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securedact-mcp

SecuRedact MCP

PyPI Python License: Apache-2.0

SecuRedact는 AI 에이전트와 AI 워크플로우를 위한 로컬 우선(local-first) 개인정보 보호 및 보안 계층입니다. 데이터가 모델, 도구, 파일 또는 외부 대상에 도달하기 전에 개인 데이터/PII, GDPR 민감 정보, 자격 증명, API 키, 토큰, 비밀 및 민감한 파일과 같은 민감한 데이터를 감지하고 보호합니다.

SecuRedact MCP는 Apache-2.0 오픈소스 MCP 서버이자 재사용 가능한 Python 개인정보 보호 엔진입니다. 민감한 텍스트를 감지하고, 버전이 지정된 정책을 적용하며, 로컬에서 편집(redact)하고, 정화된 콘텐츠를 승인으로 표시하기 전에 잔여 출력을 검증합니다.

MCP 모드는 모든 프롬프트를 자동으로 가로채지 않습니다. 호스트는 도구를 호출하고 status == "ok"일 때만 sanitized_text를 보내야 합니다. 잘못 구성되었거나 악의적인 MCP 호스트는 일반적인 MCP 워크플로우를 우회할 수 있습니다. 공급자 네이티브 강제 훅(provider-native enforced hooks)은 별도의 통합 자산입니다. 지원되는 공급자가 프롬프트 수명 주기 경계에서 그러한 훅을 호출하면 일반 모델 처리 전에 동일한 결정적 결정을 적용할 수 있습니다. SecuRedact Enforced를 참조하세요.

SecuRedact가 필요한 이유

AI 에이전트는 점점 더 파일을 읽고, 도구를 호출하고, 외부 모델에 프롬프트를 보냅니다. 데이터를 먼저 확인하는 무언가가 없다면 PII, 자격 증명 및 민감한 문서가 노출됩니다. SecuRedact는 AI 워크플로우를 위한 개인정보 보호 및 보안 제어입니다:

  • 로컬 우선 — 모든 감지, 편집 및 정책 평가는 사용자 머신에서 실행됩니다. 기본적으로 네트워크 리스너, 원격 측정, 공급자 호출이 없습니다.

  • PII / GDPR 감지 — 이름, 이메일, IBAN, 식별자 및 특수 범주 데이터가 감지되어 가명화되거나 편집됩니다.

  • 비밀 및 자격 증명 보호 — API 키, 토큰 및 비밀번호가 감지되어 환경 밖으로 나가는 것이 차단됩니다.

  • 파일 시스템 보호 — 읽기는 경로 탐색/심볼릭 링크 이스케이프로부터 방어되며 .env와 같은 보호된 경로에서 차단됩니다.

  • AI 에이전트 개인정보 방화벽 — Claude Code 및 Gemini CLI에 대한 강제 훅은 프롬프트, 모델 호출 또는 도구 작업이 진행되기 전에 동일한 로컬 결정을 실행합니다.

  • 네트워크 / 이그레스 인식 — 외부 도구 호출이 (내부/외부/알 수 없음)으로 분류되어 정책이 승인을 요구하거나 이그레스를 차단할 수 있습니다.

SecuRedact는 민감한 데이터의 노출을 줄이는 데 도움이 됩니다. 이는 규정 준수를 보장하거나 모든 유출이 방지된다는 주장이 아닙니다. 제한 사항을 참조하세요.

Related MCP server: phi-redact-mcp

빠른 시작

PyPI에서 설치하고 안내식 설정을 실행합니다 (Windows):

py -3.12 -m pip install "securedact-mcp[ml]"
securedact-mcp setup

Linux / macOS:

python3.12 -m pip install "securedact-mcp[ml]"
securedact-mcp setup

몇 초 만에 텍스트 조각을 보호합니다 (결정적 전용 데모, 모델 불필요):

import os

os.environ["SECUREDACT_REQUIRE_FLAIR"] = "0"  # deterministic detectors only
from securedact_core import RedactionRequest, SecuredactEngine

engine = SecuredactEngine.from_environment()
result = engine.prepare(
    RedactionRequest(
        text="Contact alex@example.test, IBAN NL91ABNA0417164300",
        policy="strict_external_ai",
    )
)
print(result.status)  # "ok"
print(result.sanitized_text)  # "Contact [EMAIL_1], IBAN [IBAN_1]"

재현 가능한 합성 보안 데모: docs/distribution/security-demo.md.

안전한 기본 워크플로우

일반적인 외부 AI 준비에는 prepare_for_external_ai를 사용하세요:

{
  "text": "Contact alex@example.test",
  "policy": "strict_external_ai",
  "language": "auto",
  "response_mode": "minimal"
}

승인된 응답:

{
  "schema_version": "1",
  "status": "ok",
  "sanitized_text": "Contact [EMAIL_1]",
  "counts": {"email": 1},
  "policy": "strict_external_ai",
  "policy_version": 1,
  "policy_digest": "...",
  "reason_codes": []
}

review_requiredblocked 응답에는 승인된 sanitized_text가 절대 포함되지 않습니다. 최소 응답에는 restore_capable이 명시적으로 선택되지 않는 한 원본 텍스트, 원시 엔터티 값, 매핑, 예외 본문, 스택 추적, 모델 경로 또는 복원 핸들이 포함되지 않습니다.

