Jeevesus — DugganUSA Threat Intelligence MCP
Server Details
Jeevesus saves. Threat-intel MCP, 17.9M docs, 1.13M IOCs. Search · enrich · STIX. Read-only.
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- Healthy
- Last Tested
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Tool Definition Quality
Average 4.6/5 across 3 of 3 tools scored.
Each tool has a clear, distinct purpose: enrich-ioc for single-indicator deep dive, search for broad corpus exploration, and stix-feed-summary for feed-level metadata. No functional overlap, and the descriptions make it obvious which to use for a given task.
Tool names are inconsistent in style: 'enrich-ioc' uses a verb-hyphen-noun pattern, 'search' is a single verb, and 'stix-feed-summary' is a noun phrase with hyphens. There is no uniform convention, which could confuse an agent expecting a predictable pattern.
With 3 tools, the server is on the low end of the ideal 3-15 range. Each tool earns its place by covering core threat intelligence operations (search, enrichment, feed summary), so the count feels appropriate for a focused, read-only MCP server.
The tool surface covers essential read operations but has notable gaps: no bulk IOC retrieval, no direct threat actor profile browsing (though search can find them), and no way to fetch the full STIX bundle via MCP. Users must resort to external URLs for some tasks.
Available Tools
3 toolsenrich-iocAInspect
Look up a single indicator of compromise (IP, domain, URL, or hash) in the DugganUSA corpus and return everything we know about it: threat type, malware family, source feeds, related actor (if attributed), confidence score, references, and the full description from each source. Read-only.
Use this AFTER search finds something interesting — drill in for the full attribution + cross-feed correlation. Or use it directly when triaging a single indicator from your SIEM.
Pass the IOC as either indicator or value (both work). Optional type hint: ip / domain / url / hash / auto.
Examples: indicator="185.93.3.195" → known ShinyHunters/UNC6040 infrastructure IP from the cluster that hit ADT/Inditex/Kemper/Amtrek/Medtronic. indicator="goldenleafway.lat" → fresh Apothecary/ClearFake .lat rotation domain. indicator="ee28b3137d65d74c0234eea35fa536af" → Volexity-attributed malware MD5 (BrazenBamboo/DEEPDATA campaign).
Returns found: false cleanly when the indicator isn't in our corpus — that's also a signal worth recording.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| type | No | Optional type hint. Default auto-detect. | |
| value | No | Alias of `indicator`. Either field works. | |
| indicator | No | The indicator to enrich (IP, domain, URL, or hash). |
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It declares 'Read-only' and describes the return value including 'found: false' on miss. It also lists the fields returned (threat type, malware family, etc.) and gives examples. This is comprehensive for a read-only lookup tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is well-structured: first paragraph states purpose and return, second paragraph gives usage context, third provides concrete examples. It is somewhat lengthy but each sentence adds value. No fluff.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the moderate complexity (3 optional params, no output schema), the description is thorough: it covers the full set of behaviors (return fields, missing indicator handling), usage context, and examples. It provides sufficient information for an AI agent to select and invoke the tool correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, baseline 3. The description adds value beyond schema by explaining that 'indicator' and 'value' are aliases, giving usage examples with all parameter types, and providing an optional 'type' hint with enum values. This clarifies how to use the parameters effectively.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's purpose: 'Look up a single indicator of compromise...' with a specific verb ('look up') and resource ('DugganUSA corpus'). It distinguishes from sibling tools by recommending use after 'search' and mentions 'drill in' for full attribution.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides explicit usage guidance: 'Use this AFTER `search` finds something interesting — drill in for the full attribution + cross-feed correlation. Or use it directly when triaging a single indicator.' This tells when and when not to use it, and implies alternatives (search, stix-feed-summary).
