Use this when you need the safe first commands for verifying or querying a SEAR deployment from the terminal.
ConnectorNo auth
650,522 tools. Updated 2026-10-14 04:13
"Marking Linux terminal commands as safe or unsafe for local execution" matching MCP tools:
- Read-only. The answer itself: typed facts, evidence excerpts, timestamps, confidence scores, freshness, and an explicit list of what could not be verified. Free, and safe to call repeatedly. If the job is not final yet the response is provisional (http_status 202) - poll until 200, or watch get_verification_status for a terminal state first. A completed job answers every required criterion; a partial one answers some and says so in limitations.ConnectorNo auth
- [PAID $0.01 USDC per call — optional third-party check] Preflight a proposed command or tool call through HumanMirror Safe Preflight (humanmirror.fr, x402-verified seller) before executing it. Returns the independent risk verdict (risk level, findings, required guards) from their circuit engine. Use for genuinely risky external tool calls where a second opinion matters. Benign commands settle $0.01 USDC on Base and return the verdict; commands they judge over-limit are blocked and refunded (no charge). This is an OPTIONAL external check — AgentWorld's own spend-authority, solvency and circuit-breaker layers remain primary and free.ConnectorNo auth
- Checks the status of a deep report or export record (by its record id, e.g. from smi_create_deep_report draftIds). Returns state = ready | in_progress | draft | failed | unknown and a terminal flag. Poll with bounded attempts and backoff while in_progress; stop as soon as terminal is true (ready or failed) — a failed record will never become ready. Also stop when state is draft: the record was never submitted, so it will not progress until smi_submit_deep_reports or smi_submit_exports is called on it.ConnectorOAuth
- [PAID $0.01 USDC per call — optional third-party check] Preflight a proposed command or tool call through HumanMirror Safe Preflight (humanmirror.fr, x402-verified seller) before executing it. Returns the independent risk verdict (risk level, findings, required guards) from their circuit engine. Use for genuinely risky external tool calls where a second opinion matters. Benign commands settle $0.01 USDC on Base and return the verdict; commands they judge over-limit are blocked and refunded (no charge). This is an OPTIONAL external check — AgentWorld's own spend-authority, solvency and circuit-breaker layers remain primary and free.ConnectorNo auth
- Return the best safe next action for a mixed resource. Pass version to bind an immutable hosted release. Hosted skills expose explicit-consent exact native client install commands; upstream-only resources stay open-only.ConnectorNo auth
Matching MCP Servers
- FlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceA secure, controlled terminal MCP server that enables executing whitelisted shell commands safely with multiple security layers.-
- AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceLets ChatGPT, Claude Desktop, Claude Code, and other MCP clients run an allowlisted set of local commands and read files from a chosen directory, so an assistant can analyse a codebase or trigger local generators (images, sprites, assets) without metered API tokens. The server is read-only and deny-by-default by default, with no shell, path containment, opt-in writes, and required auth when exposed over HTTP.31MIT
Matching MCP Connectors
Free read-only Base Mainnet transaction Preflight and Verification; no signing or custody.
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- Hosted-safe unsigned builder for create_escrow_v2. Use this from hosted SAP MCP, preview the result, then call local sap_payments_finalize_transaction with submit:true. The depositorWallet signs locally; keypair bytes never leave the user machine. Defaults to DisputeWindow settlementSecurity=2 and rejects SelfReport/0. SAP MCP context: Hosted-safe unsigned Escrow V2 builder. The output is not submitted and is not signed by hosted SAP MCP. Preview it, then call local sap_payments_finalize_transaction with submit:true and confirm:true. Never create temporary signing scripts or read keypair JSON. SAP MCP execution guidance: Intent: hosted unsigned transaction builder. Pricing: paid builder; estimate first, then pay/build and finalize unsigned transactions locally when returned. Routing: hosted-safe builder. If a transaction is returned, preview/sign/submit with sap_payments_finalize_transaction; never create temporary signing scripts. Signer boundary: user-controlled local profile or external signer; OOBE hosted MCP remains non-custodial.ConnectorNo auth
