securedact-mcp
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TDQS
Scored across 6 tools
Most tools have clearly distinct outputs (in-memory text, file write, file read, inspection, restoration), but prepare_for_external_ai and redact_text perform identical sanitization in normal modes, with redact_text explicitly deferring to prepare_for_external_ai. This creates a potential misselection point despite the helpful cross-references.
The majority of tools follow a clean verb_noun pattern (analyze_text, redact_text, restore_text, create_safe_copy). prepare_for_external_ai and securedact_read_file deviate with a prepositional phrase and a brand prefix, but the overall naming remains readable and predictable.
Six tools is well within the ideal scope for a focused sanitization server. Each tool maps to a distinct workflow step, and none feel extraneous enough to bloat the surface.
The set covers the core lifecycle: inspection, in-memory sanitization, safe file output, safe file input, and session restoration. Minor gaps exist around policy management and the redundant redact_text path, but there are no critical dead ends for the stated purpose.