securedact-mcp
The Securedact MCP server is a local-first privacy layer for AI workflows. You can:
Analyze text (
analyze_text): Detect and classify sensitive data (PII, identifiers, contextual info) locally, without external transmission.Redact text (
redact_text): Replace detected sensitive values with stable typed placeholders (e.g.,[EMAIL_1]) according to a named privacy policy, returning anok/review_required/blockedstatus and a mapping for later restoration.Restore text (
restore_text): Reverse redaction by substituting placeholders with original values using a caller-supplied mapping.Create safe copy (
create_safe_copy): Write sanitized content to a.txtor.mdfile in a pre-configured safe directory (SECUREDACT_SAFE_COPY_DIR), preventing overwrites.Manage contextual models: Install, verify, update, or remove English/Dutch Flair models from Hugging Face for offline, local operation.
Fail-closed operation: The system fails closed if required contextual capability is unavailable, and can be configured to permit deterministic/rule-based mode.
Click on "Install Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@securedact-mcpRedact any sensitive data from this text."
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
SecuRedact MCP
SecuRedact is a local-first privacy and security layer for AI agents and AI workflows. It detects and protects sensitive data — personal data / PII, GDPR-sensitive information, credentials, API keys, tokens, secrets, and sensitive files — before that data reaches models, tools, files, or external destinations.
SecuRedact MCP is the Apache-2.0 open-source MCP server and reusable Python privacy engine. It detects sensitive text, applies versioned policies, redacts locally, and validates residual output before marking sanitized content approved.
MCP mode does not automatically intercept every prompt. The host must invoke the tool and send only
sanitized_textwhenstatus == "ok"; a misconfigured or malicious MCP host can bypass that ordinary MCP workflow. Provider-native enforced hooks are separate integration assets: when a supported provider invokes such a hook at its prompt lifecycle boundary, it can apply the same deterministic decision before normal model processing. See SecuRedact Enforced.
Why SecuRedact
AI agents increasingly read files, call tools, and send prompts to external models. That exposes PII, credentials, and sensitive documents unless something checks the data first. SecuRedact is a privacy and security control for AI workflows:
Local-first — all detection, redaction, and policy evaluation run on your machine. No network listener by default, no telemetry, no provider calls.
PII / GDPR detection — names, emails, IBANs, identifiers, and special-category data are detected and pseudonymized or redacted.
Secret & credential protection — API keys, tokens, and passwords are detected and blocked from leaving your environment.
Filesystem protection — reads are defended against traversal/symlink escapes and blocked from protected paths such as
.env.AI Agent Privacy Firewall — enforced hooks for Claude Code and Gemini CLI run the same local decision before a prompt, model call, or tool action proceeds.
Network / egress awareness — outbound tool calls are classified (internal/external/unknown) so policy can require approval or block egress.
SecuRedact helps reduce exposure of sensitive data; it is not a guarantee of compliance or a claim that every leak is prevented. See Limitations.
Related MCP server: phi-redact-mcp
HIPAA Safe Harbor (0.5.0)
SecuRedact 0.5.0 adds a HIPAA Safe Harbor mechanical-de-identification aid for
45 CFR 164.514(b)(2) text processing. It builds on the existing deterministic
detection stack and adds an 18-category Safe Harbor mapping, US-specific identifiers
(SSN with area/group/serial validation, US ZIP/ZIP+4, health-plan beneficiary,
account numbers, ages over 89, VIN-format vehicle identifiers, fax), and an optional
validated Flair PERSON-only gate for Category A (Names).
Use engine.hipaa_safe_harbor(text) or the HIPAA_SAFE_HARBOR_POLICY policy. This is
a mechanical aid, not a compliance certification: it cannot satisfy the
actual-knowledge prong (164.514(b)(2)(ii)) or replace Expert Determination
(164.514(b)(1)). See
docs/hipaa-safe-harbor-profile.md and
docs/hipaa-safe-harbor-gap-analysis.md.
Quick start
Install from PyPI and run the guided setup (Windows):
py -3.12 -m pip install "securedact-mcp[ml]"
securedact-mcp setupLinux / macOS:
python3.12 -m pip install "securedact-mcp[ml]"
securedact-mcp setupProtect a piece of text in seconds (deterministic-only demo, no model needed):
import os
os.environ["SECUREDACT_REQUIRE_FLAIR"] = "0" # deterministic detectors only
from securedact_core import RedactionRequest, SecuredactEngine
engine = SecuredactEngine.from_environment()
result = engine.prepare(
RedactionRequest(
text="Contact alex@example.test, IBAN NL91ABNA0417164300",
policy="strict_external_ai",
)
)
print(result.status) # "ok"
print(result.sanitized_text) # "Contact [EMAIL_1], IBAN [IBAN_1]"Reproducible synthetic security demos: docs/distribution/security-demo.md.