아키텍처 및 신뢰 경계

flowchart LR
    H["MCP host"] --> M["Securedact MCP"]
    M --> D["deterministic detectors"]
    M --> C["contextual detectors"]
    D --> P["policy engine"]
    C --> P
    P --> R["redactor"]
    R --> V["residual validator"]
    V --> O["approved sanitized output"]
    O --> W["host-controlled downstream workflow"]
    H -. "host may bypass MCP" .-> W

서버에는 공급자 클라이언트, OpenAI 호환 프록시, 리버스 프록시, 웹사이트, 데스크톱 챗봇, 공급자 자격 증명 또는 공급자별 전달이 없습니다. ADR 0001위협 모델을 참조하세요.

도구

도구

의도된 용도

민감한 응답 동작

prepare_for_external_ai

권장되는 완전한 안전 워크플로우

기본적으로 최소

analyze_text

하위 수준 로컬 분석/검토

최소; review의 오프셋; 활성화된 디버그 모드에서만 원시 값

redact_text

하위 수준 호환성 작업

기본적으로 최소; 명시적 legacy 모드는 민감하며 더 이상 사용되지 않음

restore_text

로컬 불투명 세션 사용

기본적으로 일회용; 직접 매핑은 명시적 신뢰 레거시 모드 필요

create_safe_copy

구성된 단일 루트 아래에 승인된 .txt/.md 콘텐츠 작성

매핑이나 절대 경로를 반환하지 않음

securedact_read_file

로컬 파일을 안전하게 읽고 정화된 텍스트만 반환

읽기 전에 보호된 경로 차단; 탐색/심볼릭 링크/바이너리 거부; 기본적으로 minimal

응답 모드는 minimal, review, debugrestore_capable입니다. 디버그는 프로세스가 SECUREDACT_ENABLE_DEBUG_RESPONSES=1로 시작되지 않는 한 비활성화됩니다. MCP 요청으로는 활성화할 수 없습니다. 메모리 내 복원 세션은 암호화 난수 핸들, 제한된 용량, 만료, 동시성 보호 및 일회용 소비를 사용합니다. 프로세스 종료 시 모든 세션이 삭제됩니다.

MCP 도구, 응답 개인정보 보호복원 세션을 참조하세요.

설치

Python >=3.12,<3.13이 지원됩니다.

PyPI에서 일반 설치를 하려면:

py -3.12 -m pip install "securedact-mcp[ml]"
securedact-mcp setup

Linux 또는 macOS에서는 python3.12 -m pip install "securedact-mcp[ml]"를 사용하세요. python이 이미 지원되는 3.12 환경을 선택하는 경우 python -m pip install "securedact-mcp[ml]"도 적절합니다.

setup은 패키지, Python 및 ML 종속성을 확인하고, 로컬 모델 상태를 검사하며, 기존 동의 기반 모델 설치 프로그램을 제공하고, 기존 오프라인 검증기를 실행하며, 해당 호스트가 감지되면 패키지된 Claude Code 및 Gemini CLI 통합을 제공합니다. 공급자의 공식 플러그인/확장 명령을 사용하며 다시 실행해도 안전합니다. 사용자가 모델 설정을 명시적으로 선택하고 기존 업스트림 프롬프트를 수락하지 않는 한 공급자 모델 API를 호출하거나, 공급자 신뢰를 자동으로 수락하거나, 컨텍스트 모델을 다운로드하지 않습니다.

고급 또는 무인 작업을 위한 수동 모델 명령은 계속 사용할 수 있습니다:

securedact-mcp install
securedact-mcp models verify
securedact-mcp

마지막 명령은 로컬 stdio 서버를 시작합니다. 표준 출력은 MCP 프로토콜 메시지용으로 예약되어 있습니다. securedact-mcp setup --non-interactive는 업스트림 수락을 암시하거나 새 공급자를 구성하지 않고 상태를 보고합니다. 대상 대화형 공급자 설정에는 --host claude, --host gemini 또는 --host all을 사용하세요.

개발자/소스 설치

대신 검토된 소스 체크아웃에서 작업하려면:

git clone https://github.com/GigantesHJI/securedact-mcp.git
cd securedact-mcp
python -m pip install ".[ml]"
securedact-mcp setup

저장소나 휠에는 모델 체크포인트가 포함되어 있지 않으며 시작 시 다운로드하지 않습니다. Securedact는 이러한 모델 가중치를 재배포하지 않습니다. 업스트림 모델 가중치는 자체 라이선스를 유지하며 Apache-2.0으로 재라이선스되지 않습니다. 모델 설치타사 라이선스를 참조하세요.

