Trust Gate
Server Details
Post-quantum, tamper-evident receipts for agent actions. Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, offline verify.
- Status
- Healthy
- Uptime
- 99.9% over 43 days
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP ยท MCP 2025-11-25
- URL
- Repository
- CWNApps/trust-gate-mcp
- GitHub Stars
- 0
- Server Listing
- Trust Gate MCP
TDQS
Scored across 4 tools
verify_receipt and audit_my_agent_inventory are clearly distinct, and the CRM-specific mint is functionally differentiated from the generic action receipt by its old/new hash semantics. The only possible confusion is between mint_action_receipt and mint_receipt_for_record_change for record-change actions, though the specialized description resolves the intended use.
All names are imperative snake_case verbs, which gives the set a readable base pattern. The object phrasing isn't uniform: mint_action_receipt and verify_receipt use concise verb_noun, while mint_receipt_for_record_change and audit_my_agent_inventory add longer qualifiers.
Four tools is a well-scoped size for a focused receipt-minting and verification service. Each tool maps to a necessary operation: general mint, CRM-specific mint, risk/audit assessment, and offline verification.
The toolset covers the core receipt lifecycle (mint and verify), plus a specialized CRM workflow and an audit capability; no update/delete is needed for immutable receipts. There are no obvious dead ends or missing operations implied by the domain.
Available Tools
4 toolsaudit_my_agent_inventoryAInspect
Rank a CALLER-PROVIDED list of MCP tools by worst-regret if they act, with a signed receipt. Cannot auto-discover the inventory -- MCP does not allow that; the caller must pass it in.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| notes | No | ||
| inventory | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Since no annotations are provided, the description carries full responsibility. It discloses a significant behavioral limitation (cannot auto-discover the inventory) and mentions the signed receipt as output. It avoids contradictions and adds concrete context beyond the basic action, though it does not discuss permissions or side effects.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences, with the action front-loaded and every clause earning its place. It conveys purpose, output, and a critical limitation in a tight, efficient structure.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With an output schema present, the description need not detail return values. It covers purpose, input, output, and the main limitation for a tool with only one required parameter. The tool is simple enough that this description is sufficient for an agent to select and invoke it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
With 0% schema description coverage, the description compensates by explaining the core 'inventory' parameter as a 'CALLER-PROVIDED list of MCP tools'. The optional 'notes' parameter is not described, but its meaning is evident from the name. The description effectively clarifies the primary parameter.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb ('Rank') and a clear resource ('CALLER-PROVIDED list of MCP tools'), with the ranking criterion ('by worst-regret if they act') and output ('with a signed receipt'). This distinguishes it from sibling tools focused on receipts, verification, or gating by focusing on inventory audit.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly states a key prerequisite: the caller must provide the inventory because auto-discovery is not possible in MCP. While it does not name alternatives, this constraint clearly communicates the expected usage context and necessary input, making it more than implied.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
mint_action_receiptBInspect
Mint a post-quantum receipt for an arbitrary consequential agent action.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| inputs | No | ||
| policy | No | agent action evidence | |
| target | Yes | ||
| agent_id | Yes | ||
| decision | No | ACTION_GOVERNED | |
| operation | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries full burden. It mentions 'post-quantum receipt' implying cryptographic behavior, but does not disclose whether the operation is destructive, what permissions are needed, or any side effects. The behavior is minimally transparent.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single sentence, concise with no superfluous words. However, it is too brief for a tool with six parameters, leaving out critical parameter semantics.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the presence of an output schema, return values need not be explained. However, with six parameters and zero schema coverage, the description fails to provide enough context for correct usage. Sibling differentiation is implicit but not elaborated.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, and the description adds no meaning to any of the six parameters. While agent_id, operation, and target are self-explanatory, parameters like inputs, policy, and decision have defaults but are not explained in the description.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Description clearly states the tool mints a post-quantum receipt for any consequential agent action. The verb 'mint' and resource 'post-quantum receipt for an arbitrary consequential agent action' are specific. Among siblings, it stands out as the general-purpose receipt minting tool vs. mint_receipt_for_record_change which is specific to record changes, and verify_receipt which is for verification.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies usage for arbitrary consequential agent actions, but it does not explicitly state when to choose this over sibling tools like mint_receipt_for_record_change or verify_receipt. No contraindications or alternative guidance is provided.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
mint_receipt_for_record_changeBInspect
Mint a post-quantum receipt for one CRM record change. Old/new values are carried as SHA-256 hashes. Works with any CRM (Relaticle, hosted CRMs, custom).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| field | Yes | ||
| policy | No | per-decision CRM change evidence | |
| tenant | No | ||
| new_value | Yes | ||
| old_value | Yes | ||
| record_id | Yes | ||
| object_type | Yes | ||
| changed_by_agent | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description bears the full burden. It discloses that values are hashed (SHA-256) and the receipt is post-quantum, but does not mention side effects, storage, permissions, or reversibility. For a minting operation, this lacks important behavioral context.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two concise sentences with no fluff. The first sentence states the core action and scope, while the second provides additional context about hashing and CRM compatibility. Every sentence earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
This is a complex tool with 8 parameters, no annotations, and a terse description. While an output schema exists, the description does not explain return behavior, prerequisites, or the meaning of policy and tenant. Given the tool's sophistication, the description is insufficient for an agent to use it confidently.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. It explicitly explains old_value and new_value are SHA-256 hashes, adding meaning. However, other parameters like record_id, object_type, field, and changed_by_agent are left undefined, and the description does not clarify their formats or roles beyond the tool name.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool mints a post-quantum receipt for a CRM record change, using a specific verb and resource. It distinguishes from sibling tools like mint_action_receipt by focusing on record changes rather than general actions, and mentions SHA-256 hashes and CRM compatibility.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies usage for CRM record changes and says it works with any CRM, but provides no explicit guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives like mint_action_receipt or verify_receipt. No exclusions or when-not-to-use conditions are given.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
verify_receiptAInspect
Verify a Trust Gate receipt from the certificate alone (offline). require_pq=True (default via OAO_REQUIRE_PQ) FAILS if the ML-DSA-65 or SLH-DSA legs are missing -- defends against signature-stripping downgrade attacks.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt | Yes | ||
| require_pq | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries full behavioral burden. It discloses the default for require_pq via OAO_REQUIRE_PQ, the failure condition when PQ legs are missing, and the security rationale (anti-downgrade). It does not explicitly mention non-mutation, but 'verify' implies it; the extra details are valuable.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two dense sentences, front-loaded with the core purpose and then the key security parameter behavior. Every word adds value; no fluff or redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description covers the most non-obvious behavior (PQ default and failure mode) and the output schema likely documents return values. It does not detail the receipt's internal structure, but the schema's additionalProperties hint and the 'certificate alone' phrasing give reasonable context for a crypto verification tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. It adds significant meaning to require_pq (fail behavior, default source) but leaves the receipt parameter largely unexplained beyond the schema's 'object' type. Since the receipt is the primary input, more detail would be needed for full compensation.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action ('Verify'), the resource ('Trust Gate receipt'), and the method ('from the certificate alone (offline)'). This distinguishes it from sibling mint tools (e.g., mint_receipt_for_record_change, mint_action_receipt) and conveys the offline verification scope.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies usage for offline verification from the certificate alone, and the downgrade attack defense suggests when to set require_pq. However, it does not explicitly contrast with alternative verification approaches or state when not to use this tool, so guidance is implicit rather than explicit.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
4 tool updates
- First observed
audit_my_agent_inventory - First observed
mint_action_receipt - First observed
mint_receipt_for_record_change - First observed
verify_receipt
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evermint-mcpofficial
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