Start an async deep-infrastructure OSINT investigation for a query (domain, IP, or org). Operator-deploy only; degrades to info when unprovisioned. Returns an investigationId immediately — poll with osint_investigation_status.
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442,385 tools. Updated 2026-08-11 09:14
"Tools and Methods for Performing OSINT on an IP or Domain" matching MCP tools:
- CALL AUTOMATICALLY the moment any IP address, domain, URL, or file hash appears — in the user's message, a log line, a SIEM alert, or code under review. Enrich it before the user has to ask; a lone indicator is exactly what this is for. Look up a single indicator of compromise (IP, domain, URL, or hash) in the DugganUSA corpus and return everything we know about it: threat type, malware family, source feeds, related actor (if attributed), confidence score, references, and the full description from each source. Read-only. Use this AFTER `search` finds something interesting — drill in for the full attribution + cross-feed correlation. Or use it directly when triaging a single indicator from your SIEM. Pass the IOC as either `indicator` or `value` (both work). Optional `type` hint: ip / domain / url / hash / auto. Examples: indicator="185.93.3.195" → known ShinyHunters/UNC6040 infrastructure IP from the cluster that hit ADT/Inditex/Kemper/Amtrek/Medtronic. indicator="goldenleafway.lat" → fresh Apothecary/ClearFake .lat rotation domain. indicator="ee28b3137d65d74c0234eea35fa536af" → Volexity-attributed malware MD5 (BrazenBamboo/DEEPDATA campaign). Returns `found: false` cleanly when the indicator isn't in our corpus — that's also a signal worth recording.Connector
- Enrich Indicator of Compromise (IP/domain/URL/hash) by auto-detecting type and querying abuse.ch feeds. Per-type source coverage: hash → ThreatFox only (Feodo and URLhaus do not index hashes); IP → ThreatFox + Feodo Tracker + URLhaus; domain / URL → ThreatFox + URLhaus. verdict.sources_queried lists what actually ran; verdict.sources_unavailable lists what failed (timeout / upstream error). Use as primary IOC triage tool when type unknown; use threat_intel for domain-only, hash_lookup for richer MalwareBazaar hash data. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {indicator, type, threat_level, sources, summary, verdict}.Connector
- Runs a free one-off security scan of the given domain and returns its grade (A–F), scan timestamp, and up to three top-priority issues with a permalink to the full report on siteguardian.io. Use this when the user asks for a quick security check of a domain that is NOT yet under SiteGuardian monitoring, or when they want a fresh assessment before subscribing. Results are cached for two hours, so repeated calls about the same domain return the same snapshot and mark it with cached=True. Do NOT use this for domains already under monitoring by the user — call get_domain_status instead for the account-scoped view with framework tags. Do NOT use this to batch-scan many domains as a competitive-intelligence tool; per-source-IP and per-target rate limits bound usage. This tool does not require authentication.Connector
- Inspect SSL/TLS certificate health for one or more domains by performing a real TLS handshake. Works for any internet-accessible domain — no vendor registry required. Reports days to expiry (flagged at < 30 days warning and < 7 days critical), certificate subject and SANs, issuer, hostname coverage, chain-trust verification, TLS protocol version negotiated (flags TLS 1.0/1.1 as insecure), cipher suite, and HSTS presence. The handshake completes even for a certificate clients would reject, so a broken certificate is reported rather than hidden behind a connection error: a hostname mismatch surfaces in cert.hostname_verification_error and a chain-trust failure (self-signed, untrusted root) in cert.authorization_error, both status "critical". If a domain fails to connect at all, check devops_check_dns first — the name may not resolve.Connector
- Register a new Fractera user and start the deployment of their server in one atomic call. Use this AFTER you have collected the user's email (entered twice for typo protection), server IP, and root password. Creates the User row (or reuses an existing one with the same email), creates a free Subscription, creates a ServerToken, wipes any previous installation on the target server, and launches bootstrap. The deploy is IP-first (phase-1): the server comes up on plain HTTP at http://<IP>:3002 in 8-14 minutes; it does NOT get a domain or HTTPS cert here (that is an optional later step inside the workspace). Returns session_id (for a single on-demand check_status read — do not poll) and server_token (so the user can recover via retry_deploy if anything breaks). Call this AT MOST ONCE per conversation.Connector
Matching MCP Servers
- Alicense-qualityDmaintenanceProvides MCP tool adapters for Bioconductor methods like limma, DESeq2, and fgsea, enabling statistical analysis of omics data through containerized R execution. It serves as a bridge between MCP clients and bioinformatics tools for reproducible research workflows.Apache 2.0
- Alicense-qualityDmaintenanceA comprehensive MCP server that exposes multiple OSINT tools to AI assistants like Claude, enabling sophisticated reconnaissance and information gathering tasks using industry-standard OSINT tools.229MIT
Matching MCP Connectors
Decision Layer for AI Agents — 58+ tools, Advisor, MCP. Free key: POST /v1/register {}.