결정적 전용 로컬 개발은 명시적으로 선택해야 합니다:

$env:SECUREDACT_REQUIRE_FLAIR = "0"
securedact-mcp

프로덕션은 기본적으로 컨텍스트 기능을 요구하며 구성된 모델이 없거나, 로드 중이거나, 손상되었거나, 사용할 수 없는 경우 폐쇄적으로 실패합니다.

호스트 패키지

테스트된 구성 자산과 안전한 워크플로우 지침은 Codex, Cursor 및 Windsurf용 integrations/ 아래에 있습니다. 자동화된 MCP 클라이언트 하네스는 서버 시작, 도구 목록, 호출, 최소 응답 형태, stdout 무결성 및 종료를 검증합니다. 실제 호스트가 모든 프롬프트에 대해 도구를 호출한다는 것을 증명하지는 않습니다. 호환성 증거를 참조하세요.

저장소는 또한 Gemini CLI 확장 루트입니다: gemini extensions install https://github.com/GigantesHJI/securedact-mcp로 훅을 설치할 수 있습니다. 해당 경로가 해석되려면 gemini-cli-extension 토픽과 태그 트리에 루트 매니페스트가 포함된 릴리스가 필요합니다. pip install "securedact-mcp[ml]" 및 로컬 모델 없이는 설치된 훅이 아무것도 강제하지 않습니다. SecuRedact Enforced를 참조하세요.

정책 및 Python API

내장 정책에는 default, strict_external_ai, gdpr, identifiers_onlyreview_all_contextual이 포함됩니다. 호환성 정책은 계속 사용할 수 있습니다. 로컬 조직 정책 파일은 제어된 정책 디렉토리에서만 로드되며, 엄격한 선언적 스키마를 사용하고, 폐쇄 실패 불변식을 비활성화할 수 없습니다. 알 수 없거나, 중복되거나, 크기가 초과되거나, 잘못된 형식이거나, 심볼릭 링크된 정책은 폐쇄적으로 실패합니다.

from securedact_core import RedactionRequest, SecuredactEngine

engine = SecuredactEngine.from_environment()
result = engine.prepare(
    RedactionRequest(
        text="Contact alex@example.test",
        policy="strict_external_ai",
    )
)

from_environment()는 컨텍스트 모델 요구 사항을 유지합니다. 독립형 결정적 개발에는 SECUREDACT_REQUIRE_FLAIR=0이 필요합니다. 애플리케이션은 테스트된 감지기 구현을 주입할 수도 있습니다. 공개 API정책을 참조하세요.

재현 가능한 개발

커밋된 uv.lock은 Python 3.12에 대한 런타임, ML, 개발, 벤치마크 및 보안 엑스트라를 해결합니다.

uv sync --frozen --extra dev --extra benchmark
uv run python scripts\verify.py

테스트, 이슈, 스크린샷, 픽스처 또는 풀 리퀘스트에 실제 개인 정보, 개인 문서, 자격 증명, 고객 로그 또는 모델 가중치를 사용하지 마십시오. CONTRIBUTING.md를 참조하세요.

평가 및 성능

uv run python -m securedact_eval quality --mode deterministic --gate `
  --thresholds benchmarks\thresholds.json `
  --baseline benchmarks\baselines\quality-deterministic.json
uv run python -m securedact_eval performance --mode deterministic

버전이 지정된 합성 코퍼스는 정확 및 완화된 스팬 정밀도, 재현율, F1, 거짓 양성 및 거짓 음성 비율, 엔터티/언어/도메인/분할별 결과, 동작/카테고리 정확도 및 부트스트랩 재현율 구간을 보고합니다. 진짜 음성은 토큰 수준 안전이 아닌 문서 수준의 부정적 예입니다. GDPR 관련 스위트는 감지 평가이지 법적 규정 준수 인증이 아닙니다. 실제 Flair 및 GPU 벤치마크는 명시적으로 구성된 로컬 모델이 필요하며 일반 CI가 아닙니다. 벤치마킹을 참조하세요.

벤치마크 프레임워크는 로컬 데이터 계층과 대규모 프로필을 문서화합니다. 마이그레이션 계획은 향후 추출 경계를 정의합니다. GitHub가 저장소 단계를 실행하기 전에 실패한 경우 CI 문제 해결 결정 트리를 사용하세요. 로컬 성공은 필수 GitHub 검사를 대체하지 않습니다.

보안 및 제한 사항

  • 애플리케이션 코드는 프롬프트, 발견 사항, 매핑, 복원 핸들, 비밀, 모델 입력 또는 복원된 출력을 기록하지 않습니다.

  • 결정적 및 컨텍스트 감지는 새롭거나, 모호하거나, 적대적인 공개를 놓칠 수 있습니다. 상호 참조 및 보편적 난독화 저항은 주장되지 않습니다.

  • 검토 오프셋을 사용하면 원본 입력이 있는 신뢰할 수 있는 로컬 클라이언트가 값을 재구성할 수 있습니다. 검토 응답을 로컬에 유지하세요.

  • 호스트 동작 및 다운스트림 공급자 동작은 신뢰 경계 밖에 있습니다.

