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Glama
Jimil-Joshi

BlastRadius MCP

enforce_policy

Evaluates prospective tool calls against security policies, scans parameters for DLP, and records a cryptographic audit trail.

Instructions

The central zero-trust decision point. Evaluates a prospective tool call against organizational security policies, scans parameters for DLP, and records a cryptographic audit trail.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
callerIdNoUnique identifier for the calling agent or user.agent-client
toolNameYesThe name of the target tool intended to be called.
parametersYesThe parameters intended to be passed to the tool.
confirmationTokenNoOptional cryptographically signed approval token for elevated destructive actions.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It usefully discloses a side effect ('records a cryptographic audit trail'), which tells the agent this is not a pure read, but it omits critical behavior: what a deny decision looks like, whether the call is blocked or merely reported, and how confirmationToken gates elevated destructive actions.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three tight sentences with the most important framing front-loaded and zero filler. It could be marginally shorter, but nothing is wasted.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a central security gate with no annotations and no output schema, the description is under-specified: it never says what the tool returns (allow/deny, reason codes) or explains the confirmation-token elevation flow described in the schema. The nested-object parameters argument is also left opaque.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all four parameters are already documented in the schema, establishing a baseline of 3. The description only indirectly references 'parameters' as being scanned for DLP and adds no format or constraint detail beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific function with strong framing ('central zero-trust decision point') plus three concrete actions: policy evaluation, DLP scanning, and audit recording. It is distinguishable from most siblings, though it overlaps conceptually with inspect_payload_dlp (DLP) and simulate_action (evaluation) without naming how it differs.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The phrase 'prospective tool call' implies this is a pre-execution gate, which is useful context, but there is no explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use guidance and no mention of the sibling tools an agent should consider instead (e.g., simulate_action for dry runs). Usage is only implied.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.