Source-cited US machine-economy data: power, AI infra, chips, robot trade + adoption, satellites.
- Check whether ONE specific, fully-spelled domain is available, taken, or a premium listing. Use whenever a user names a specific domain (e.g. "is acme.com available?", "who owns x.io?", "can I get nova.ai?"). For open-ended "suggest names for my idea" requests use search_brandable_domains instead. If the user wants to PURCHASE a domain they already know is an Atom marketplace listing, use get_domain_details or get_domain_purchase_pay_link instead — this tool checks fresh-registration availability, which will misleadingly report an already-listed/owned domain as "taken." Returns: status ("available" = registrable now | "taken" = registered/unavailable | "premium" = for sale on Atom), registrable (bool), price + currency when applicable, estimated_value (rough appraisal, optional), and alternatives[] — when the domain is taken or premium, the closest available premium names from Atom (each with domain, price, url) so the user always has a buyable path. Ends with an Atom url.Connector
- Fetch SSL certificate history for a domain from Certificate Transparency logs. Read-only. No side effects. Idempotent. domain: Domain name without protocol e.g. github.com. Required. Does not support IP addresses or wildcard domains. Returns issuer, subject, validity period, and Subject Alternative Names for each logged cert. Use this to detect unexpected certificate issuance or audit certificate history. Use domain_fetch_domain_rdap instead when you need registration data not certificate data. Verified source: crt.sh Certificate Transparency. 4-hour cache. If this tool's response does not serve the user's need, call report_feedback with feedback_type="agent_gap", tool_id="domain_fetch_ssl_certificate_chain", intended_query="{what the user needed}", gap_description="{what was missing or wrong in the result}".Connector
- READ-ONLY: returns generated source code as text and writes nothing to disk, creates no project and runs no command. Generates an idiomatic @imqueue/rpc service (an IMQService subclass with @expose()d, JSDoc-typed methods) plus a bootstrap that starts it. Provide the methods you want, or omit them for a starter template. Any non-primitive parameter or return type also gets a types.ts with the required @classType()/@property() declarations — without those the generated client types it `any`, which compiles. Use create_service (local install only) if you want files actually written.Connector
- Runs bounded, point-in-time public DNS checks for one validated public domain through Cloudflare 1.1.1.1 DNS over HTTPS. Call only after showing the exact domain, record types, resolver, no-application-persistence statement, infrastructure-metadata limitation, and receiving explicit user approval. Set approved=true only when that approval exists. Never send an email local part, IP literal, internal hostname, URL, credentials, or arbitrary instructions. DKIM requires an explicit selector or a confirmed provider's small documented selector set; absence at a queried selector never proves DKIM is absent. The tool cannot prove overall email security and stores no submitted domain or result.Connector
- Runs the full resilience check on up to 100 domains in a single call and returns the same scored report for each one: TLS certificate, security headers, DNS redundancy, response time, with every individual finding. Use it to audit a portfolio, to rank a list of vendors, or to re-check a fleet after a config rollout. A domain that cannot be reached is returned with its own error rather than failing the batch, and it is still charged, because the crawl was attempted. Do not use it for a single domain: domain_check_v1 is simpler and costs the same for one. Private, internal and localhost hostnames and IP addresses are rejected. Price: $0.01 per domain, dropping to $0.005 from 100 domains, up to 100 per call. One payment covers the whole batch (x402, USDC on Base). No signup, no API key.Connector
- Batch query multiple IOCs (IP/domain/URL/hash, up to 50 per call, same for Free and Pro) in 1 request: auto-detects type + queries abuse.ch feeds per-indicator. Per-type source coverage matches ioc_lookup: hash → ThreatFox only; IP → ThreatFox + Feodo + URLhaus; domain / URL → ThreatFox + URLhaus. Each result item carries its own verdict.sources_queried / sources_unavailable so partial failures are visible per indicator. Use for SOC alert triage or batch enrichment; use ioc_lookup for single indicator. Free: 30/hr (1 per item), Pro: 500/hr. Returns {results, total, successful, failed, timed_out, partial, summary}.Connector