  • 파일에 문서화된 저장소 보안 설정은 여전히 관리자 확인이 필요합니다.

취약점은 SECURITY.md를 사용하여 비공개로 보고하세요. 공개 이슈에 취약점 세부 정보나 실제 데이터를 넣지 마십시오.

라이선스

원본 저장소 소스 및 문서는 Apache License 2.0에 따라 라이선스가 부여됩니다. 저작권 귀속은 NOTICE에 기록되어 있습니다. 타사 종속성 및 모델 가중치는 자체 라이선스를 유지합니다.

Available Tools

6 tools
analyze_textA

Inspect text locally and report detected sensitive content without producing sanitized output.

Use this when you need to understand what PII, secrets, or credentials are present (counts, entity types, and, with review/debug modes, positions) but do not need redacted text for transmission. The original text is not modified and no sanitized representation is returned. For a policy-approved, ready-to-send result use prepare_for_external_ai; for a sanitized file use create_safe_copy; for reversing a prior local session use restore_text.

Returns a JSON object with 'status' ('ok', 'review_required', or 'blocked'), 'policy', 'policy_version', 'policy_digest', 'counts' (entity-type tallies), and, when response_mode is 'review' or 'debug', a 'findings' list. 'debug' additionally returns 'debug_details'.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
textYesFree text to inspect locally for sensitive content. Processing is on this machine only; the original text is never modified or transmitted.
policyNoNamed analysis policy controlling which detectors and entity types apply. Defaults to 'default'. Common values include 'default'; other policies may be registered in your environment. An unknown name returns a policy_not_found error.default
response_modeNoLevel of detail returned. 'minimal' returns only status and entity-type counts; 'review' additionally returns a 'findings' list with spans and entity types; 'debug' additionally returns 'debug_details' (only when debug responses are enabled). Defaults to 'minimal'.minimal

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription

No output parameters

TDQS

A4.9/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It states the text is processed locally, never modified, and no sanitized representation is returned. It also discloses conditions like 'debug responses are enabled' and the policy_not_found error, giving a complete picture of side effects and edge behavior.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense but well-organized: a one-line purpose statement, then usage guidance, alternatives, and return format all in a compact sequence. Every sentence adds value; there is no fluff or repetition, and the critical scoping constraint ('without producing sanitized output') is front-loaded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The tool has 3 parameters, all fully documented in the schema, and an output schema (implied via the described JSON structure). The description explains the return object thoroughly, including conditional fields for review/debug modes, and covers error behavior for unknown policies. Nothing an agent needs to invoke it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

All three parameters already have descriptive schema entries (coverage 100%), so the baseline is 3. The description adds meaningful context beyond the schema: it explains the effect of response_mode on the return structure, describes the policy error condition, and reiterates local-only processing for the text parameter. This extra context justifies a 4 rather than a baseline 3.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb-resource pair ('Inspect text locally') and explicitly distinguishes the tool by stating it reports sensitive content 'without producing sanitized output.' This clearly differentiates it from siblings like prepare_for_external_ai and create_safe_copy, making its purpose immediately unambiguous.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives explicit when-to-use guidance: 'Use this when you need to understand what PII, secrets, or credentials are present... but do not need redacted text for transmission.' It then names three alternatives with their appropriate contexts (prepare_for_external_ai, create_safe_copy, restore_text), leaving no ambiguity about tool selection.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

create_safe_copyA

Sanitize text locally and write the approved result to a new file in the Safe Copies directory.

Use this when you need a sanitized on-disk copy (for storage, handoff, or archival) rather than an in-memory sanitized string. For the sanitized text only, use prepare_for_external_ai; for inspection-only use analyze_text; for reversing a prior session use restore_text.

Side effects: a new file is written to the directory set by SECUREDACT_SAFE_COPY_DIR. The supplied 'content' is not modified and no existing file is overwritten. The filename must be a bare '.txt' or '.md' basename (no path separators or directory traversal). The operation blocks and reports 'blocked' if the directory is unconfigured, the filename is invalid, or policy blocks the content.

Returns a JSON object with 'status' ('ok' or 'blocked'), 'filename', and 'counts'.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
policyNoNamed redaction policy applied before writing. Defaults to 'strict_external_ai'. An unknown name returns a policy_not_found error.strict_external_ai
contentYesText to sanitize locally and write to disk. Processed on this machine; never transmitted.
filenameYesBare target filename (no directory components) ending in '.txt' or '.md'. The file is created inside the configured Safe Copies directory; an existing file is never overwritten.

