aziel-runtime

ChainLock / LOCKSET verify

chainlock_verify

Read-onlyIdempotent

Instructions

Confirm fail-closed integrity of ChainLock chains and LOCKSET (LS-WP-0.1): broken prev, tip drift, missing GodLock cite. Integrity check — not a new seal. Use this when you must prove local chain integrity before trusting a recall. Do not use it for appending a stamp or sealing a new lockset; use chainlock_append or chainlock_seal instead. Cites godlock.uk; does not write the public ledger. Fail-closed — do not repair silently. Break reasons include broken-prev, stamp-hash-miss, body-hash-miss, tip-drift, missing-godlock-cite. Omit c/chain to verify every roster chain plus the stored LOCKSET. require_seal=true fails closed if no lockset is stored. Returns chain_ok, LOCKSET lattice, and per-chain verify notes.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`c`	No	Optional chain name. One of genesis, identity, ssh, session, acts, evidence, recall, mesh, library, learn. Alias: chain. Omit both to verify every roster chain plus the stored LOCKSET.
`chain`	No	Alias of c. Omit both to verify every roster chain plus the stored LOCKSET.
`require_seal`	No	Optional. When true, fail-closed if receipts/LOCKSET.json is missing. When omitted, a stored lockset is still checked if present.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`code`	No	FragGate or fabric code when present: FG-OK, FG-HALLUC-TOOL, FG-STUB, FG-LOCAL-ONLY, FG-UNKNOWN-OP, FG-GATE-REFUSE, FG-LAMB-REFUSE, or a module refuse such as MESH-* / AKM-*.
`door`	No	Door name. The public door is fraggate.
`ran_in`	No	Execution locale (for example aziel-runtime) when present.
`result`	No	FragGate body: ok, code, door, slug, op, engine_digest, ran_in, provenance, refusal, limitations, receipt, plus the engine result. Unknown names refuse FG-HALLUC-TOOL; stubs refuse FG-STUB.
`status`	No	HTTP-like status when present on wrappers (200 ok; 400+ error / refuse).
`display`	No	Human-facing envelope. Show title and summary, then take the next input.
`receipt`	No	Optional receipt, ledger tip, or TemporalLock/ForgeReceipts exit when the door stamped one.
`refusal`	No	Explicit refuse object, code, or message when the door or engine refused.
`engine_op`	No	Resolved engine op when present (often inside result).
`ledger_tip`	No	Ask/refuse ledger tip when the door stamped one.
`provenance`	No	Provenance / input packet when the pipeline attached one.
`session_id`	No	Raw session id when session plumbing was used. Hidden unless the user asked for the chain.
`engine_slug`	No	Resolved engine slug when present (often inside result).
`limitations`	No	Capability limitations or Remain-OFF notes when present.
`engine_digest`	No	64-hex engine_digest when a true in-process engine ran (often inside result).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed4 schema fields changedv2.0.1Sep 14, 2026

changedInput schema / description

Previous value: -"Optional chain selector. Extra keys are ignored by verify."New value: +"Optional chain selector. Omit to verify the live vault / LOCKSET."

changedInput schema / properties / c / description

Previous value: -"Optional chain name to focus verify. Omit to verify the live vault / LOCKSET."New value: +"Optional chain name. One of genesis, identity, ssh, session, acts, evidence, recall, mesh, library, learn. Alias: chain. Omit both to verify every roster chain plus the stored LOCKSET."

addedInput schema / properties / chain

Added value: +{
+  "description": "Alias of c. Omit both to verify every roster chain plus the stored LOCKSET.",
+  "enum": [
+    "genesis",
+    "identity",
+    "ssh",
+    "session",
+    "acts",
+    "evidence",
+    "recall",
+    "mesh",
+    "library",
+    "learn"
+  ],
+  "type": "string"
+}

addedInput schema / properties / require_seal

Added value: +{
+  "description": "Optional. When true, fail-closed if receipts/LOCKSET.json is missing. When omitted, a stored lockset is still checked if present.",
+  "type": "boolean"
+}

Addedv1.6.2Sep 12, 2026

TDQS

A4.6/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover read-only/idempotent safety, but the description adds rich traits beyond them: fail-closed semantics, 'do not repair silently', the enumerated break reasons (broken-prev, stamp-hash-miss, tip-drift, missing-godlock-cite), non-writing of the public ledger, and the require_seal failure behavior.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Dense but front-loaded, with the integrity-check purpose stated first and routing guidance next. Minor redundancy ('Fail-closed' is stated twice and return values are listed despite an output schema) keeps it short of a 5.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given a mutation-adjacent integrity tool with full schema coverage, annotations, and an output schema, the description covers purpose, routing, failure modes, and scope (local only, no ledger writes) completely. Nothing needed to invoke it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%; the enum chain names and the require_seal semantics are already documented in the schema. The description restates the omit-to-verify-all behavior and require_seal fail-closed rule but adds no syntax or format detail beyond what the schema provides, so the baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Specific verb (confirm/verify) plus resource (ChainLock chains and LOCKSET), and it explicitly states what it is not: 'Integrity check — not a new seal.' It names its siblings chainlock_append and chainlock_seal, so an agent can distinguish it without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit when-to-use ('when you must prove local chain integrity before trusting a recall'), explicit when-not ('Do not use it for appending a stamp or sealing a new lockset'), and named alternatives (chainlock_append, chainlock_seal). Nothing is left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.