aziel-runtime

Advanced: seal a session

runtime_session_close

DestructiveIdempotent

Close a raw session to block further exec or policy on that session_id, ending its lifecycle while preserving receipts. Use when the user requests session closure.

Instructions

[advanced/internal] Seal a raw session so further exec or policy on that session_id is rejected. End of the raw lifecycle — not a LOCKSET seal and not a FragGate call. Use this when the user asked to close the session. Do not use it for ordinary completion, writing a ChainLock LOCKSET, or default product work; use leaving the session to TTL expire (6h), chainlock_seal for a lockset, or fraggate_call for new work instead. Destructive to further exec/policy on that session_id only (session_closed 409). Does not delete receipts. A second close does not reopen — it returns session_closed (409) while the session stays sealed. Missing session returns session_not_found. Prefer leaving sessions to expire unless asked. session_id or id (aliases) required. No force flag on the public tool — TTL expiry is the automatic close path. Mutation requires confirm=true (runtime gate) or dry_run=true (preview only, no write). confirm and dry_run stay optional on inputSchema.required. dry_run still returns FG-HALLUC-TOOL, FG-STUB, FG-UNKNOWN-OP, or FG-LOCAL-ONLY when a confirm call would refuse. confirm is consent, not tenant auth, and it does not upgrade shared public-demo isolation. Returns sealed session status, close receipt, and verified.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`id`	No	Alias of session_id. The door accepts either key; do not send two different values.
`confirm`	No	Documented confirmation flag. Optional in inputSchema.required (connector refresh must not break). tools/call still refuses MCP-CONFIRM-REQUIRED when confirm is missing or false unless dry_run=true. confirm is consent to run the call. It is not tenant auth and it does not upgrade shared public-demo isolation.
`dry_run`	No	Optional preview flag. When true, do not write and do not stamp a ledger tip. Allowlist, hallucination, stub, and local-only checks still run and return the same FragGate refuse code a confirm call would get. MCP-DRY-RUN is returned only when that call would have been allowed to proceed. confirm is consent, not tenant auth, and it does not upgrade shared public-demo isolation.
`session_id`	Yes	Required. Raw session id from runtime_session_open (sess_ + 32 lowercase hex). Alias: id. Missing both fails with session_id required; unknown id returns session_not_found.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`code`	No	FragGate or fabric code when present: FG-OK, FG-HALLUC-TOOL, FG-STUB, FG-LOCAL-ONLY, FG-UNKNOWN-OP, FG-GATE-REFUSE, FG-LAMB-REFUSE, or a module refuse such as MESH-* / AKM-*.
`door`	No	Door name. The public door is fraggate.
`ran_in`	No	Execution locale (for example aziel-runtime) when present.
`result`	No	Close body: sealed session, close receipt, verified. Errors: session_id required, session_not_found, session_closed (already sealed; does not reopen).
`status`	No	HTTP-like status when present on wrappers (200 ok; 400+ error / refuse).
`display`	No	Human-facing envelope. Show title and summary, then take the next input.
`receipt`	No	Optional receipt, ledger tip, or TemporalLock/ForgeReceipts exit when the door stamped one.
`refusal`	No	Explicit refuse object, code, or message when the door or engine refused.
`engine_op`	No	Resolved engine op when present (often inside result).
`ledger_tip`	No	Ask/refuse ledger tip when the door stamped one.
`provenance`	No	Provenance / input packet when the pipeline attached one.
`session_id`	No	Raw session id when session plumbing was used. Hidden unless the user asked for the chain.
`engine_slug`	No	Resolved engine slug when present (often inside result).
`limitations`	No	Capability limitations or Remain-OFF notes when present.
`engine_digest`	No	64-hex engine_digest when a true in-process engine ran (often inside result).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed2 schema fields changedv2.0.8Sep 27, 2026

changedInput schema / properties / confirm / description

Previous value: -"Documented confirmation flag. Optional in inputSchema.required (connector refresh must not break). tools/call still refuses MCP-CONFIRM-REQUIRED when confirm is missing or false unless dry_run=true (preview, no write)."New value: +"Documented confirmation flag. Optional in inputSchema.required (connector refresh must not break). tools/call still refuses MCP-CONFIRM-REQUIRED when confirm is missing or false unless dry_run=true. confirm is consent to run the call. It is not tenant auth and it does not upgrade shared public-demo isolation."

