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Jimil-Joshi

BlastRadius MCP

simulate_action

Assess the blast radius, danger score (0-100), and reversibility of a shell command, SQL query, or cloud action before execution to block destructive operations.

Instructions

Simulates and predicts the blast radius, danger score (0-100), and destructive reversibility of a shell command, SQL query, or cloud operation before execution.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
contextNoExecution context such as environment (prod/stage), working directory, or target host.
actionTypeNoOptional action category hint.
commandOrQueryYesThe shell command, SQL query, or cloud API call to simulate.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden. It usefully discloses the return content (blast radius, 0-100 danger score, reversibility), but never states explicitly that the tool does NOT execute the command, whether it needs elevated permissions, or how it handles unknown/unparseable input — key facts for a safety-oriented simulator.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single front-loaded sentence that packs the purpose, accepted input types, and expected outputs with zero filler. Nothing redundant or off-topic.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, so the description correctly takes on the job of naming the return values, which it does. But for a pre-execution risk-assessment tool it omits whether the action is actually executed, the result format, and any annotation-level safety guarantees, leaving meaningful gaps.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all three parameters (including the nested context object and the actionType enum) are already documented in the schema. The description only echoes the shell/SQL/cloud mapping, adding no syntax, format, or enum-value meaning beyond the schema; baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb (simulates/predicts) and resource (shell command, SQL query, cloud operation), plus the exact outputs produced (blast radius, danger score 0-100, reversibility). It is clearly distinct from the sibling tools like enforce_policy or request_confirmation_token, but it never explicitly names or contrasts an alternative.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The phrase 'before execution' implies the intended usage window (pre-flight dry run), which is meaningful for an agent deciding when to call this. However, there is no explicit when-not guidance, no prerequisites, and no routing between this and siblings such as enforce_policy or get_security_posture.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.