clarity.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description correctly supplies the return shape and the trust boundaries an agent needs to interpret a result. The only material omission is any guidance on the optional `now` parameter and the semantics of the `reason` field when valid is false.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so both parameters are already documented and the baseline is 3. The description adds the internal fields of the receipt that get validated (id, citer signature, consent signature, expiry), but never explains the optional `now` timestamp used to pin the evaluation moment.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource — 'verify an AttributionReceipt end-to-end' — and enumerates exactly what is checked (id, citer signature, consent signature, expiry). The 'representation boundary' framing and the explicit non-guarantees cleanly separate this from related siblings like aps_verify_attribution_projection and aps_verify_attribution_primitive.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description sets a semantic scope ('what it does not establish: that either party is authorized for your relying-party decision') which implies the tool should not be used as an authorization check, but it never names an alternative tool or states a when-to-use trigger. Usage is inferable rather than instructed, and the many similarly named aps_verify_* siblings are not disambiguated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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