Safe default workflow
Use prepare_for_external_ai for normal external-AI preparation:
{
"text": "Contact alex@example.test",
"policy": "strict_external_ai",
"language": "auto",
"response_mode": "minimal"
}Approved response:
{
"schema_version": "1",
"status": "ok",
"sanitized_text": "Contact [EMAIL_1]",
"counts": {"email": 1},
"policy": "strict_external_ai",
"policy_version": 1,
"policy_digest": "...",
"reason_codes": []
}review_required and blocked responses never contain approved
sanitized_text. Minimal responses contain no original text, raw entity values,
mapping, exception body, stack trace, model path, or restoration handle unless
restore_capable was explicitly selected.
Architecture and trust boundary
flowchart LR
H["MCP host"] --> M["Securedact MCP"]
M --> D["deterministic detectors"]
M --> C["contextual detectors"]
D --> P["policy engine"]
C --> P
P --> R["redactor"]
R --> V["residual validator"]
V --> O["approved sanitized output"]
O --> W["host-controlled downstream workflow"]
H -. "host may bypass MCP" .-> WThe server has no provider clients, OpenAI-compatible proxy, reverse proxy, website, desktop chatbot, provider credentials, or provider-specific forwarding. See ADR 0001 and the threat model.
Tools
Tool | Intended use | Sensitive-response behavior |
| Recommended complete safe workflow | Minimal by default |
| Lower-level local analysis/review | Minimal; offsets in |
| Lower-level compatibility operation | Minimal by default; explicit |
| Consume a local opaque session | Single-use by default; direct mappings require explicit trusted legacy mode |
| Write approved | Returns no mapping or absolute path |
| Safely read a local file and return only sanitized text | Blocks protected paths before reading; rejects traversal/symlink/binary; |
Response modes are minimal, review, debug, and restore_capable. Debug is
disabled unless the process was started with
SECUREDACT_ENABLE_DEBUG_RESPONSES=1; an MCP request cannot enable it. In-memory
restoration sessions use cryptographic random handles, bounded capacity,
expiration, concurrency protection, and single-use consumption. Process exit
destroys all sessions.
See MCP tools, response privacy, and restoration sessions.
Installation
Python >=3.12,<3.13 is supported.
For a normal installation from PyPI:
py -3.12 -m pip install "securedact-mcp[ml]"
securedact-mcp setupOn Linux or macOS, use python3.12 -m pip install "securedact-mcp[ml]";
python -m pip install "securedact-mcp[ml]" is also appropriate when python
already selects a supported 3.12 environment.
setup checks the package, Python and ML dependencies, inspects local model
state, offers the existing consent-based model installer, runs the existing
offline verifier, and offers the packaged Claude Code and Gemini CLI
integrations when those hosts are detected. It uses the providers' official
plugin/extension commands and is safe to rerun. It does not call a provider
model API, accept provider trust automatically, or download a contextual model
unless the user explicitly selects model setup and accepts the existing
upstream prompt.
Manual model commands remain available for advanced or unattended operation:
securedact-mcp install
securedact-mcp models verify
securedact-mcpThe last command starts a local stdio server. Standard output is reserved for
MCP protocol messages. securedact-mcp setup --non-interactive reports state
without implying upstream acceptance or configuring a new provider. Use
--host claude, --host gemini, or --host all for targeted interactive
provider setup.
Developer/source installation
To work from a reviewed source checkout instead:
git clone https://github.com/GigantesHJI/securedact-mcp.git
cd securedact-mcp
python -m pip install ".[ml]"
securedact-mcp setupNo model checkpoint is included in the repository or wheel, and startup never downloads one. Securedact does not redistribute these model weights. Upstream model weights retain their own licenses and are not relicensed by Apache-2.0. See model installation and third-party licenses.
Deterministic-only local development must be explicitly selected:
$env:SECUREDACT_REQUIRE_FLAIR = "0"
securedact-mcpProduction defaults to requiring contextual capability and fails closed while a configured model is missing, loading, corrupt, or unavailable.