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription

No output parameters

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are present, so the description carries the full burden—and it excels. It discloses side effects: writes a new file to SECUREDACT_SAFE_COPY_DIR, does not modify 'content', never overwrites an existing file, blocks with status 'blocked' under specific conditions, and returns a JSON structure. This is a thorough disclosure of behavior beyond the schema.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured: core action first, then usage guidance, then side effects, then return format. Each paragraph adds distinct value with no redundancy. Concise yet complete, and front-loaded with the most important decision-driving information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's moderate complexity (3 parameters, no nested objects), an output schema exists (per signals), and the description itself explains side effects, blocking conditions, filename constraints, and return format. Nothing an agent needs to call it correctly is missing. The description is fully self-contained even without annotations.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema fully describes all three parameters. The description adds practical context (e.g., filename must be bare, policy defaults to 'strict_external_ai', content is never transmitted) but does not materially enhance the semantic meaning beyond what the schema already provides. Baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific action ('sanitize text locally and write the approved result to a new file'), names the resource ('Safe Copies directory'), and explicitly differentiates from all four siblings by naming them and the conditions under which each is preferred. An agent can immediately tell this tool writes a sanitized copy to disk.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The second paragraph gives explicit when-to-use guidance: 'Use this when you need a sanitized on-disk copy... rather than an in-memory sanitized string,' and names the alternative tools (prepare_for_external_ai, analyze_text, restore_text) with their complementary use cases. This fully eliminates ambiguity about tool selection.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

prepare_for_external_aiA

Use this before sending user-supplied or potentially sensitive text to an external AI service.

SecuRedact inspects and sanitizes the text locally and returns the policy-approved representation; this tool does not transmit the text externally. It is the recommended default for outbound AI workflows. Use analyze_text for inspection-only classifications, redact_text for the lower-level compatibility path, create_safe_copy when a sanitized file is required, and restore_text only to reverse a prior local session in a trusted context.

Returns a JSON object with 'status' ('ok', 'review_required', or 'blocked'), 'sanitized_text' (present only when approved), 'counts', 'policy', and optionally 'restoration_session' (when response_mode is 'restore_capable').

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
textYesFree text to inspect and sanitize locally before it is sent to an external AI service. All processing happens on this machine; this tool never transmits the text to any provider.
policyNoNamed redaction policy controlling which entity types are masked or blocked. Defaults to 'strict_external_ai'. Common values include 'strict_external_ai' and 'default'; other policies may be registered in your environment. An unknown name returns a policy_not_found error.strict_external_ai
languageNoHint for the contextual detection language. One of 'auto' (detect automatically), 'en', or 'nl'. Defaults to 'auto'.auto
response_modeNoAmount of detail returned. 'minimal' returns only the approved result and counts; 'review' adds per-detection findings for human review; 'debug' adds engine internals (only when debug responses are enabled); 'restore_capable' additionally returns a local restoration_session for later trusted restore_text. Defaults to 'minimal'.minimal

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription

No output parameters

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full transparency burden and does well by stating that the tool does not transmit text externally, operates locally, can return different statuses, and optionally creates a restoration session. It also discloses the policy_not_found error behavior. It could go slightly further on whether any local state or session data is persisted, but overall it is transparent for a sanitization tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with the primary use case, then a clear sibling-routing paragraph, then a concise output contract. Every sentence earns its place, and the structure makes it easy for an agent to scan quickly.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The description covers when to use the tool, how it behaves, what alternatives exist, and what the return value looks like including statuses and optional fields. With a rich input schema and output schema present, nothing essential is missing for an agent to select and invoke it correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, and the input schema already explains text, policy, language, and response_mode in detail. The description adds little new parameter-level meaning beyond the schema, but the schema is fully sufficient, so the baseline score of 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific use case: preparing user-supplied or sensitive text before sending it to an external AI service, with local sanitization via SecuRedact. It clearly differentiates from siblings by naming each alternative and its purpose (analyze_text, redact_text, create_safe_copy, restore_text).

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explicitly recommends this tool as the default for outbound AI workflows and gives concrete routing rules: analyze_text for inspection-only, redact_text for lower-level compatibility, create_safe_copy when a file is needed, and restore_text only for reversing a prior local session. This leaves little ambiguity about when to choose it.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

redact_textA

Direct/lower-level redaction entry point; prefer prepare_for_external_ai for normal outbound workflows.

In its normal modes this performs the same local sanitization as prepare_for_external_ai and returns the approved result, so most agents should call prepare_for_external_ai instead. Use redact_text when you specifically need this lower-level compatibility path, or the 'legacy' mode for local review of raw redaction internals. The 'legacy' mode returns potentially sensitive local-review details and is never selected by default.

Returns, for normal modes, the same approved result as prepare_for_external_ai (status, sanitized_text, counts). For 'legacy' mode it returns a result with deprecation_code 'legacy_sensitive_response' containing local-review redaction data.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
textYesFree text to redact locally. Processing is on this machine; nothing is transmitted externally.
policyNoNamed redaction policy controlling which entity types are masked or blocked. Defaults to 'default'. Common values include 'default' and 'strict_external_ai'; other policies may be registered. An unknown name returns a policy_not_found error.default
response_modeNoNormal modes behave like prepare_for_external_ai: 'minimal', 'review', and 'debug' return the approved result with increasing detail. The special value 'legacy' returns raw local-review redaction internals (including a mapping that reveals original values) under deprecation_code 'legacy_sensitive_response'; it must never be sent to an external service. Defaults to 'minimal'.minimal

