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Glama

Server Details

ZEN SecDB MCP server for CVE intelligence, CVSS/EPSS scoring, advisories, SSVC, and package audits.

Status
Healthy
Last Tested
Transport
Streamable HTTP
URL

Glama MCP Gateway

Connect through Glama MCP Gateway for full control over tool access and complete visibility into every call.

MCP client
Glama
MCP server

Full call logging

Every tool call is logged with complete inputs and outputs, so you can debug issues and audit what your agents are doing.

Tool access control

Enable or disable individual tools per connector, so you decide what your agents can and cannot do.

Managed credentials

Glama handles OAuth flows, token storage, and automatic rotation, so credentials never expire on your clients.

Usage analytics

See which tools your agents call, how often, and when, so you can understand usage patterns and catch anomalies.

100% free. Your data is private.
Tool DescriptionsA

Average 4.7/5 across 11 of 11 tools scored.

Server CoherenceA
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have clearly distinct purposes (e.g., vulnerability_search for discovery, vulnerability_info for full details, vulnerability_score for CVSS/EPSS, epss_timeseries for history). However, pairs like vulnerability_info vs. vulnerability_score and linux_audit vs. purl_audit have overlapping functionality, though detailed descriptions help differentiate them.

Naming Consistency5/5

All tool names follow a consistent lowercase snake_case pattern with a descriptor and an operation noun (e.g., vulnerability_info, linux_audit, sightings_search, ssvc_calculator). No mixed conventions or stylistic deviations are present.

Tool Count5/5

The 11 tools are well-scoped for a vulnerability intelligence server, covering search, details, scoring, trends, audits, reports, and prioritization. The count is within the expected 3-15 range and each tool contributes a distinct capability.

Completeness5/5

The tool surface covers the full vulnerability intelligence lifecycle: discovery (vulnerability_search), detailed lookup (vulnerability_info), risk scoring (vulnerability_score), EPSS history, real-world sightings, SSVC prioritization, audits for both OS packages and application dependencies, and aggregated reports. No obvious dead-end or missing critical operation is apparent.

Available Tools

11 tools
epss_timeseriesAInspect

Get the historical EPSS time series for a specific CVE.

What this tool does

Returns the historical EPSS score, percentile, and model version available for a CVE across time, ordered by date. Useful for analyzing how exploitability likelihood has evolved over time.

When to use this tool

Use this tool when the user asks about:

  • EPSS trend over time

  • how exploitability probability changed

  • whether EPSS spiked or dropped

  • historical comparison of risk

If the user only wants the current EPSS score, use vulnerability_score instead.

Inputs

  • cve_id: valid CVE identifier (CVE-YYYY-NNNNN).

Outputs

  • series: array of objects, each containing:

    • date: measurement date in ISO format

    • score: EPSS score

    • percentile: EPSS percentile

    • model: EPSS model version

LLM usage guidelines

  • Never guess EPSS values-use this tool for all EPSS time-series questions.

  • If cve_id is malformed or incomplete, ask the user to correct it before calling.

  • If the user mentions multiple CVEs, call the tool once per CVE as needed.

  • If no historical data is available, return an empty series and state that no EPSS history was found.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cve_idYesCVE identification (CVE-YYYY-NNNNN)

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription
seriesNo
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden. It discloses the return structure (series with date, score, percentile, model), ordering by date, and handles the empty-series edge case. However, it does not explicitly state that the tool is read-only or describe any potential side effects, which is a minor gap for a retrieval tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured with clear headers: purpose, when to use, inputs, outputs, and LLM guidelines. It is detailed but not verbose; each sentence serves a purpose, and the most critical information is front-loaded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The tool has only one parameter, an output schema, and no annotations. The description covers everything needed: what the tool does, when to use it, input format, output structure, and edge-case behavior (no history). It also distinguishes from a sibling tool, making it contextually complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds value by specifying the CVE format ('CVE-YYYY-NNNNN') and providing guidance on handling malformed IDs (asking the user to correct). This goes beyond the schema's minimal description.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Get the historical EPSS time series for a specific CVE.' It clearly identifies the tool's scope (historical time series) and differentiates from the sibling `vulnerability_score` by explicitly stating that tool covers current EPSS scores.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Includes a dedicated 'When to use this tool' section listing concrete user intents (e.g., 'EPSS trend over time', 'whether EPSS spiked or dropped') and provides an explicit alternative: 'If the user only wants the current EPSS score, use `vulnerability_score` instead.' Also includes LLM-specific directives like never guessing values and handling malformed CVE IDs.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

feed_reportAInspect

Run a public ZEN SecDB feed report.