Host packages
Tested configuration assets and safe-workflow instructions are under
integrations/ for Codex, Cursor, and Windsurf. The automated MCP client harness
validates server startup, tool listing, calls, minimal response shape, stdout
integrity, and shutdown. It does not prove that a real host invokes the tool for
every prompt. See the compatibility evidence.
The repository is also a Gemini CLI extension root: gemini extensions install https://github.com/GigantesHJI/securedact-mcp can install the hooks. The
gemini-cli-extension topic and a release whose tag tree contains the root
manifest are required for that path to resolve; without pip install "securedact-mcp[ml]" and the local models the installed hooks do not enforce
anything. See SecuRedact Enforced.
Policies and Python API
Built-ins include default, strict_external_ai, gdpr, identifiers_only,
and review_all_contextual; compatibility policies remain available. Local
organization policy files load only from the controlled policy directory, use a
strict declarative schema, and cannot disable fail-closed invariants. Unknown,
duplicate, oversized, malformed, or symlinked policies fail closed.
from securedact_core import RedactionRequest, SecuredactEngine
engine = SecuredactEngine.from_environment()
result = engine.prepare(
RedactionRequest(
text="Contact alex@example.test",
policy="strict_external_ai",
)
)from_environment() preserves the contextual-model requirement. Standalone
deterministic development requires SECUREDACT_REQUIRE_FLAIR=0; applications may
also inject tested detector implementations. See public API
and policies.
Reproducible development
The committed uv.lock resolves runtime, ML, development, benchmark, and
security extras for Python 3.12.
uv sync --frozen --extra dev --extra benchmark
uv run python scripts\verify.pyNever use real personal information, private documents, credentials, customer logs, or model weights in tests, issues, screenshots, fixtures, or pull requests. See CONTRIBUTING.md.
Evaluation and performance
uv run python -m securedact_eval quality --mode deterministic --gate `
--thresholds benchmarks\thresholds.json `
--baseline benchmarks\baselines\quality-deterministic.json
uv run python -m securedact_eval performance --mode deterministicThe versioned synthetic corpus reports exact and relaxed span precision, recall, F1, false-positive and false-negative rates, per-entity/language/domain/split results, action/category accuracy, and bootstrap recall intervals. True negatives are document-level negative examples, not token-level safety. The GDPR-related suite is detection evaluation, not legal compliance certification. Real Flair and GPU benchmarks require an explicitly configured local model and are not ordinary CI. See benchmarking. The benchmark framework documents local data tiers and large profiles; the migration plan defines its future extraction boundary. For a failure before GitHub executes repository steps, use the CI troubleshooting decision tree. Local success does not replace a required GitHub check.
Security and limitations
No prompt, finding, mapping, restoration handle, secret, model input, or restored output is logged by application code.
Deterministic and contextual detection can miss novel, ambiguous, or adversarial disclosure; coreference and universal obfuscation resistance are not claimed.
Review offsets let a trusted local client with the original input reconstruct a value; keep review responses local.
Host behavior and downstream provider behavior are outside the trust boundary.
Repository security settings documented in files still require administrator verification.
Report vulnerabilities privately using SECURITY.md. Do not put vulnerability details or real data in a public issue.
License
Original repository source and documentation are licensed under the Apache License 2.0. Copyright attribution is recorded in NOTICE. Third-party dependencies and model weights retain their own licenses.
Available Tools
6 toolsanalyze_textA
Inspect text locally and report detected sensitive content without producing sanitized output.
Use this when you need to understand what PII, secrets, or credentials are present (counts, entity types, and, with review/debug modes, positions) but do not need redacted text for transmission. The original text is not modified and no sanitized representation is returned. For a policy-approved, ready-to-send result use prepare_for_external_ai; for a sanitized file use create_safe_copy; for reversing a prior local session use restore_text.