- Hosted-safe unsigned builder for close_escrow_v2. The depositor signs locally; the builder refuses to close until balance and pendingAmount are both zero. SAP MCP context: Hosted-safe unsigned Escrow V2 builder. The output is not submitted and is not signed by hosted SAP MCP. Preview it, then call local sap_payments_finalize_transaction with submit:true and confirm:true. Never create temporary signing scripts or read keypair JSON. SAP MCP execution guidance: Intent: hosted unsigned transaction builder. Pricing: paid builder; estimate first, then pay/build and finalize unsigned transactions locally when returned. Routing: hosted-safe builder. If a transaction is returned, preview/sign/submit with sap_payments_finalize_transaction; never create temporary signing scripts. Signer boundary: user-controlled local profile or external signer; OOBE hosted MCP remains non-custodial.ConnectorDestructiveNo auth
- Fallback for clients that cannot download and query the source locally. Use only when local execution is unavailable or the user explicitly asks for Aard-managed staging. Never fetch the URL with web search or request its response body directly. Stage the exact unchanged fallback URL outside model context; this tool returns metadata only. Use its dataset_id with inspect_dataset or query_dataset. The URL alone is sufficient. download_ref is an optional fast path — if you cannot copy it exactly, OMIT it rather than risk mistyping it; the server then re-derives the grant itself and the call still succeeds. no_records_for_selection is TERMINAL, not a fault: the request was well-formed and the source holds no observations for it. Widen the selection or state that no data exists — do not retry the same selection.ConnectorOAuth
- Probe one Linux machine — this host (`local`) or a remote host over SSH (`ssh`) — and report its OS, kernel, architecture, package manager, Node/npm, OpenCode, Docker, and per-tool detection flags, plus the names (never values) of credentials present. Read-only: it runs one shell probe as the target user (over SSH when `mode:ssh`), installs nothing, writes nothing, contacts no external service, and can take a few seconds per hop. Parameter semantics: `target.mode` selects local vs ssh (default `local`); `target.host` is required only for ssh; `target.user` defaults to the ssh config/current user; `target.cwd` sets the directory for relative checks; `target.port`/`identityFile` pass straight to ssh. Use it to see what a clone would touch, then plan_clone to turn that into an ordered plan and apply_clone to perform it.ConnectorNo auth
- Probe one Linux machine — this host (`local`) or a remote host over SSH (`ssh`) — and report its OS, kernel, architecture, package manager, Node/npm, OpenCode, Docker, and per-tool detection flags, plus the names (never values) of credentials present. Read-only: it runs one shell probe as the target user (over SSH when `mode:ssh`), installs nothing, writes nothing, contacts no external service, and can take a few seconds per hop. Parameter semantics: `target.mode` selects local vs ssh (default `local`); `target.host` is required only for ssh; `target.user` defaults to the ssh config/current user; `target.cwd` sets the directory for relative checks; `target.port`/`identityFile` pass straight to ssh. Use it to see what a clone would touch, then plan_clone to turn that into an ordered plan and apply_clone to perform it.ConnectorNo auth
- Create a workspace-scoped credential for the SPACE CLI only when the host supports a local terminal and the user requests an upload. It expires within 30 minutes and never outlives the parent token. Pass it to the CLI process environment, never a file, log, user-facing message or unrelated service. This is not needed for browsing or feedback, and does not give a chat-only host a terminal. Revoking the parent does not cascade to an already derived token; revoke the temporary token separately if needed.ConnectorAPI key
- Cancel one exact queued or running non-Agent 2ools build after named explicit confirmation. Repeating the same cancellation is safe, late Engine results are rejected, completed versions are never deleted, and immutable history remains. Governed Agent execution uses cancel_agent_run.ConnectorDestructiveNo auth
- Perform a Linux package vulnerability audit using SecDB. ## What this tool does Analyzes the installed packages of a Linux system-identified by OS and OS version-and returns vulnerability information plus a Markdown summary. The audit results are based exclusively on the package list provided by the user. ## When to use this tool Use this tool when the user wants to determine: - whether installed packages contain known vulnerabilities - whether a host, VM, container, or base image is affected by security advisories - which packages require patching or upgrading If the user does not know the valid values for `os` or `version`, first call the `linux_os` tool to retrieve the exact supported combinations. ## Inputs - **os**: Linux distribution identifier supported by SecDB (use `linux_os` to obtain allowed values). - **version**: OS version or codename corresponding to the selected distribution. - **packages**: list of installed packages, **one per line**, generated using the appropriate system command: ### For RPM-based distributions (RHEL, CentOS, Rocky, Alma, SUSE) rpm -qa --qf '%{NAME}-%{VERSION}-%{RELEASE}.