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription

No output parameters

TDQS

A4.9/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It transparently warns that legacy mode 'returns potentially sensitive local-review details' and 'must never be sent to an external service', and specifies the return contents (status, sanitized_text, counts) for normal modes. It also notes local processing, adding essential context about data handling.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is concisely structured: the first sentence directly states the routing preference, followed by a clear explanation of normal vs. legacy behavior, and finally the return contract. Every sentence earns its place, with no filler or repetition.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's three parameters and existing output schema, the description covers all necessary context: when to use it, what it returns, the special legacy mode with its sensitive nature, and the difference from its sibling. No critical information is missing for correct invocation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds meaningful value for response_mode by clarifying that normal modes 'behave like prepare_for_external_ai' and that the legacy value exposes original values, which is not fully captured in the schema. This extra explanation helps an agent avoid misusing the sensitive legacy path.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly identifies this as a 'Direct/lower-level redaction entry point' and explicitly states it performs 'the same local sanitization as prepare_for_external_ai', distinguishing it from the preferred sibling. It names the action (redact), the resource (text), and explains the optional legacy mode, leaving no ambiguity about what the tool does.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives explicit guidance: 'prefer prepare_for_external_ai for normal outbound workflows' and 'Use redact_text when you specifically need this lower-level compatibility path, or the legacy mode'. It names the alternative tool and the precise conditions for choosing this one, fully satisfying the when/when-not requirement.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

restore_textA

Reverse a prior SecuRedact protection step in a trusted, local-only context.

Use this ONLY after you previously received a restoration_session from SecuRedact (for example from prepare_for_external_ai with response_mode 'restore_capable') and now need to reconstruct the original text locally for trusted review. Restoration can reveal the original sensitive values (PII, secrets, credentials); it is a trusted-local operation, not a step to prepare data for external transmission. Never call it to sanitize or prepare text for an external AI; for that use prepare_for_external_ai. Never call it on text you did not previously protect with SecuRedact.

Security boundary: all processing is local and nothing leaves the machine. The 'mapping' form requires trusted_local_review=true and exposes raw originals, so its output must never be transmitted. Returns a JSON object with 'status' ('ok' or 'blocked'), 'restored_text' (present only on success), and 'reason_codes' describing any failure.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
textYesText containing SecuRedact placeholders (or a prior protected representation) to restore. Processed locally; never transmitted.
mappingNoLegacy direct mapping from placeholder token to original value. Supplying this bypasses the session vault and immediately reveals the original sensitive values. It is only honored when 'trusted_local_review' is true and 'restoration_session' is omitted.
restoration_sessionNoOpaque session token previously returned by SecuRedact (for example from prepare_for_external_ai with response_mode 'restore_capable'). It identifies the trusted local vault entry used to reverse protection and recover the original values. Required unless you supply 'mapping' together with trusted_local_review.
trusted_local_reviewNoExplicit acknowledgment that you are in a trusted local review context and accept that restoration reveals original sensitive values. Required (true) to use the 'mapping' form. It has no effect on the 'restoration_session' form.

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription

No output parameters

TDQS

A4.9/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description takes full responsibility for behavioral disclosure. It reveals that processing is entirely local and nothing leaves the machine, that the mapping form requires trusted_local_review=true and exposes raw originals that must never be transmitted, and it details the return format including 'status', 'restored_text', and 'reason_codes' for failures. This goes well beyond the schema and covers security-boundary concerns comprehensively.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is structured with a clear lead sentence stating the core action, followed by usage conditions and security boundary in a logical flow. Every sentence contributes new information—no redundancy or fluff—and the critical constraints (local-only, trusted-review) are front-loaded. The length is justified by the security-sensitive nature of the operation.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a security-sensitive restoration tool with no annotations and no explicit output schema details (though an output schema exists), the description is remarkably complete. It covers preconditions, security boundaries, parameter interactions, failure handling via reason_codes, and explicitly routes to the correct sibling for sanitization. Nothing an agent needs to call it correctly and safely is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. However, the description enriches the parameters: it explains the mapping parameter as 'legacy direct mapping' that bypasses the session vault and immediately reveals originals, describes restoration_session as an opaque token identifying the trusted vault entry, and clarifies that trusted_local_review is an acknowledgment with no effect on the session form. These security-relevant semantics add value beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description uses a specific verb 'Reverse' and identifies the resource as 'a prior SecuRedact protection step', clearly stating the local trusted-review purpose. It explicitly distinguishes itself from sibling tools by warning against using it for external AI preparation and pointing to prepare_for_external_ai for that role, so it is immediately differentiated.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives explicit preconditions: use only after receiving a restoration_session from SecuRedact (e.g., from prepare_for_external_ai with response_mode 'restore_capable'), and never on text not previously protected. It also names the alternative tool and states the exact negative condition ('never call it to sanitize or prepare text for an external AI'), leaving no ambiguity about when to choose this tool.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

securedact_read_fileA

Safely read a local file and return only its sanitized (PII/secrets removed) text.