Returns a JSON object with 'status' ('ok', 'review_required', or 'blocked'), 'policy', 'policy_version', 'policy_digest', 'counts' (entity-type tallies), and, when response_mode is 'review' or 'debug', a 'findings' list. 'debug' additionally returns 'debug_details'.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| text | Yes | Free text to inspect locally for sensitive content. Processing is on this machine only; the original text is never modified or transmitted. | |
| policy | No | Named analysis policy controlling which detectors and entity types apply. Defaults to 'default'. Common values include 'default'; other policies may be registered in your environment. An unknown name returns a policy_not_found error. | default |
| response_mode | No | Level of detail returned. 'minimal' returns only status and entity-type counts; 'review' additionally returns a 'findings' list with spans and entity types; 'debug' additionally returns 'debug_details' (only when debug responses are enabled). Defaults to 'minimal'. | minimal |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It states the text is processed locally, never modified, and no sanitized representation is returned. It also discloses conditions like 'debug responses are enabled' and the policy_not_found error, giving a complete picture of side effects and edge behavior.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is dense but well-organized: a one-line purpose statement, then usage guidance, alternatives, and return format all in a compact sequence. Every sentence adds value; there is no fluff or repetition, and the critical scoping constraint ('without producing sanitized output') is front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool has 3 parameters, all fully documented in the schema, and an output schema (implied via the described JSON structure). The description explains the return object thoroughly, including conditional fields for review/debug modes, and covers error behavior for unknown policies. Nothing an agent needs to invoke it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
All three parameters already have descriptive schema entries (coverage 100%), so the baseline is 3. The description adds meaningful context beyond the schema: it explains the effect of response_mode on the return structure, describes the policy error condition, and reiterates local-only processing for the text parameter. This extra context justifies a 4 rather than a baseline 3.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb-resource pair ('Inspect text locally') and explicitly distinguishes the tool by stating it reports sensitive content 'without producing sanitized output.' This clearly differentiates it from siblings like prepare_for_external_ai and create_safe_copy, making its purpose immediately unambiguous.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit when-to-use guidance: 'Use this when you need to understand what PII, secrets, or credentials are present... but do not need redacted text for transmission.' It then names three alternatives with their appropriate contexts (prepare_for_external_ai, create_safe_copy, restore_text), leaving no ambiguity about tool selection.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
create_safe_copyA
Sanitize text locally and write the approved result to a new file in the Safe Copies directory.
Use this when you need a sanitized on-disk copy (for storage, handoff, or archival) rather than an in-memory sanitized string. For the sanitized text only, use prepare_for_external_ai; for inspection-only use analyze_text; for reversing a prior session use restore_text.
Side effects: a new file is written to the directory set by SECUREDACT_SAFE_COPY_DIR. The supplied 'content' is not modified and no existing file is overwritten. The filename must be a bare '.txt' or '.md' basename (no path separators or directory traversal). The operation blocks and reports 'blocked' if the directory is unconfigured, the filename is invalid, or policy blocks the content.
Returns a JSON object with 'status' ('ok' or 'blocked'), 'filename', and 'counts'.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| policy | No | Named redaction policy applied before writing. Defaults to 'strict_external_ai'. An unknown name returns a policy_not_found error. | strict_external_ai |
| content | Yes | Text to sanitize locally and write to disk. Processed on this machine; never transmitted. | |
| filename | Yes | Bare target filename (no directory components) ending in '.txt' or '.md'. The file is created inside the configured Safe Copies directory; an existing file is never overwritten. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are present, so the description carries the full burden—and it excels. It discloses side effects: writes a new file to SECUREDACT_SAFE_COPY_DIR, does not modify 'content', never overwrites an existing file, blocks with status 'blocked' under specific conditions, and returns a JSON structure. This is a thorough disclosure of behavior beyond the schema.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is well-structured: core action first, then usage guidance, then side effects, then return format. Each paragraph adds distinct value with no redundancy. Concise yet complete, and front-loaded with the most important decision-driving information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's moderate complexity (3 parameters, no nested objects), an output schema exists (per signals), and the description itself explains side effects, blocking conditions, filename constraints, and return format. Nothing an agent needs to call it correctly is missing. The description is fully self-contained even without annotations.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema fully describes all three parameters. The description adds practical context (e.g., filename must be bare, policy defaults to 'strict_external_ai', content is never transmitted) but does not materially enhance the semantic meaning beyond what the schema already provides. Baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific action ('sanitize text locally and write the approved result to a new file'), names the resource ('Safe Copies directory'), and explicitly differentiates from all four siblings by naming them and the conditions under which each is preferred. An agent can immediately tell this tool writes a sanitized copy to disk.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The second paragraph gives explicit when-to-use guidance: 'Use this when you need a sanitized on-disk copy... rather than an in-memory sanitized string,' and names the alternative tools (prepare_for_external_ai, analyze_text, restore_text) with their complementary use cases. This fully eliminates ambiguity about tool selection.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
prepare_for_external_aiA
Use this before sending user-supplied or potentially sensitive text to an external AI service.
