CVE search (NVD)

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint and openWorldHint, so safety is covered; the description adds genuinely useful operational context that annotations cannot convey: it is keyless but rate-limited, and NVD_API_KEY raises limits. It stops short of describing pagination or result ordering.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three tight sentences: what it searches, what it returns, and the auth/rate-limit caveat. The purpose is front-loaded and nothing is redundant.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 6-parameter read-only search with no output schema, the description covers filters, return fields (CVSS, CWE, KEV status), and authentication. The undocumented limit parameter is the only material gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must carry the load, and it does: cveId, keyword (clarified as product/vendor), severity, recency, and kevOnly all map to parameters with added meaning. Only the limit parameter (and why it caps at 30) is left unexplained.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (Search) and resource (NIST National Vulnerability Database) and enumerates the query dimensions, which cleanly distinguishes it from siblings like kev_lookup and breach_catalog. An agent can identify the tool's domain without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description lists the searchable modes (CVE id, keyword, severity, recency, KEV-listed only), which implies usage, but it never states when to prefer this tool over the sibling kev_lookup for KEV data or when a single-CVE lookup is the right call. No exclusions or explicit alternative routing are given.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.