What this tool does

Executes a predefined report on ZEN SecDB public feed data and returns structured results for analytics, trends, distributions, and top-N summaries.

Supported reports can cover public datasets such as:

  • CVEs

  • security advisories

  • EPSS

  • weaknesses

  • CPE vendors and products

  • exploit references

  • sightings and IOC-related data

Use feed_report_catalog to discover the list of available reports and their supported input parameters.

When to use this tool

Use this tool when the user asks about:

  • distributions, trends, or counts across public vulnerability data

  • top CVEs, top weaknesses, top vendors, or similar rankings

  • timeline-based summaries such as yearly or monthly trends

  • aggregated views over public SecDB feed data

Do not use this tool when the user asks for details about a single CVE, advisory, or exploit. Use the dedicated lookup tools instead.

Inputs

  • report_id: identifier of the report to execute

  • filters: optional object with report-specific filters

  • limit: optional maximum number of results to return, when supported by the selected report

Outputs

  • summary: Optional Markdown summary of the report results

  • report: structured JSON object containing:

    • report_id: executed report identifier

    • filters: applied filters

    • data: structured report rows or aggregated values

LLM usage guidelines

  • Use feed_report_catalog when you need to discover which public reports are available or which parameters they support.

  • Do not guess report IDs-use the catalog when uncertain.

  • Present summary directly to the user-it is already Markdown.

  • Use report for structured follow-up analysis, comparisons, or tool chaining.

  • If the selected report does not exist, return a clear not-found error instead of guessing an alternative.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
limitNooptional maximum number of results to return, when supported by the selected report
filtersNooptional object with report-specific filters
report_idYesidentifier of the report to execute

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription
dataYesstructured report rows or aggregated values
filtersNooptional JSON schema describing supported input parameters
summaryNoOptional Markdown summary of the report results
report_idYesexecuted report identifier
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral transparency. It discloses the purpose, describes the output structure (summary and report), notes that 'limit' is only applied 'when supported by the selected report,' and specifies error handling: 'If the selected report does not exist, return a clear not-found error instead of guessing an alternative.' This goes beyond the schema in explaining behavior.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is comprehensive yet efficiently structured with clear sections: 'What this tool does,' 'When to use this tool,' 'Inputs,' 'Outputs,' and 'LLM usage guidelines.' Each section serves a specific purpose, front-loads the core action, and avoids redundant filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The description fully equips an agent to decide when to use the tool, how to discover valid report IDs, what parameters are available, what output format to expect, and how to handle missing reports. The presence of an output schema is complemented by the description's explanation of summary vs. report structure, making the context complete for correct invocation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, but the description adds critical usage semantics: it advises using 'feed_report_catalog' to discover supported input parameters, warns not to guess report IDs, and clarifies that the 'limit' parameter is conditional on report support. This adds practical value beyond the raw schema definitions.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description immediately states 'Run a public ZEN SecDB feed report' and elaborates with 'Executes a predefined report on ZEN SecDB public feed data and returns structured results for analytics, trends, distributions, and top-N summaries.' It clearly distinguishes from siblings by explicitly saying 'Do not use this tool when the user asks for details about a single CVE, advisory, or exploit. Use the dedicated lookup tools instead.'

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description includes a dedicated 'When to use this tool' section with bullet points for appropriate use cases, and a 'Do not use' section pointing to alternatives. It also instructs to use 'feed_report_catalog' for discovering reports and parameters, and warns against guessing report IDs. This provides explicit when-to-use and when-not-to-use guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

feed_report_catalogAInspect

List available public ZEN SecDB feed reports.

What this tool does

Returns the catalog of available ZEN SecDB public feed reports, including their identifiers, descriptions, and supported input parameters.

This tool helps discover which reports can be executed through feed_report.

When to use this tool

Use this tool when:

  • the user asks what public reports are available

  • you need to discover the correct report ID before running a report

  • you need to inspect supported filters or input parameters

  • you are unsure which report best matches the user request

Inputs

This tool does not require any input.

