Trust Gate
Server Details
Post-quantum, tamper-evident receipts for agent actions. Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, offline verify.
- Status
- Healthy
- Uptime
- 100.0% over 62 days
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP · MCP 2025-11-25
- URL
- Repository
- CWNApps/trust-gate-mcp
- GitHub Stars
- 0
- Server Listing
- Trust Gate MCP
TDQS
Scored across 7 tools
Each tool targets a distinct operation: auditing inventory, checking egress, gating decisions, minting receipts (generic vs CRM-specific), running exit drills, and verifying receipts. The descriptions clearly delineate boundaries, and even the two minting tools are separated by scope (arbitrary action vs CRM record change).
All names use snake_case and mostly follow a verb_noun pattern (e.g., check_egress, mint_action_receipt, verify_receipt). The name gate_decision deviates slightly as it reads as a noun phrase rather than a clear verb_noun, but overall the pattern is predictable.
Seven tools is well-scoped for a trust and receipt management server. Each tool earns its place by covering a distinct aspect of the domain without redundancy or excessive fragmentation.
The server covers the key lifecycle: auditing, egress checking, decision gating, receipt minting, verification, and exit drills. Gaps exist in managing pending human escalations or querying stored receipts, but these are minor and consistent with the stated design (e.g., human decisions occur outside the tool).
Available Tools
7 toolsaudit_my_agent_inventoryAInspect
Rank a CALLER-PROVIDED list of MCP tools by worst-regret if they act (a name-based heuristic that weights a name's first word most). Read-only: it mints no receipt. Cannot auto-discover the inventory -- MCP does not allow that; the caller must pass it in.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| notes | No | ||
| inventory | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations the description carries the full burden, and it does disclose the key traits: read-only with no receipt minted, the name-first-word heuristic nature, and the hard inability to auto-discover inventory. It omits behavior on malformed or empty input (errors, ranking ties), which keeps it short of a 5.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three sentences, front-loaded with the core action and free of filler. Slightly dense parentheses aside, but every clause adds a distinct fact.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return values need no explanation, and the heuristic plus read-only constraint are covered. The unexplained 'notes' parameter and the undocumented structure of inventory entries, against 0% schema coverage, leave it only partially complete for a nontrivial ranking tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% and the description must compensate, but it only characterizes the inventory argument loosely ('list of MCP tools'). The shape of inventory items and the entire 'notes' parameter are left unexplained in both schema and description, leaving a real gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource ('Rank a CALLER-PROVIDED list of MCP tools by worst-regret') and immediately qualifies the scope with the heuristic used. It clearly distinguishes itself from the mint_*/verify_* siblings by stating it mints no receipt, so an agent can route correctly without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives a real usage constraint ('Cannot auto-discover the inventory -- MCP does not allow that; the caller must pass it in') and implies its read-only role versus receipt-minting siblings. However, it never states when to reach for this tool versus check_egress or gate_decision, so selection guidance is only implied.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
check_egressAInspect
Egress classification check. Scans a data sample for a finite list of sensitivity markers and classifies as NO_MARKERS_FOUND / INTERNAL / CONFIDENTIAL / RESTRICTED. RESTRICTED sets blocked=true; this tool cannot block anything itself, and NO_MARKERS_FOUND is not clearance to send. Returns classification, retention info, and a tamper-evident receipt.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| provider | Yes | ||
| data_sample | Yes | ||
| destination | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does disclose key traits: RESTRICTED drives blocked=true, the tool is non-enforcing, and the result includes retention info and a tamper-evident receipt. It omits whether the sample itself is retained/logged (implied by 'retention info') and any auth or rate-limit requirements.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three tight sentences, front-loaded with the core action, followed by the exclusivity caveat and return summary. No filler or repetition of the tool name.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, yet the description still summarizes the returns, which is mildly redundant but helpful. Combined with the classification semantics and enforcement boundary, an agent has enough to decide whether to call it; the main gap is undocumented parameter formats.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% for all three required parameters, so the description must compensate and largely does not. It implies data_sample is what gets scanned but says nothing about the format or meaning of 'provider' and 'destination' (e.g., is provider an email/cloud vendor, is destination a URL?).