changedInput schema / properties / dry_run / description

Previous value: -"Optional preview flag. When true, return a would-mutate preview and do not write. Alternative to confirm=true. Does not mutate."New value: +"Optional preview flag. When true, do not write and do not stamp a ledger tip. Allowlist, hallucination, stub, and local-only checks still run and return the same FragGate refuse code a confirm call would get. MCP-DRY-RUN is returned only when that call would have been allowed to proceed. confirm is consent, not tenant auth, and it does not upgrade shared public-demo isolation."

Changed3 schema fields changedv2.0.2Sep 18, 2026

changedInput schema / description

Previous value: -"session_id or id required. Extra keys are ignored. This is not chainlock_seal."New value: +"session_id or id required. Extra keys are ignored. This is not chainlock_seal. Mutation requires confirm=true or dry_run=true."

addedInput schema / properties / confirm

Added value: +{
+  "description": "Documented confirmation flag. Optional in inputSchema.required (connector refresh must not break). tools/call still refuses MCP-CONFIRM-REQUIRED when confirm is missing or false unless dry_run=true (preview, no write).",
+  "type": "boolean"
+}

addedInput schema / properties / dry_run

Added value: +{
+  "description": "Optional preview flag. When true, return a would-mutate preview and do not write. Alternative to confirm=true. Does not mutate.",
+  "type": "boolean"
+}

Changed5 schema fields changedv2.0.1Sep 14, 2026

changedInput schema / description

Previous value: -"session_id is required."New value: +"session_id or id required. Extra keys are ignored. This is not chainlock_seal."

addedInput schema / properties / id

Added value: +{
+  "description": "Alias of session_id. The door accepts either key; do not send two different values.",
+  "pattern": "^sess_[a-f0-9]{32}$",
+  "type": "string"
+}

changedInput schema / properties / session_id / description

Previous value: -"Required session id to seal. Further exec on this id is rejected."New value: +"Required. Raw session id from runtime_session_open (sess_ + 32 lowercase hex). Alias: id. Missing both fails with session_id required; unknown id returns session_not_found."

addedInput schema / properties / session_id / pattern
```
Added value: +"^sess_[a-f0-9]{32}$"
```

changedOutput schema / properties / result / description

Previous value: -"Machine payload. FragGate-style results commonly include ok, code, slug, op, status, engine_slug, engine_op, engine_digest, ran_in, provenance, refusal, limitations, and ledger_tip."New value: +"Close body: sealed session, close receipt, verified. Errors: session_id required, session_not_found, session_closed (already sealed; does not reopen)."

Changed3 schema fields changedv1.6.2Sep 12, 2026

addedInput schema / description
```
Added value: +"session_id is required."
```

addedInput schema / properties / session_id / description

Added value: +"Required session id to seal. Further exec on this id is rejected."

changedOutput schema / (root)

Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+  "additionalProperties": true,
+  "description": "Display envelope shown to the user (display.title / display.summary) plus the machine result. Extra engine fields may appear.",
+  "properties": {
+    "code": {
+      "description": "FragGate or fabric code when present: FG-OK, FG-HALLUC-TOOL, FG-STUB, FG-LOCAL-ONLY, FG-UNKNOWN-OP, FG-GATE-REFUSE, FG-LAMB-REFUSE, or a module refuse such as MESH-* / AKM-*.",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "display": {
+      "additionalProperties": true,
+      "description": "Human-facing envelope. Show title and summary, then take the next input.",
+      "properties": {
+        "fields": {
+          "description": "Optional labeled scalars copied from the result for display.",
+          "items": {
+            "additionalProperties": true,
+            "properties": {
+              "label": {
+                "description": "Field label.",
+                "type": "string"
+              },
+              "value": {
+                "description": "Field value as text.",
+                "type": "string"
+              }
+            },
+            "type": "object"
+          },
+          "type": "array"
+        },
+        "next": {
+          "description": "What the agent should do after showing this output.",
+          "type": "string"
+        },
+        "summary": {
+          "description": "One-line outcome or refuse reason.",
+          "type": "string"
+        },
+        "title": {
+          "description": "Short result title for the AI client.",
+          "type": "string"
+        }
+      },
+      "type": "object"
+    },
+    "door": {
+      "description": "Door name. The public door is fraggate.",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "engine_digest": {
+      "description": "64-hex engine_digest when a true in-process engine ran (often inside result).",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "engine_op": {
+      "description": "Resolved engine op when present (often inside result).",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "engine_slug": {
+      "description": "Resolved engine slug when present (often inside result).",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "ledger_tip": {
+      "description": "Ask/refuse ledger tip when the door stamped one."
+    },
+    "limitations": {
+      "description": "Capability limitations or Remain-OFF notes when present."
+    },
+    "provenance": {
+      "description": "Provenance / input packet when the pipeline attached one."
+    },
+    "ran_in": {
+      "description": "Execution locale (for example aziel-runtime) when present.",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "receipt": {
+      "description": "Optional receipt, ledger tip, or TemporalLock/ForgeReceipts exit when the door stamped one."
+    },
+    "refusal": {
+      "description": "Explicit refuse object, code, or message when the door or engine refused."
+    },
+    "result": {
+      "description": "Machine payload. FragGate-style results commonly include ok, code, slug, op, status, engine_slug, engine_op, engine_digest, ran_in, provenance, refusal, limitations, and ledger_tip."
+    },
+    "session_id": {
+      "description": "Raw session id when session plumbing was used. Hidden unless the user asked for the chain.",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "status": {
+      "description": "HTTP-like status when present on wrappers (200 ok; 400+ error / refuse).",
+      "type": "integer"
+    }
+  },
+  "type": "object"
+}

First observedv1.5.0Sep 5, 2026

TDQS

A4.8/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=true, and the description adds substantial context beyond those: destruction is scoped to 'further exec/policy on that session_id only,' receipts are not deleted, and a second close returns session_closed (409) without reopening. It also discloses mutation gating via confirm/dry_run and that dry_run still runs FragGate checks, making the side-effect profile fully transparent.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense rather than concise, but it is front-loaded with purpose and then systematically covers usage, effects, errors, and flag semantics. A little redundancy (e.g., session_closed 409 appears twice) and length are justified by the tool's advanced nature, but it could be trimmed slightly without losing information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so the description need not detail the full return shape, yet it still summarizes the response as 'sealed session status, close receipt, and verified.' Error cases, parameter requirements, mutation gates, and alternative tools are all covered. Nothing an agent needs to invoke this tool correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the schema itself documents session_id/id aliasing and confirm/dry_run semantics, so the baseline is 3. The description goes further by clarifying 'No force flag on the public tool,' noting that confirm and dry_run stay optional on inputSchema.required, and listing the exact FragGate refuse codes dry_run can return. This adds real meaning beyond the schema, though some repetition of schema content keeps it from a 5.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a precise action: 'Seal a raw session so further exec or policy on that session_id is rejected.' It clearly identifies the resource (raw session) and the outcome, and it distinguishes itself from siblings by stating it is 'not a LOCKSET seal and not a FragGate call.' An agent can immediately tell what this tool does and how it differs from chainlock_seal or fraggate_call.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage guidance is explicit and complete: 'Use this when the user asked to close the session' and 'Do not use it for ordinary completion, writing a ChainLock LOCKSET, or default product work.' It names the alternatives with conditions: TTL expiry (6h), chainlock_seal for a lockset, and fraggate_call for new work. This leaves no ambiguity about when to select this tool over its siblings.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.