Use this when you must ingest a local file's contents for use with an external AI but want path-traversal, size, and binary defenses plus sanitization applied first. If the content is already in memory, use prepare_for_external_ai; for a sanitized file on disk, use create_safe_copy.

Side effects: reads a file from local disk and never transmits it. Sensitive paths and escapes are blocked before any file content is read. The returned 'sanitized_text' is safe to forward.

Returns a JSON object with 'status' ('ok' or 'blocked'), 'path', and 'sanitized_text' (present only when approved).

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
pathYesLocal filesystem path to read. It is resolved and defended against path traversal, symlink/UNC escapes, and oversized or binary content (FW-011/012/013); sensitive paths are blocked before any file content is read.
policyNoNamed redaction policy applied to the file contents. Defaults to 'strict_external_ai'. An unknown name returns a policy_not_found error.strict_external_ai
max_bytesNoOptional cap on the number of bytes read from the file. When omitted, the engine's configured size limit applies.

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription

No output parameters

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description fully owns behavioral disclosure. It spells out side effects (reads file, never transmits), the defense order (sensitive paths and escapes blocked before reading), and the return structure. It even notes sanitized_text is safe to forward. This is thorough and anticipates an agent's security and safety questions.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured: purpose sentence, usage trigger, alternatives, side-effects, and return format. Every sentence serves a distinct function with no redundancy. The most important info (what it does and when to use it) is front-loaded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the output schema is present, all return fields are covered. The description addresses security, policy defaults, size limits, and side effects. There is nothing an agent needs to know to call this tool correctly that is missing or ambiguous.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all three parameters. The tool description itself does not add new meaning beyond what's in the schema, but it does echo the security posture (e.g., path defenses). Baseline 3 is appropriate because the schema carries the load and the description adds no extra helpful nuance.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Safely read a local file and return only its sanitized text.' It clearly distinguishes from siblings by naming prepare_for_external_ai (in-memory content) and create_safe_copy (sanitized file on disk), so the agent can immediately tell which tool to use.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explicitly states the condition for use: 'when you must ingest a local file's contents for use with an external AI' and gives two alternatives with the contexts under which those would be preferred. This is direct routing guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. 6 tool updatesv0.4.2
    • Changedanalyze_text3 fields changed
      • addedInput schema / properties / policy / description
        Added value: +"Named analysis policy controlling which detectors and entity types apply. Defaults to 'default'. Common values include 'default'; other policies may be registered in your environment. An unknown name returns a policy_not_found error."
      • addedInput schema / properties / response_mode / description
        Added value: +"Level of detail returned. 'minimal' returns only status and entity-type counts; 'review' additionally returns a 'findings' list with spans and entity types; 'debug' additionally returns 'debug_details' (only when debug responses are enabled). Defaults to 'minimal'."
      • addedInput schema / properties / text / description
        Added value: +"Free text to inspect locally for sensitive content. Processing is on this machine only; the original text is never modified or transmitted."
    • Changedcreate_safe_copy3 fields changed
      • addedInput schema / properties / content / description
        Added value: +"Text to sanitize locally and write to disk. Processed on this machine; never transmitted."
      • addedInput schema / properties / filename / description
        Added value: +"Bare target filename (no directory components) ending in '.txt' or '.md'. The file is created inside the configured Safe Copies directory; an existing file is never overwritten."
      • addedInput schema / properties / policy / description
        Added value: +"Named redaction policy applied before writing. Defaults to 'strict_external_ai'. An unknown name returns a policy_not_found error."
    • Changedprepare_for_external_ai4 fields changed
      • addedInput schema / properties / language / description
        Added value: +"Hint for the contextual detection language. One of 'auto' (detect automatically), 'en', or 'nl'. Defaults to 'auto'."
      • addedInput schema / properties / policy / description
        Added value: +"Named redaction policy controlling which entity types are masked or blocked. Defaults to 'strict_external_ai'. Common values include 'strict_external_ai' and 'default'; other policies may be registered in your environment. An unknown name returns a policy_not_found error."
      • addedInput schema / properties / response_mode / description
        Added value: +"Amount of detail returned. 'minimal' returns only the approved result and counts; 'review' adds per-detection findings for human review; 'debug' adds engine internals (only when debug responses are enabled); 'restore_capable' additionally returns a local restoration_session for later trusted restore_text. Defaults to 'minimal'."
      • addedInput schema / properties / text / description
        Added value: +"Free text to inspect and sanitize locally before it is sent to an external AI service. All processing happens on this machine; this tool never transmits the text to any provider."
    • Changedredact_text3 fields changed
      • addedInput schema / properties / policy / description
