Trust Gate MCP
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| TRUST_GATE_BEARER_TOKEN | No | Optional bearer token for authentication. | |
| TRUST_GATE_ALLOWED_ORIGINS | No | Comma-separated list of allowed origins for CORS. |
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {
"listChanged": false
} |
| prompts | {
"listChanged": false
} |
| resources | {
"subscribe": false,
"listChanged": false
} |
| experimental | {} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| mint_receipt_for_record_changeB | Mint a post-quantum receipt for one CRM record change. Old/new values are carried as SHA-256 hashes. Works with any CRM (Relaticle, hosted CRMs, custom). |
| audit_my_agent_inventoryA | Rank a CALLER-PROVIDED list of MCP tools by worst-regret if they act, with a signed receipt. Cannot auto-discover the inventory -- MCP does not allow that; the caller must pass it in. |
| mint_action_receiptA | Mint a post-quantum receipt for an arbitrary consequential agent action. Optional attestation: triggered_by_type (human/agent/script), triggered_by_source (api/cli/cron), decision_model (the LLM model used). Allowlisted to safe chars. |
| verify_receiptA | Verify a Trust Gate receipt from the certificate alone (offline). require_pq=True (default via OAO_REQUIRE_PQ) FAILS if the ML-DSA-65 or SLH-DSA legs are missing -- defends against signature-stripping downgrade attacks. |
| gate_decisionA | Two-phase decision gate. PREVIEW phase returns a risk assessment and preview_id without acting. COMMIT phase requires that preview_id back, verifies inputs match, mints a tamper-evident receipt, and returns an execution permit. Stateless. Optional attestation: triggered_by_type, triggered_by_source, decision_model. |
| check_egressA | Egress classification check. Scans a data sample for sensitivity markers (heuristic) and classifies as PUBLIC / INTERNAL / CONFIDENTIAL / RESTRICTED. Blocks RESTRICTED-class egress. Returns classification, retention info, and a tamper-evident receipt. |
| run_exit_drillA | Vendor exit readiness drill. Checks local signing key, local model access (Ollama), and local data export capability. Returns step-by-step results and a tamper-evident receipt. Informational -- no side effects. |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 7 tools
Multiple tools mint or return receipts (mint_receipt_for_record_change, mint_action_receipt, gate_decision, check_egress, run_exit_drill), creating potential confusion about which to use. The descriptions differentiate primary purposes, but mint_receipt_for_record_change and mint_action_receipt have clear overlap for record-change actions.
All tool names are snake_case with a verb-first pattern (mint, verify, gate, check, run). One outlier, 'audit_my_agent_inventory', uses a possessive 'my', and 'gate_decision' could be read as a noun, but overall the naming is predictable.
Seven tools is well within the ideal 3-15 range, and each tool covers a distinct operational aspect of the Trust Gate workflow without feeling redundant or excessive.
The set covers receipt minting (two variants), verification, decision gating, egress classification, agent inventory auditing, and exit drills. Minor gaps include no tool for managing trust configurations or revocation, but core workflows are covered.