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource ('scans a data sample for sensitivity markers and classifies') and names the exact output taxonomy (NO_MARKERS_FOUND / INTERNAL / CONFIDENTIAL / RESTRICTED). This is distinct from siblings like gate_decision or verify_receipt, which handle enforcement and receipts respectively.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It clearly bounds the tool's role with two strong exclusions: 'this tool cannot block anything itself' and 'NO_MARKERS_FOUND is not clearance to send.' However, it never names the alternative tool (e.g., gate_decision) that does perform blocking, so the agent must infer the routing itself.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gate_decisionAInspect
Two-phase decision gate with a real verdict. PREVIEW returns ALLOW, DENY or ESCALATE with the risk tier and reasons, plus a preview_id, without acting. COMMIT re-evaluates the same inputs and mints a signed receipt for the verdict. Only ALLOW returns a GRANTED permit; DENY returns DENIED; ESCALATE returns WITHHELD_PENDING_HUMAN and a human must decide outside this tool. Applies only to actions the caller routes through it: it does not observe or block what an agent does. Verb-tier heuristic on the action name and resource, not a proof. Stateless. Optional attestation: triggered_by_type, triggered_by_source, decision_model.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| phase | No | PREVIEW | |
| action | Yes | ||
| context | Yes | ||
| resource | Yes | ||
| preview_id | No | ||
| decision_model | No | ||
| triggered_by_type | No | ||
| triggered_by_source | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so well: it discloses statelessness, that the verdict comes from a verb-tier heuristic on the action name and resource rather than a proof, exactly what each verdict returns, and that ESCALATE requires a human outside this tool. It also warns that the gate does not observe or block un-routed agent actions – a critical scope limit.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the core concept ('Two-phase decision gate with a real verdict') followed by tightly packed sentences that each carry distinct, load-bearing information. No filler or restatement of the name.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a stateless, high-complexity tool with an output schema, the description covers the phase model, verdict outcomes, scope limits, and attestation fields adequately; the output schema relieves it of describing return shape. The main gap is `context` semantics and the precise preview_id→COMMIT linkage, but overall it is close to complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0% across 8 parameters, so the description must compensate. It explains phase (PREVIEW/COMMIT), preview_id's role in the two-phase flow, and that triggered_by_type/source/model are optional attestation, but it never explains the `context` object or what triggered_by_* actually attest, leaving several parameters undocumented in both places.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb+resource ('two-phase decision gate') and enumerates the exact verdicts (ALLOW/DENY/ESCALATE) and phase semantics (PREVIEW/COMMIT). It is distinguishable from siblings like mint_action_receipt and verify_receipt because it frames this tool as the decision gate that other tools' receipts record/verify.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives clear context: PREVIEW acts without acting, COMMIT re-evaluates and mints a receipt, and it only applies to actions the caller explicitly routes through it. It does not, however, explicitly say when to choose this over mint_action_receipt or verify_receipt, so the alternative-routing guidance is implied rather than stated.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
mint_action_receiptAInspect
Mint a signed receipt (Ed25519, plus ML-DSA-65 when the post-quantum backend is available) for an arbitrary consequential agent action. Optional attestation: triggered_by_type (human/agent/script), triggered_by_source (api/cli/cron), decision_model (the LLM model used). Attestation values are caller claims: allowlisted to safe characters, signed, not verified. Decisions that contain a gate verdict word are reserved for gate_decision.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| inputs | No | ||
| policy | No | agent action evidence | |
| target | Yes | ||
| agent_id | Yes | ||
| decision | No | ACTION_GOVERNED | |
| operation | Yes | ||
| decision_model | No | ||
| triggered_by_type | No | ||
| triggered_by_source | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the burden, and it does disclose meaningful traits: Ed25519 signing with ML-DSA-65 fallback, attestation values being caller claims (allowlisted, signed, not verified), and the reservation rule. It omits permissions/auth requirements and durability of the emitted receipt.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the core action and mechanism, then the optional attestation, then the exclusion rule. Dense but each sentence carries information; only the parenthetical backend caveat is slightly incidental.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return values need no explanation, and the description covers mechanism, optional fields, and sibling routing. It would be complete if it addressed the overlap with mint_receipt_for_record_change and any auth prerequisites for minting.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0% across 9 params, so the description must compensate. It documents three parameters with example values (triggered_by_type human/agent/script, triggered_by_source api/cli/cron, decision_model) and implicitly constrains 'decision' via the gate-verdict rule, but agent_id, operation, target, inputs, policy, and the ACTION_GOVERNED default are left undefined.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource ('mint a signed receipt ... for an arbitrary consequential agent action') with the crypto mechanism named, and explicitly carves out the sibling gate_decision for gate-verdict decisions. An agent can distinguish it from verify_receipt and gate_decision without opening a schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly routes gate-verdict-word decisions to gate_decision, which is genuine when-not guidance. However it never mentions mint_receipt_for_record_change, the nearest-scoped sibling, so the agent must infer the boundary between 'arbitrary action' and 'record change'.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
mint_receipt_for_record_changeCInspect
Mint a signed receipt (Ed25519, plus ML-DSA-65 when the post-quantum backend is available) for one CRM record change. Old/new values are carried as SHA-256 hashes. Works with any CRM (Relaticle, hosted CRMs, custom).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| field | Yes | ||
| policy | No | per-decision CRM change evidence | |
| tenant | No | ||
| new_value | Yes | ||
| old_value | Yes | ||
| record_id | Yes | ||
| object_type | Yes | ||