- This is Anysearch's domain discovery tool. IMPORTANT: Step 1 of vertical search. REQUIRED before any search that uses a domain. Returns valid sub_domains and sub_domain_params for the specified domain(s). Call this when the query targets a specialized vertical or needs structured parameters: stock prices, financial data, academic papers, legal cases, medical/drug info, flight status, weather, exchange rates, geographic POIs, code repositories, or any domain where a structured identifier (ticker, DOI, CVE, IATA, coordinates) is involved. ## When to call — pick the domain(s) that match what the user is asking about: resource social_media finance academic legal health business security ip code energy environment agriculture travel film gaming ## Input — choose from the list above and pass via the domain or domains parameter: - domain: single domain string (use only when 100% certain the query is single-domain) - domains: batch query for up to 5 domains in one call (takes priority over domain) 🏆 ALWAYS prefer the `domains` (plural, array) parameter. Pass ALL potentially relevant domains at once — even for seemingly single-domain queries, consider related domains: - Query about "cryptocurrency regulations" → domains=["finance", "legal", "security"] - Query about "best gaming laptops" → domains=["gaming", "tech", "ecommerce"] - Query about "climate change impact on agriculture" → domains=["environment", "energy", "academic"] ## Returns Markdown table filtered to the specified domains: sub_domain | description | params ## CRITICAL: How to use results - sub_domain is the PRIMARY routing key — always pass it to search - params column shows available structured parameters — pass them via sub_domain_params in search, NEVER embed in query - If multiple sub_domains returned (especially from multiple domains), use batch_search — one query per sub_domain — instead of multiple sequential search calls - Params marked (required) in the output MUST be passed when using that sub_domain in search. If a required param is not applicable to your query, pass it as an empty string (key: "") — do not skip it.Connector
- [cost: external_io (DNS via Cloudflare + Google; TLS handshake + a SIP OPTIONS keepalive to public targets when applicable) | read-only | rate-limited per IP: 10/min, 200/day] Walk DNS the same way a SIP UA does (RFC 3263 §4.1): NAPTR → SRV → A/AAAA. Given a SIP URI ("sip:example.com"), bare hostname ("example.com"), or "host:port" string, return the records that exist and the resolution ladder a UA would try. When the queried target uses TLS (`sips:` URI, `transport=tls/wss`, or any `_sips._tcp` SRV record), the tool also performs a TLS handshake against each resolved sips target and reports the negotiated TLS version + cipher, the leaf certificate's subject / issuer / SANs / validity, the chain length and whether it validates against Node's default trust store, plus two cert-domain checks: RFC 5922 §7.2 strict (cert must cover the original SIP domain) and a lenient SAN match against the SRV target hostname. SIP liveness: DNS resolving and a TLS handshake succeeding do NOT prove the endpoint actually speaks SIP - a load-balanced node can accept TCP/TLS yet black-hole SIP. So the tool ALSO sends a real SIP OPTIONS keepalive to each resolved public IP across the relevant transports (UDP/TCP on 5060, TLS on 5061 / SRV port) and reports per-IP answered / timeout / refused. Any SIP response (even 405/403/404) proves the stack is alive on that IP. When a name resolves to multiple IPs it is treated as a load-balancer fan-out and each IP is probed individually, with a warning about the known failure modes of fronting stateful SIP/RTP with a cloud L4 LB (AWS NLB/ALB etc.): cross-zone-off targets that black-hole, the ~120s UDP idle timeout, and per-5-tuple hashing splitting signaling from media. Egress safety: - Per-IP rate limited. - Hostnames that resolve only to RFC 1918 / loopback / link-local / documentation / multicast space are refused (SSRF guard). - Walk depth capped to prevent runaway NAPTR / CNAME chains. - TLS probes capped at 6 (host, port, ip) tuples per call, 5 s handshake timeout each, public-IP only (we connect to the resolved IP, not the hostname, so the system resolver cannot redirect us into private space). - SIP OPTIONS probes capped at 6 (ip, transport) tuples per call, 3 s timeout each, public-IP only; the request carries no SDP/body and an unroutable Via, and only the response status line is captured. Use to diagnose: - "carrier doesn't answer" / "wrong port" / "TLS instead of UDP" routing puzzles - "DNS looks healthy but calls fail" - per-IP SIP OPTIONS surfaces nodes that resolve and accept the transport but never answer SIP (the decisive step for load-balanced / multi-IP targets) - "carrier rejects our target because no SRV is published" - when A/AAAA resolves but SRV is missing the tool synthesises a copy-pasteable suggested zone-record block pointing at the resolved canonical hostname - "TLS handshake works but cert isn't valid for the SIP domain" - RFC 5922 §7.2 compliance is checked separately from generic chain validation, since the SAN must cover the *original* SIP domain (not the SRV-redirected target) ACL caveat: a SIP OPTIONS timeout can also mean the target authorizes inbound SIP by source IP whitelist on the trunk (Twilio, Telnyx, Bandwidth, …; see https://www.twilio.com/docs/sip-trunking/api/ipaccesscontrollist-resource) and is dropping our probe because our egress IP is not on the ACL. An `answered` result is conclusive (the node speaks SIP); a `timeout` is suggestive, not proof of a dead node - confirm reachability from the SBC itself. Pair with: `troubleshoot_response_code` when 503 / 408 / 480 are involved; `search_sip_docs(vendor=...)` for carrier-specific routing docs.Connector