SecuRedact inspects and sanitizes the text locally and returns the policy-approved representation; this tool does not transmit the text externally. It is the recommended default for outbound AI workflows. Use analyze_text for inspection-only classifications, redact_text for the lower-level compatibility path, create_safe_copy when a sanitized file is required, and restore_text only to reverse a prior local session in a trusted context.
Returns a JSON object with 'status' ('ok', 'review_required', or 'blocked'), 'sanitized_text' (present only when approved), 'counts', 'policy', and optionally 'restoration_session' (when response_mode is 'restore_capable').
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| text | Yes | Free text to inspect and sanitize locally before it is sent to an external AI service. All processing happens on this machine; this tool never transmits the text to any provider. | |
| policy | No | Named redaction policy controlling which entity types are masked or blocked. Defaults to 'strict_external_ai'. Common values include 'strict_external_ai' and 'default'; other policies may be registered in your environment. An unknown name returns a policy_not_found error. | strict_external_ai |
| language | No | Hint for the contextual detection language. One of 'auto' (detect automatically), 'en', or 'nl'. Defaults to 'auto'. | auto |
| response_mode | No | Amount of detail returned. 'minimal' returns only the approved result and counts; 'review' adds per-detection findings for human review; 'debug' adds engine internals (only when debug responses are enabled); 'restore_capable' additionally returns a local restoration_session for later trusted restore_text. Defaults to 'minimal'. | minimal |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full transparency burden and does well by stating that the tool does not transmit text externally, operates locally, can return different statuses, and optionally creates a restoration session. It also discloses the policy_not_found error behavior. It could go slightly further on whether any local state or session data is persisted, but overall it is transparent for a sanitization tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the primary use case, then a clear sibling-routing paragraph, then a concise output contract. Every sentence earns its place, and the structure makes it easy for an agent to scan quickly.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description covers when to use the tool, how it behaves, what alternatives exist, and what the return value looks like including statuses and optional fields. With a rich input schema and output schema present, nothing essential is missing for an agent to select and invoke it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, and the input schema already explains text, policy, language, and response_mode in detail. The description adds little new parameter-level meaning beyond the schema, but the schema is fully sufficient, so the baseline score of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific use case: preparing user-supplied or sensitive text before sending it to an external AI service, with local sanitization via SecuRedact. It clearly differentiates from siblings by naming each alternative and its purpose (analyze_text, redact_text, create_safe_copy, restore_text).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It explicitly recommends this tool as the default for outbound AI workflows and gives concrete routing rules: analyze_text for inspection-only, redact_text for lower-level compatibility, create_safe_copy when a file is needed, and restore_text only for reversing a prior local session. This leaves little ambiguity about when to choose it.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
redact_textA
Direct/lower-level redaction entry point; prefer prepare_for_external_ai for normal outbound workflows.
In its normal modes this performs the same local sanitization as prepare_for_external_ai and returns the approved result, so most agents should call prepare_for_external_ai instead. Use redact_text when you specifically need this lower-level compatibility path, or the 'legacy' mode for local review of raw redaction internals. The 'legacy' mode returns potentially sensitive local-review details and is never selected by default.
Returns, for normal modes, the same approved result as prepare_for_external_ai (status, sanitized_text, counts). For 'legacy' mode it returns a result with deprecation_code 'legacy_sensitive_response' containing local-review redaction data.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| text | Yes | Free text to redact locally. Processing is on this machine; nothing is transmitted externally. | |
| policy | No | Named redaction policy controlling which entity types are masked or blocked. Defaults to 'default'. Common values include 'default' and 'strict_external_ai'; other policies may be registered. An unknown name returns a policy_not_found error. | default |
| response_mode | No | Normal modes behave like prepare_for_external_ai: 'minimal', 'review', and 'debug' return the approved result with increasing detail. The special value 'legacy' returns raw local-review redaction internals (including a mapping that reveals original values) under deprecation_code 'legacy_sensitive_response'; it must never be sent to an external service. Defaults to 'minimal'. | minimal |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It transparently warns that legacy mode 'returns potentially sensitive local-review details' and 'must never be sent to an external service', and specifies the return contents (status, sanitized_text, counts) for normal modes. It also notes local processing, adding essential context about data handling.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concisely structured: the first sentence directly states the routing preference, followed by a clear explanation of normal vs. legacy behavior, and finally the return contract. Every sentence earns its place, with no filler or repetition.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's three parameters and existing output schema, the description covers all necessary context: when to use it, what it returns, the special legacy mode with its sensitive nature, and the difference from its sibling. No critical information is missing for correct invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds meaningful value for response_mode by clarifying that normal modes 'behave like prepare_for_external_ai' and that the legacy value exposes original values, which is not fully captured in the schema. This extra explanation helps an agent avoid misusing the sensitive legacy path.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly identifies this as a 'Direct/lower-level redaction entry point' and explicitly states it performs 'the same local sanitization as prepare_for_external_ai', distinguishing it from the preferred sibling. It names the action (redact), the resource (text), and explains the optional legacy mode, leaving no ambiguity about what the tool does.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit guidance: 'prefer prepare_for_external_ai for normal outbound workflows' and 'Use redact_text when you specifically need this lower-level compatibility path, or the legacy mode'. It names the alternative tool and the precise conditions for choosing this one, fully satisfying the when/when-not requirement.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
restore_textA
Reverse a prior SecuRedact protection step in a trusted, local-only context.