Outputs

  • reports: array of report definitions, each containing:

    • report_id: report identifier

    • title: human-readable report title

    • description: short explanation of what the report returns

    • input_schema: optional JSON schema describing supported input parameters

LLM usage guidelines

  • Use this tool before feed_report whenever the correct report ID or supported parameters are not already known.

  • Do not invent report IDs or parameters not present in the catalog.

  • Prefer the most specific matching report for the user request.

  • When useful, briefly summarize the most relevant available reports before calling feed_report.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No parameters

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription
reportsNo
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It clearly indicates a read-only catalog operation ('List','Returns') and describes the output structure. It does not mention auth, rate limits, or side effects, but for a zero-input, non-destructive listing tool, this is sufficient context.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured with clear markdown sections (What this tool does, When to use, Inputs, Outputs, LLM usage guidelines) and front-loaded purpose. Despite length, every sentence provides actionable guidance with no redundancy.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a zero-parameter catalog tool, the description fully covers purpose, usage, inputs, outputs, and relationship to the sibling feed_report. The output section describes the report objects, and the guidance on not inventing IDs adds important safety context.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The tool has zero parameters, so schema coverage is 100% and the baseline is 4. The description explicitly reinforces this with 'This tool does not require any input.' This adds clarity beyond the empty schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with 'List available public ZEN SecDB feed reports' and explains it returns a catalog of report identifiers, descriptions, and input parameters. It explicitly distinguishes from the sibling tool feed_report by stating it enables discovery of reports executable through feed_report.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Includes a dedicated 'When to use this tool' section with concrete criteria (e.g., user asks what reports are available, need to discover report ID, inspect filters). LLM usage guidelines add explicit direction: 'Use this tool before feed_report whenever the correct report ID or supported parameters are not already known,' indicating when to use versus the alternative.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

linux_auditAInspect

Perform a Linux package vulnerability audit using SecDB.

What this tool does

Analyzes the installed packages of a Linux system-identified by OS and OS version-and returns vulnerability information plus a Markdown summary. The audit results are based exclusively on the package list provided by the user.

When to use this tool

Use this tool when the user wants to determine:

  • whether installed packages contain known vulnerabilities

  • whether a host, VM, container, or base image is affected by security advisories

  • which packages require patching or upgrading

If the user does not know the valid values for os or version, first call the linux_os tool to retrieve the exact supported combinations.

Inputs

  • os: Linux distribution identifier supported by SecDB (use linux_os to obtain allowed values).

  • version: OS version or codename corresponding to the selected distribution.

  • packages: list of installed packages, one per line, generated using the appropriate system command:

For RPM-based distributions (RHEL, CentOS, Rocky, Alma, SUSE)

rpm -qa --qf '%{NAME}-%{VERSION}-%{RELEASE}.%{ARCH}\n'

For DEB-based distributions (Ubuntu, Debian)

dpkg-query -W -f='${Package} ${Version} ${Architecture}\n'

For Alpine Linux

apk list -I

The raw output of these commands can be passed directly as the packages input (one package per line).

...
python3 3.12.3-0ubuntu2.1 amd64
systemd 255.4-1ubuntu8.10 amd64
tmux 3.4-1ubuntu0.1 amd64
...

Outputs

  • report: structured objects describing the advisories affecting the audited packages.

  • summary: Markdown summary including total vulnerabilities, severity breakdown, and key findings.

LLM usage guidelines

  • Never guess whether a package is vulnerable-always call this tool for Linux audits.

  • If os or version is unclear or missing, call linux_os and ask the user to choose a valid combination.

  • Normalize the package list to “one entry per line” if the user provides unstructured output.

  • The summary is already Markdown and can be shown directly.