        Added value: +"Named redaction policy controlling which entity types are masked or blocked. Defaults to 'default'. Common values include 'default' and 'strict_external_ai'; other policies may be registered. An unknown name returns a policy_not_found error."
      • addedInput schema / properties / response_mode / description
        Added value: +"Normal modes behave like prepare_for_external_ai: 'minimal', 'review', and 'debug' return the approved result with increasing detail. The special value 'legacy' returns raw local-review redaction internals (including a mapping that reveals original values) under deprecation_code 'legacy_sensitive_response'; it must never be sent to an external service. Defaults to 'minimal'."
      • addedInput schema / properties / text / description
        Added value: +"Free text to redact locally. Processing is on this machine; nothing is transmitted externally."
    • Changedrestore_text4 fields changed
      • addedInput schema / properties / mapping / description
        Added value: +"Legacy direct mapping from placeholder token to original value. Supplying this bypasses the session vault and immediately reveals the original sensitive values. It is only honored when 'trusted_local_review' is true and 'restoration_session' is omitted."
      • addedInput schema / properties / restoration_session / description
        Added value: +"Opaque session token previously returned by SecuRedact (for example from prepare_for_external_ai with response_mode 'restore_capable'). It identifies the trusted local vault entry used to reverse protection and recover the original values. Required unless you supply 'mapping' together with trusted_local_review."
      • addedInput schema / properties / text / description
        Added value: +"Text containing SecuRedact placeholders (or a prior protected representation) to restore. Processed locally; never transmitted."
      • addedInput schema / properties / trusted_local_review / description
        Added value: +"Explicit acknowledgment that you are in a trusted local review context and accept that restoration reveals original sensitive values. Required (true) to use the 'mapping' form. It has no effect on the 'restoration_session' form."
    • Addedsecuredact_read_file
  2. 5 tool updatesv0.2.0
    • Changedanalyze_text1 field changed
      • addedInput schema / properties / response_mode
        Added value: +{
        +  "default": "minimal",
        +  "title": "Response Mode",
        +  "type": "string"
        +}
    • Changedcreate_safe_copy1 field changed
      • changedInput schema / properties / policy / default
        Previous value: -"default"New value: +"strict_external_ai"
    • Addedprepare_for_external_ai
    • Changedredact_text1 field changed
      • addedInput schema / properties / response_mode
        Added value: +{
        +  "default": "minimal",
        +  "title": "Response Mode",
        +  "type": "string"
        +}
    • Changedrestore_text11 fields changed
      • removedInput schema / properties / mapping / additionalProperties
        Removed value: -{
        -  "type": "string"
        -}
      • addedInput schema / properties / mapping / anyOf
        Added value: +[
        +  {
        +    "additionalProperties": {
        +      "type": "string"
        +    },
        +    "type": "object"
        +  },
        +  {
        +    "type": "null"
        +  }
        +]
      • addedInput schema / properties / mapping / default
        Added value: +null
      • removedInput schema / properties / mapping / type
        Removed value: -"object"
      • addedInput schema / properties / restoration_session
        Added value: +{
        +  "anyOf": [
        +    {
        +      "type": "string"
        +    },
        +    {
        +      "type": "null"
        +    }
        +  ],
        +  "default": null,
        +  "title": "Restoration Session"
        +}
      • addedInput schema / properties / trusted_local_review
        Added value: +{
        +  "default": false,
        +  "title": "Trusted Local Review",
        +  "type": "boolean"
        +}
      • changedInput schema / required
        Previous value: -[
        -  "text",
        -  "mapping"
        -]New value: +[
        +  "text"
        +]
      • addedOutput schema / additionalProperties
        Added value: +true
      • removedOutput schema / properties
        Removed value: -{
        -  "result": {
        -    "title": "Result",
        -    "type": "string"
        -  }
        -}
      • removedOutput schema / required
        Removed value: -[
        -  "result"
        -]
      • changedOutput schema / title
        Previous value: -"restore_textOutput"New value: +"restore_textDictOutput"
  3. 4 tool updatesv0.1.0
    • First observedanalyze_text
    • First observedcreate_safe_copy
    • First observedredact_text
    • First observedrestore_text

TDQS

A4.6/5.0

Scored across 6 tools

Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have clearly distinct purposes (analyze, restore, create, read file), but redact_text is explicitly described as a lower-level compatibility path that performs the same sanitization as prepare_for_external_ai, which could cause misselection if an agent reads only the names. The detailed descriptions mitigate this ambiguity, keeping it to just one confusing pair.

Naming Consistency4/5

All tool names use snake_case and mostly follow a verb_noun pattern (analyze_text, redact_text, restore_text, create_safe_copy). prepare_for_external_ai and securedact_read_file deviate slightly—one uses a longer phrase and the other has a product-name prefix—but the overall style remains predictable and readable.

Tool Count5/5

With 6 tools, the server is well-scoped for its purpose of text sanitization and file handling. Each tool covers a distinct workflow step (inspect, sanitize, restore, file read/write), and the count is within the ideal 3-15 range without being bloated or sparse.

Completeness5/5

The tool surface covers the full lifecycle of sensitive text handling: sanitizing for external AI, inspection-only analysis, lower-level redaction, restoration, creating safe copies, and reading files safely. No obvious dead ends or missing operations for the stated domain; the additional file-oriented tools fill a practical gap.

Maintenance

ActivityActive
ResponsivenessNo issues

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