Use this ONLY after you previously received a restoration_session from SecuRedact (for example from prepare_for_external_ai with response_mode 'restore_capable') and now need to reconstruct the original text locally for trusted review. Restoration can reveal the original sensitive values (PII, secrets, credentials); it is a trusted-local operation, not a step to prepare data for external transmission. Never call it to sanitize or prepare text for an external AI; for that use prepare_for_external_ai. Never call it on text you did not previously protect with SecuRedact.
Security boundary: all processing is local and nothing leaves the machine. The 'mapping' form requires trusted_local_review=true and exposes raw originals, so its output must never be transmitted. Returns a JSON object with 'status' ('ok' or 'blocked'), 'restored_text' (present only on success), and 'reason_codes' describing any failure.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| text | Yes | Text containing SecuRedact placeholders (or a prior protected representation) to restore. Processed locally; never transmitted. | |
| mapping | No | Legacy direct mapping from placeholder token to original value. Supplying this bypasses the session vault and immediately reveals the original sensitive values. It is only honored when 'trusted_local_review' is true and 'restoration_session' is omitted. | |
| restoration_session | No | Opaque session token previously returned by SecuRedact (for example from prepare_for_external_ai with response_mode 'restore_capable'). It identifies the trusted local vault entry used to reverse protection and recover the original values. Required unless you supply 'mapping' together with trusted_local_review. | |
| trusted_local_review | No | Explicit acknowledgment that you are in a trusted local review context and accept that restoration reveals original sensitive values. Required (true) to use the 'mapping' form. It has no effect on the 'restoration_session' form. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description takes full responsibility for behavioral disclosure. It reveals that processing is entirely local and nothing leaves the machine, that the mapping form requires trusted_local_review=true and exposes raw originals that must never be transmitted, and it details the return format including 'status', 'restored_text', and 'reason_codes' for failures. This goes well beyond the schema and covers security-boundary concerns comprehensively.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is structured with a clear lead sentence stating the core action, followed by usage conditions and security boundary in a logical flow. Every sentence contributes new information—no redundancy or fluff—and the critical constraints (local-only, trusted-review) are front-loaded. The length is justified by the security-sensitive nature of the operation.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a security-sensitive restoration tool with no annotations and no explicit output schema details (though an output schema exists), the description is remarkably complete. It covers preconditions, security boundaries, parameter interactions, failure handling via reason_codes, and explicitly routes to the correct sibling for sanitization. Nothing an agent needs to call it correctly and safely is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. However, the description enriches the parameters: it explains the mapping parameter as 'legacy direct mapping' that bypasses the session vault and immediately reveals originals, describes restoration_session as an opaque token identifying the trusted vault entry, and clarifies that trusted_local_review is an acknowledgment with no effect on the session form. These security-relevant semantics add value beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb 'Reverse' and identifies the resource as 'a prior SecuRedact protection step', clearly stating the local trusted-review purpose. It explicitly distinguishes itself from sibling tools by warning against using it for external AI preparation and pointing to prepare_for_external_ai for that role, so it is immediately differentiated.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit preconditions: use only after receiving a restoration_session from SecuRedact (e.g., from prepare_for_external_ai with response_mode 'restore_capable'), and never on text not previously protected. It also names the alternative tool and states the exact negative condition ('never call it to sanitize or prepare text for an external AI'), leaving no ambiguity about when to choose this tool.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
securedact_read_fileA
Safely read a local file and return only its sanitized (PII/secrets removed) text.