  • Use report when deeper technical analysis is required.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
osYesLinux distribution identifier supported by SecDB (use `linux_os` to obtain allowed values)
versionYesOS version or codename corresponding to the selected distribution
packagesYeslist of installed packages, **one per line**, generated using the appropriate system command

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription
reportNo
summaryNoMarkdown summary including total vulnerabilities, severity breakdown, and key findings
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full behavioral disclosure burden. It clearly states that 'audit results are based exclusively on the package list provided by the user,' setting expectations about scope and limitations. It also describes the two outputs (report and summary) and notes the summary is ready-to-show Markdown, which is valuable contextual information.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is structured with clear headings, bullet points, and code blocks. It is longer than average, but every section earns its place: the one-line summary front-loads the purpose, and the subsequent sections provide necessary commands, usage context, and output details. No redundant or filler sentences exist.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The description covers input preparation (exact commands per distro), validation (call linux_os for valid values), normalization (one entry per line), output interpretation (report vs. summary), and behavioral caveats (exclusivity on provided packages). Combined with the output schema existence and high schema coverage, this tool is fully specified for an agent to invoke correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Although the schema already covers all three parameters, the description significantly enriches them. For 'packages' it provides per-distro commands and an example format; for 'os' and 'version' it points to linux_os to obtain authoritative values. This goes well beyond the schema descriptions, making the parameters actionable.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Perform a Linux package vulnerability audit using SecDB.' It clearly distinguishes this tool from sibling linux_os by explicitly instructing users to call linux_os for valid OS values. The scope (analyzing installed packages and returning vulnerability info plus a Markdown summary) is precise and unambiguous.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

A dedicated 'When to use this tool' section lists three concrete use cases (known vulnerabilities, affected hosts/VMs/containers/base images, patching needs). It explicitly directs users to first call linux_os when os/version values are unknown, and provides exact package-list generation commands for RPM-, DEB-, and Alpine-based systems. The LLM guidelines further clarify when to always use this tool.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

linux_osAInspect

List supported Linux operating systems and their corresponding versions for use with the linux_audit tool.

What this tool does

Returns an array of supported OS/version pairs, each in the form:

{"os":"name", "versions":["version or codename"]}

This allows the LLM and the user to know exactly which inputs are valid for the linux_audit tool.

When to use this tool

Use this tool when:

  • the user does not know which OS names or versions are supported

  • the user provides unclear or ambiguous OS information

  • you need to validate os/version before performing a Linux audit

This tool should typically be called before linux_audit whenever parameters are uncertain.

Inputs

This tool does not require any input.

Outputs

Returns an array of objects:

  • os: supported Linux distribution identifier

  • versions: corresponding list of supported release or codename

Example:

[
    {"os": "ubuntu", "versions": ["noble","focal"]},
    {"os": "debian", "versions": ["bookworm","sid"]},
    {"os": "redhat", "version": ["redhat-9.0"]}
]

LLM usage guidelines

  • Use this tool to validate or suggest correct OS/version combinations before calling linux_audit.

  • If the user provides invalid or misspelled OS names, retrieve the official list here and ask them to select one.

  • Do not guess operating system identifiers-always rely on this tool to confirm correctness.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No parameters

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription
supportedNo
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden. It discloses that the tool requires no input, returns an array of objects, and shows the output format with an example. It also clarifies its non-destructive, informational nature and warns against guessing OS identifiers. It could explicitly state there are no side effects or that it is a static list, but the behavior is well understood from the description.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured with clear headings, bullet points, and an example. It is longer than necessary but each section adds value: what it does, when to use, inputs, outputs, and LLM guidelines. It is front-loaded with the main purpose, making it easy to scan.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The description is complete given the tool's simplicity. It fully explains the purpose, output format, and usage context, and the inclusion of an example provides concrete guidance. Since there is no input schema beyond '{}', there are no gaps, and the output is fully described.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The tool has zero parameters, and the description explicitly states 'This tool does not require any input.' This exceeds the baseline for 0-parameter tools by confirming there is nothing to provide, eliminating any ambiguity.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool 'List supported Linux operating systems and their corresponding versions for use with the linux_audit tool.' It specifies the exact resource (supported OS/version pairs) and distinguishes itself from sibling tools like linux_audit by noting it provides the valid inputs for that tool.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explicitly provides 'When to use this tool' with bullet points, states it 'should typically be called before linux_audit whenever parameters are uncertain,' and includes LLM usage guidelines that clarify when to use it for validation and correction. This is thorough alternative/context guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

purl_auditAInspect

Perform a software package vulnerability audit using SecDB.

What this tool does

Analyzes a list of software packages identified by PURL (Package URL) and returns vulnerability information plus a Markdown summary. The audit results are based exclusively on the package list provided.