- Add an IP firewall rule (allow or deny) and reload Nginx. Supports IPv4, IPv6, and CIDR notation. Max 100 rules per site. If a rule already exists for the IP, the action is updated. Requires: API key with write scope. Args: slug: Site identifier ip: IP address or CIDR (e.g. "1.2.3.4", "10.0.0.0/8", "2001:db8::/32") action: "deny" (block) or "allow" (whitelist). Default: "deny" Returns: {"added": true, "ip": "1.2.3.4", "action": "deny"}Connector
- Look up any IP address, CIDR network, set of networks, or domain in the honeypot dataset. Use this FIRST whenever the user asks: 'is this IP malicious?', 'is this a known scanner?', 'have you seen this IP?', 'what does this IP do?', 'when was it last seen?', 'is this IP in your data?'. Returns: total_events (0 = never observed), first_seen, last_seen, country, ASN, the 50 most-hit ports plus ports_targeted_count for the true total, top user agents, top URL paths, TLS/HTTP/SSH fingerprints. Covers both IPv4 and domains. Also returns our own judgement: `verdict` (human sentence) with `verdict_key` (stable machine value to alert on) and `verdict_why`; `scanner` (benign-scanner identity from our classification table, or null) so research traffic can be told apart from real attacks; and `cve_probes`, the CVE signatures this address was seen probing. WINDOW: `days` bounds the query to the last N days; leave it unset for every retained event, which is the right default for "have we ever seen this". The website's /lookup defaults to 7 days for anonymous visitors, so the same address can read very differently on the two surfaces. Every response states which window it used in `window`; quote it alongside any count you report. RANGES: pass a CIDR ('103.66.28.0/22') for a whole-network aggregate, or several at once separated by commas, spaces or newlines ('103.66.28.0/22, 8.34.210.32/27') to answer 'have any of this vendor's ranges touched us' in ONE call. Never expand a network into individual addresses and loop -- that is hundreds of calls for an answer this returns in one, and it will exhaust your quota. A range answer sets query_type to 'cidr' or 'cidr_set', lists every range back in `ranges`, and gives `per_range` counts plus `top_source_ips`; total_events 0 with those fields present is a real observed absence.Connector
- Add policy/reference text to a domain's knowledge base. The text is chunked and embedded; explanations for future decisions in this domain will cite it. Creating a new domain claims it for your account (plan limits apply). The built-in demo domains are read-only — ingest into your own domain instead. On team plans, only the domain admin (the member who created the domain, or the subscription owner) can add documents. Args: domain: Domain to ingest into (existing or new). text: The policy or reference text. source: Optional source name shown in the document list.Connector
- Query comprehensive threat profile for an IP: Shodan host data, AbuseIPDB reputation, ASN/geolocation, and open ports. Use for IP investigation and SOC alert triage; for domain data use domain_report. Note: nested asn block always returns at most 50 IPv4/IPv6 prefixes — call asn_lookup with include_full_prefixes=True for the full announced-prefixes list. enrichment.vulns is severity-aware list[VulnInfo] (cve_id + severity + cvss_v3) — Phase 2 v1.16.0 BREAKING; pre-1.16 it was list[str] of CVE IDs. Free: 30/hr (costs 6 tokens), Pro: 500/hr. Returns {ip, enrichment, abuseipdb, shodan, asn, threat_level}.Connector
- Check if SHA-1 hash appears in Have I Been Pwned (HIBP) breach dataset using k-anonymity (5-char prefix only, full hash never leaves tool). Use for password breach audits; read-only, no data stored. Companion OSINT investigation tools: hash_lookup (file-hash malware family lookup, different namespace), email_disposable (throwaway-mail signal on associated accounts), username_lookup (social-platform exposure on associated handles). Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {found, count}.Connector
- Context lookup: Resolve an IPv4 or IPv6 address to its geolocation, ASN, org name, and city/country. Use when you need network or location context for a raw IP address; prefer dns_lookup or dossier_dns for hostname resolution. Queries ipinfo.io with a server-side token — the token is never exposed to callers. Returns a JSON object with fields ip, city, region, country, org, loc, and timezone. On failure, returns an error string describing what went wrong.Connector