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
searchAInspect
Hybrid (keyword + semantic) search across the DugganUSA threat-intelligence corpus — 17.9M+ indexed documents. Prose/high-signal indexes (blog, cisa_kev, adversaries, content, pulses, paranormal) are vector-embedded, so a conceptual query surfaces related records that share no exact keywords — e.g. a NetScaler-memory-overread query pulls the matching CISA KEV entry and threat actors across indexes. Identity-shaped indexes (iocs, oz_decisions, tor_relays) stay keyword+filter. Public indexes only, read-only, prompt-injection sanitized. Returns up to 25 hits with title, snippet, source, and timestamp. Available indexes: • iocs (1.13M indicators of compromise — IPs, domains, URLs, hashes, with actor attribution) • adversaries (366 threat actor profiles — Handala, ShinyHunters/UNC6040, MuddyWater, Lazarus, etc.) • cisa_kev (1,600+ CVEs in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, daily-synced) • pulses (16K+ OTX community pulses) • blog (1,800+ DugganUSA threat-intel blog posts including our left-of-boom predictions) • epstein_files (400K+ documents from the Epstein archive) • oz_decisions (auto-blocker decisions from our edge — 7.5M+ rows) • paranormal (3,400 fringe-research docs) • tor_relays (1.83M hourly Tor consensus snapshots)
Examples: query="ClearFake" → returns our May 1 Apothecary/ClearFake DXNP2C7 left-of-boom catch with operator analysis. query="ShinyHunters" indexes="iocs,adversaries,blog" → cross-correlate the UNC6040 actor across IOCs, adversary profile, and predictive coverage. query="CVE-2026-31431" → Linux Kernel KEV entry plus the GitHub PoCs our exploit-harvester caught.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | Max results (default 10, hard max 25). | |
| query | Yes | Search query. | |
| indexes | No | Optional comma-separated allow-listed indexes. Defaults to all public indexes. |
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description fully discloses behavior: read-only, prompt-injection sanitized, returns up to 25 results with specific fields, and explains hybrid search behavior (conceptual querying across vector-embedded indexes). No contradictions.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is well-structured, starting with a concise purpose, then listing indexes in bullet form, and ending with illustrative examples. Every sentence contributes meaningful information without redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the complexity of the tool (17.9M documents, multiple index types, hybrid search) and no output schema, the description covers key aspects: return format, read-only nature, index distinctions, and example queries. It's sufficiently complete for an agent to use correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, but the description adds value by explaining the indexes parameter in depth (listing all options with descriptions) and clarifying query behavior via examples. The limit parameter benefits less from the description beyond schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool performs hybrid keyword+semantic search across a specific corpus, listing available indexes and giving concrete examples. It distinguishes from sibling tools (enrich-ioc, stix-feed-summary) which serve different purposes.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides clear context: it's for searching public threat-intel indexes, read-only, with sanitization. Examples demonstrate effective usage, though it doesn't explicitly state when not to use it or name alternatives beyond the sibling list.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
stix-feed-summaryAInspect
Live shape report on the DugganUSA STIX 2.1 threat feed for a chosen lookback window (1-7 days). Returns total indicator count, top malware families, top source feeds, type breakdown (ip/domain/url/hash/cidr), and top countries.
Use this BEFORE pulling the full STIX bundle to gauge feed depth and freshness, plan SIEM ingestion budget, or sanity-check that a campaign you read about is actually in our corpus.
Does NOT return the full bundle — for that, fetch https://analytics.dugganusa.com/api/v1/stix-feed with the same Bearer key. The bundle is STIX 2.1 / TAXII 2.1 with Splunk ES, OPNsense, Suricata, and Unbound DNS sinkhole plugins.
Authentication required (Bearer token). Anonymous callers get a clear 401 with the registration URL.
Example: {"days": 7} returns the last week's feed shape — useful for capacity planning and spot-checking recent ingest tags.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| days | No | Lookback window in days (1–7). Default 1. |
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations provided, but the description discloses that it does not return the full bundle, mentions authentication failure behavior, and describes the allowed days range. It could mention rate limits or output format, but covers key behaviors.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is somewhat long but every sentence provides useful information. It is well-structured with distinct sections for purpose, usage, and example. Could be slightly tighter, but no wasted words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the single parameter, no output schema, and no annotations, the description thoroughly covers the tool's purpose, usage guidelines, authentication details, and an example. It is complete and leaves no major gaps.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The single parameter 'days' is fully described in the schema (100% coverage). The description adds context by stating the default is 1 and provides an example usage, which adds value beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool returns a 'live shape report' on the STIX 2.1 threat feed and lists specific return types (total indicator count, top malware families, etc.). It distinguishes itself from the full bundle retrieval tool.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly says 'Use this BEFORE pulling the full STIX bundle' and provides concrete use cases such as gauging feed depth, planning SIEM ingestion, and sanity-checking campaigns. Also mentions authentication requirements and error responses.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
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