Use this when you must ingest a local file's contents for use with an external AI but want path-traversal, size, and binary defenses plus sanitization applied first. If the content is already in memory, use prepare_for_external_ai; for a sanitized file on disk, use create_safe_copy.
Side effects: reads a file from local disk and never transmits it. Sensitive paths and escapes are blocked before any file content is read. The returned 'sanitized_text' is safe to forward.
Returns a JSON object with 'status' ('ok' or 'blocked'), 'path', and 'sanitized_text' (present only when approved).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| path | Yes | Local filesystem path to read. It is resolved and defended against path traversal, symlink/UNC escapes, and oversized or binary content (FW-011/012/013); sensitive paths are blocked before any file content is read. | |
| policy | No | Named redaction policy applied to the file contents. Defaults to 'strict_external_ai'. An unknown name returns a policy_not_found error. | strict_external_ai |
| max_bytes | No | Optional cap on the number of bytes read from the file. When omitted, the engine's configured size limit applies. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description fully owns behavioral disclosure. It spells out side effects (reads file, never transmits), the defense order (sensitive paths and escapes blocked before reading), and the return structure. It even notes sanitized_text is safe to forward. This is thorough and anticipates an agent's security and safety questions.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is well-structured: purpose sentence, usage trigger, alternatives, side-effects, and return format. Every sentence serves a distinct function with no redundancy. The most important info (what it does and when to use it) is front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the output schema is present, all return fields are covered. The description addresses security, policy defaults, size limits, and side effects. There is nothing an agent needs to know to call this tool correctly that is missing or ambiguous.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all three parameters. The tool description itself does not add new meaning beyond what's in the schema, but it does echo the security posture (e.g., path defenses). Baseline 3 is appropriate because the schema carries the load and the description adds no extra helpful nuance.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Safely read a local file and return only its sanitized text.' It clearly distinguishes from siblings by naming prepare_for_external_ai (in-memory content) and create_safe_copy (sanitized file on disk), so the agent can immediately tell which tool to use.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It explicitly states the condition for use: 'when you must ingest a local file's contents for use with an external AI' and gives two alternatives with the contexts under which those would be preferred. This is direct routing guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
6 tool updates
v0.4.2- Changed
analyze_text3 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / policy / descriptionAdded value: +"Named analysis policy controlling which detectors and entity types apply. Defaults to 'default'. Common values include 'default'; other policies may be registered in your environment. An unknown name returns a policy_not_found error." - added
Input schema / properties / response_mode / descriptionAdded value: +"Level of detail returned. 'minimal' returns only status and entity-type counts; 'review' additionally returns a 'findings' list with spans and entity types; 'debug' additionally returns 'debug_details' (only when debug responses are enabled). Defaults to 'minimal'." - added
Input schema / properties / text / descriptionAdded value: +"Free text to inspect locally for sensitive content. Processing is on this machine only; the original text is never modified or transmitted."
- Changed
create_safe_copy3 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / content / descriptionAdded value: +"Text to sanitize locally and write to disk. Processed on this machine; never transmitted." - added
Input schema / properties / filename / descriptionAdded value: +"Bare target filename (no directory components) ending in '.txt' or '.md'. The file is created inside the configured Safe Copies directory; an existing file is never overwritten." - added
Input schema / properties / policy / descriptionAdded value: +"Named redaction policy applied before writing. Defaults to 'strict_external_ai'. An unknown name returns a policy_not_found error."
- Changed
prepare_for_external_ai4 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / language / descriptionAdded value: +"Hint for the contextual detection language. One of 'auto' (detect automatically), 'en', or 'nl'. Defaults to 'auto'." - added
Input schema / properties / policy / descriptionAdded value: +"Named redaction policy controlling which entity types are masked or blocked. Defaults to 'strict_external_ai'. Common values include 'strict_external_ai' and 'default'; other policies may be registered in your environment. An unknown name returns a policy_not_found error." - added
Input schema / properties / response_mode / descriptionAdded value: +"Amount of detail returned. 'minimal' returns only the approved result and counts; 'review' adds per-detection findings for human review; 'debug' adds engine internals (only when debug responses are enabled); 'restore_capable' additionally returns a local restoration_session for later trusted restore_text. Defaults to 'minimal'." - added
Input schema / properties / text / descriptionAdded value: +"Free text to inspect and sanitize locally before it is sent to an external AI service. All processing happens on this machine; this tool never transmits the text to any provider."