%{ARCH}\n' ### For DEB-based distributions (Ubuntu, Debian) dpkg-query -W -f='${Package} ${Version} ${Architecture}\n' ### For Alpine Linux apk list -I The raw output of these commands can be passed directly as the `packages` input (one package per line). ... python3 3.12.3-0ubuntu2.1 amd64 systemd 255.4-1ubuntu8.10 amd64 tmux 3.4-1ubuntu0.1 amd64 ... ## Outputs - **report**: structured objects describing the advisories affecting the audited packages. - **summary**: Markdown summary including total vulnerabilities, severity breakdown, and key findings. ## LLM usage guidelines - Never guess whether a package is vulnerable-always call this tool for Linux audits. - If `os` or `version` is unclear or missing, call `linux_os` and ask the user to choose a valid combination. - Normalize the package list to “one entry per line” if the user provides unstructured output. - The `summary` is already Markdown and can be shown directly. - Use `report` when deeper technical analysis is required.ConnectorNo auth
- Use this free read-only discovery-tier tool when the user asks for help, available commands, MCP tools, core concepts, pricing, parser-stable fields, grants, x402, Morning Brief, Company Report, MSTR treasury review, perp adapters, SPECTRA, or examples. Parameters: optional topic, detail, include_examples, question, or query fields; callers may omit all arguments for overview help. Behavior: local and idempotent with no destructive side effects; it does not run paid analysis routes or expose internal-only tools. It translates natural-language orientation requests into the live DeltaSignal MCP/OpenAPI discovery contract and points users to tools/list, /v1/pricing, /v1/contract/fields, and /v1/readiness. It is not a trading, execution, or investment-advice tool and must not expose internal-only tools unless the live public contract lists them.ConnectorNo auth
- Use this free read-only discovery-tier tool when the user asks for help, available commands, MCP tools, core concepts, pricing, parser-stable fields, grants, x402, Morning Brief, Company Report, MSTR treasury review, perp adapters, SPECTRA, or examples. Parameters: optional topic, detail, include_examples, question, or query fields; callers may omit all arguments for overview help. Behavior: local and idempotent with no destructive side effects; it does not run paid analysis routes or expose internal-only tools. It translates natural-language orientation requests into the live DeltaSignal MCP/OpenAPI discovery contract and points users to tools/list, /v1/pricing, /v1/contract/fields, and /v1/readiness. It is not a trading, execution, or investment-advice tool and must not expose internal-only tools unless the live public contract lists them.ConnectorNo auth
- Return terminal xDaLa session start result, lean result summary, and audit events. Read-only preparation/result lookup only; the MCP does not sign, submit, or execute, and users sign locally in Workbench/wallet/local signer. For completed handoffs, prefer result.results[].owner/sessionId/pid over XRC-729 contract owner facts when identifying the actual session owner/starter.ConnectorNo auth
- Execute a signed swap transaction obtained from getOrder and receive execution status. SAP MCP context: Jupiter protocol tools are served as AgentKit ecosystem tools. Use them for quote, route, and swap preparation, then use SAP transaction preview/sign/submit tools when an unsigned transaction must pass MCP signer policy. SAP MCP execution guidance: Intent: SAP MCP tool workflow. Pricing: paid value-action; preview cost and transaction effects before user confirmation. Routing: hosted accountless write is blocked; do not call this as a paid hosted write and no x402 payment should be charged. Use the local sap_payments bridge or a hosted unsigned builder when user signing is required. Signer boundary: user-controlled local profile or external signer; OOBE hosted MCP remains non-custodial.ConnectorDestructiveNo auth
- Check an asynchronous provider-estimate job created by request_provider_estimate, including its queued or terminal execution substate. Terminal statuses: completed, degraded, refused. An unknown read returns reason_code=unknown_or_not_yet_visible. Retry with backoff only when the id came from an authoritative admitted response; never infer an id after a rejected admission.ConnectorNo auth
- Encode UTF-8 text as standard Base64 (padded, A-Z a-z 0-9 + /), for embedding binary-unsafe content in JSON, data URIs, HTTP headers or Basic auth. Returns JSON { encoded }. The output uses the standard alphabet, so it is NOT URL-safe: '+' and '/' must still be percent-escaped before they go in a query string or path segment, and this tool does not do that. It is an encoding, not encryption — anyone can reverse it with decode_base64. Runs locally, no size limit beyond the request body.ConnectorNo auth
- Encode UTF-8 text as standard Base64 (padded, A-Z a-z 0-9 + /), for embedding binary-unsafe content in JSON, data URIs, HTTP headers or Basic auth. Returns JSON { encoded }. The output uses the standard alphabet, so it is NOT URL-safe: '+' and '/' must still be percent-escaped before they go in a query string or path segment, and this tool does not do that. It is an encoding, not encryption — anyone can reverse it with decode_base64. Runs locally, no size limit beyond the request body.ConnectorNo auth