| changed_by_agent | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden, and it does add real behavioral context: signature algorithms (Ed25519, conditional ML-DSA-65), SHA-256 hashing of values, and CRM-agnostic support. It omits important traits for a mutation-style tool, such as whether receipts are persisted, idempotency, required permissions, or failure behavior when the post-quantum backend is unavailable.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three tight sentences, front-loaded with the core purpose. Some budget is spent on crypto-backend detail that matters less than the undocumented parameters, but there is no filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists so return values need no explanation, but for an 8-parameter, annotation-free tool the description leaves too much unsaid. No parameter guidance, no usage routing, and no operational constraints make it insufficient for correct invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% across 8 parameters (6 required), so the description must compensate and does not. It never explains record_id, object_type, field, tenant, policy, or changed_by_agent, and its claim that old/new values are 'carried as SHA-256 hashes' ambiguously implies hashing behavior without clarifying whether callers pass raw or pre-hashed values.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (mint) and resource (signed receipt for one CRM record change) plus scope, so an agent knows what it produces. However, it does not distinguish itself from the sibling mint_action_receipt, leaving the agent to guess which receipt tool applies to which scenario.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No when-to-use guidance, no prerequisites, and no routing to or from alternatives like mint_action_receipt or verify_receipt, despite those siblings existing. The agent is left to infer the place of this tool in the broader workflow.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
run_exit_drillAInspect
Vendor exit readiness drill. Checks local signing key, local model access (Ollama). Returns step-by-step results and a tamper-evident receipt. Informational; it signs one receipt, which creates the signing key on a host that has none yet.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden, and it does disclose a genuinely non-obvious side effect: despite being 'Informational', it signs one receipt, which creates a signing key on a host that has none yet. That is exactly the kind of mutation disclosure an agent needs before invoking. It stops short of describing auth requirements, rate limits, or failure modes.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three short sentences, front-loaded with what the drill is, then what it checks, then the return shape and the caveat. Every sentence carries information and none is redundant.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so the description need not explain the step-by-step results or receipt structure, and it correctly does not. It covers purpose, checks performed, and the key side effect; only invocation prerequisites (permissions, environment assumptions) are left implicit.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool takes zero parameters and the schema is empty at 100% coverage, so there is nothing for the description to disambiguate. The baseline for a parameterless tool is 4.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names a specific verb+resource ('Vendor exit readiness drill') and enumerates exactly what it inspects: the local signing key and local model access via Ollama. It is clearly not a receipt-minting or egress-checking tool, so an agent can separate it from most siblings, though it never explicitly contrasts itself with check_egress or audit_my_agent_inventory.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The word 'Informational' implies this is a diagnostic to run when validating vendor-exit readiness, and the check list hints at the preconditions it evaluates. However, there is no explicit when-to-use, when-not-to-use, or named alternative among the six sibling tools, so usage must be inferred.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
verify_receiptAInspect
Verify a Trust Gate receipt from the certificate alone (offline). ok=true means unchanged since signing, signed, kid consistent with the embedded key, and (require_pq default on) at least one post-quantum leg verified; unsigned receipts fail. It does not prove who signed: pass expected_kid to pin the signer's Ed25519 key; a pin counts only when that key's own signature verifies (see signer_pinned). The post-quantum keys in a receipt are not covered by the kid.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt | Yes | ||
| require_pq | No | ||
| expected_kid | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description fully carries the behavioral burden. It explains what ok=true means, that unsigned receipts fail, that it does not prove signer identity, how expected_kid pinning works, and that post-quantum keys are not covered by the kid.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the core verification contract, then adds the important signer-pinning caveat and PQ-key caveat. Every sentence adds necessary semantic information without filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the cryptographic complexity, missing annotations, and 0% schema description coverage, the description covers the critical behavioral guarantees and limitations. Return values are additionally covered by the output schema.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. It explains require_pq's effective default and expected_kid's pinning semantics in detail, though the receipt parameter itself is left largely opaque as a Trust Gate receipt object.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: verify a Trust Gate receipt. It also names the exact verification mode, offline from the certificate alone, which clearly distinguishes it from the minting siblings.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives clear context for use and conditionally describes when to supply expected_kid to pin the signer. It does not explicitly compare against sibling tools or state when not to use this tool, so it falls short of the top level.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
5 tool updates
- Added
check_egress - Added
gate_decision - Changed
mint_action_receipt3 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / decision_modelAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "title": "Decision Model" +} - added
Input schema / properties / triggered_by_sourceAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "title": "Triggered By Source" +} - added
Input schema / properties / triggered_by_typeAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "title": "Triggered By Type" +}
- Added
run_exit_drill - Changed
verify_receipt1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / expected_kidAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "title": "Expected Kid" +}
4 tool updates
- First observed
audit_my_agent_inventory - First observed
mint_action_receipt - First observed
mint_receipt_for_record_change - First observed
verify_receipt
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