- Changed
redact_text3 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / policy / descriptionAdded value: +"Named redaction policy controlling which entity types are masked or blocked. Defaults to 'default'. Common values include 'default' and 'strict_external_ai'; other policies may be registered. An unknown name returns a policy_not_found error." - added
Input schema / properties / response_mode / descriptionAdded value: +"Normal modes behave like prepare_for_external_ai: 'minimal', 'review', and 'debug' return the approved result with increasing detail. The special value 'legacy' returns raw local-review redaction internals (including a mapping that reveals original values) under deprecation_code 'legacy_sensitive_response'; it must never be sent to an external service. Defaults to 'minimal'." - added
Input schema / properties / text / descriptionAdded value: +"Free text to redact locally. Processing is on this machine; nothing is transmitted externally."
- Changed
restore_text4 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / mapping / descriptionAdded value: +"Legacy direct mapping from placeholder token to original value. Supplying this bypasses the session vault and immediately reveals the original sensitive values. It is only honored when 'trusted_local_review' is true and 'restoration_session' is omitted." - added
Input schema / properties / restoration_session / descriptionAdded value: +"Opaque session token previously returned by SecuRedact (for example from prepare_for_external_ai with response_mode 'restore_capable'). It identifies the trusted local vault entry used to reverse protection and recover the original values. Required unless you supply 'mapping' together with trusted_local_review." - added
Input schema / properties / text / descriptionAdded value: +"Text containing SecuRedact placeholders (or a prior protected representation) to restore. Processed locally; never transmitted." - added
Input schema / properties / trusted_local_review / descriptionAdded value: +"Explicit acknowledgment that you are in a trusted local review context and accept that restoration reveals original sensitive values. Required (true) to use the 'mapping' form. It has no effect on the 'restoration_session' form."
- Added
securedact_read_file
5 tool updates
v0.2.0- Changed
analyze_text1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / response_modeAdded value: +{ + "default": "minimal", + "title": "Response Mode", + "type": "string" +}
- Changed
create_safe_copy1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / policy / defaultPrevious value: -"default"New value: +"strict_external_ai"
- Added
prepare_for_external_ai - Changed
redact_text1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / response_modeAdded value: +{ + "default": "minimal", + "title": "Response Mode", + "type": "string" +}
- Changed
restore_text11 fields changed- removed
Input schema / properties / mapping / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -{ - "type": "string" -} - added
Input schema / properties / mapping / anyOfAdded value: +[ + { + "additionalProperties": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } +] - added
Input schema / properties / mapping / defaultAdded value: +null - removed
Input schema / properties / mapping / typeRemoved value: -"object" - added
Input schema / properties / restoration_sessionAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "title": "Restoration Session" +} - added
Input schema / properties / trusted_local_reviewAdded value: +{ + "default": false, + "title": "Trusted Local Review", + "type": "boolean" +} - changed
Input schema / requiredPrevious value: -[ - "text", - "mapping" -]New value: +[ + "text" +] - added
Output schema / additionalPropertiesAdded value: +true - removed
Output schema / propertiesRemoved value: -{ - "result": { - "title": "Result", - "type": "string" - } -} - removed
Output schema / requiredRemoved value: -[ - "result" -] - changed
Output schema / titlePrevious value: -"restore_textOutput"New value: +"restore_textDictOutput"
4 tool updates
v0.1.0- First observed
analyze_text - First observed
create_safe_copy - First observed
redact_text - First observed
restore_text
TDQS
Scored across 6 tools
Most tools have clearly distinct purposes (analyze, restore, create, read file), but redact_text is explicitly described as a lower-level compatibility path that performs the same sanitization as prepare_for_external_ai, which could cause misselection if an agent reads only the names. The detailed descriptions mitigate this ambiguity, keeping it to just one confusing pair.
All tool names use snake_case and mostly follow a verb_noun pattern (analyze_text, redact_text, restore_text, create_safe_copy). prepare_for_external_ai and securedact_read_file deviate slightly—one uses a longer phrase and the other has a product-name prefix—but the overall style remains predictable and readable.
With 6 tools, the server is well-scoped for its purpose of text sanitization and file handling. Each tool covers a distinct workflow step (inspect, sanitize, restore, file read/write), and the count is within the ideal 3-15 range without being bloated or sparse.
The tool surface covers the full lifecycle of sensitive text handling: sanitizing for external AI, inspection-only analysis, lower-level redaction, restoration, creating safe copies, and reading files safely. No obvious dead ends or missing operations for the stated domain; the additional file-oriented tools fill a practical gap.
Maintenance
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