breach_detailsRetrieve complete details for a named Have I Been Pwned data breach, including its exposed data classes, affected accounts, and incident timeline.
Full details of one HIBP breach by name (e.g. 'Adobe', 'LinkedIn').
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | Yes |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
v1.0.0Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already establish readOnlyHint=true and openWorldHint=true, so the safety and external-data profile is covered, and the description reinforces that the data is HIBP-sourced. It adds nothing about lookup behavior, e.g. exact-match requirements or case sensitivity. Against an annotation-backed baseline this is adequate but thin.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single front-loaded sentence with the resource, scope, and parameter meaning in the fewest possible words. Nothing is wasted and nothing important is buried.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
There is no output schema, so the description carries the burden of explaining what 'Full details' returns. It signals comprehensiveness but does not characterize the payload (breach metadata, affected accounts, data classes), leaving an agent to guess at the response shape.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0%, so the description is the only source of parameter meaning. It correctly identifies 'name' as a breach identifier and supplies two example values ('Adobe', 'LinkedIn'), which is genuine added value, but it doesn't specify match semantics or format constraints beyond what the schema implies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description gives a specific verb ('Full details'), a specific resource ('one HIBP breach'), and the lookup key ('by name'), so an agent knows exactly what comes back. It stops short of explicitly distinguishing itself from siblings like breach_catalog or domain_breaches, which an agent might otherwise confuse with it.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Usage is only implied: retrieve detail for a known breach name. There is no statement of when to prefer this over breach_catalog (listing) or the domain_breaches/email_breaches variants, and no mention of what happens if the name is unknown.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.