When to use this tool

Use this tool when the user wants to determine:

  • whether application dependencies contain known vulnerabilities

  • whether a project is affected by security advisories

  • which packages require patching or upgrading

Supported ecosystems

Inputs

  • purls: list of Package URLs, one per entry. Generate them from your project manifest files:

    • Node.js: package.json / package-lock.json

    • Python: requirements.txt / Pipfile.lock / pyproject.toml

    • Ruby: Gemfile.lock

    • Go: go.mod / go.sum

    • Rust: Cargo.lock

    • PHP: composer.lock

    • Java: pom.xml / build.gradle

    • .NET: *.csproj / packages.lock.json

Outputs

  • report: structured JSON objects describing the advisories affecting the audited packages.

  • summary: Markdown summary including total vulnerabilities, severity breakdown, and key findings.

LLM usage guidelines

  • Never guess whether a package is vulnerable — always call this tool.

  • Only submit PURLs from the supported ecosystems listed above; others will be ignored.

  • The summary is already Markdown and can be shown directly.

  • Use report when deeper technical analysis is required.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
purlsYesList of Package URLs (PURL) to audit

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription
reportNo
summaryNoMarkdown summary including total vulnerabilities, severity breakdown, and key findings
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It discloses that results are based exclusively on the provided package list, that unsupported ecosystem PURLs will be ignored, and what outputs to expect (report and summary). This provides strong behavioral transparency beyond basic operation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured with clear headings (What, When, Supported ecosystems, Inputs, Outputs, LLM guidelines). While lengthy, every section earns its place by providing essential details like examples and manifest file sources. It is informative without being redundant.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's complexity (one parameter but many ecosystem variations), the description is complete: it covers supported ecosystems, input generation, output format, and usage rules. With an output schema present, it doesn't need to detail return structure, but it still mentions the two outputs. This is exceptional contextual coverage.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Although schema coverage is 100%, the description adds substantial meaning: it explains what PURLs are, gives examples for each supported ecosystem, and lists manifest files to generate them from. This goes far beyond the schema's bare 'List of Package URLs' and gives the agent concrete guidance for constructing valid inputs.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool performs a vulnerability audit on a list of PURLs, returning vulnerability information and a Markdown summary. It uses specific verb+resource ('Perform a software package vulnerability audit') and distinguishes from sibling tools by focusing on PURL-based package audits.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly says when to use this tool (e.g., when user wants to know if dependencies contain known vulnerabilities), and provides 'LLM usage guidelines' such as 'Never guess whether a package is vulnerable — always call this tool.' It also clarifies which ecosystems are supported, giving clear usage context.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

ssvc_calculatorAInspect

Compute CISA SSVC (Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization) for a CVE.

What this tool does

Calculates the SSVC decision (Track, Track*, Attend, Act) using:

  • exploitation status

  • technical impact

  • automatable exploitation

  • mission prevalence (user-provided)

  • public well-being impact (user-provided)

This reflects CISA's official SSVC prioritization model.

When to use this tool

Use this tool when the user asks about:

  • how urgently a CVE should be remediated

  • CISA SSVC priority or risk category

  • a structured decision model for remediation

Inputs

  • cve_id: the vulnerability to evaluate (CVE-YYYY-NNNNN)

  • mission_prevalence: M, S, or E (must be provided by the user)

  • public_well_being_impact: M, A, or I (must be provided by the user)

Outputs

  • decision: one of Track, Track*, Attend, Act

  • exploitation

  • technical_impact

  • automatable

  • mission_prevalence

  • public_well_being_impact

  • mission_and_well_being_impact_value

  • vector_string

  • summary: Markdown explanation of the outcome

LLM usage guidelines

  • Always ask the user for mission_prevalence (M/S/E) and public_well_being_impact (M/A/I) before calling.

  • Never guess these values—SSVC depends on user context.

  • Use the summary to explain clearly why the decision was returned.

  • Combine with vulnerability_score or sightings_search if the user needs additional context.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cve_idYesCVE ID
mission_prevalenceYes# Mission Prevalence A mission essential function (MEF) is a function directly related to accomplishing the organization's mission as set forth in its statutory or executive charter. Identifying MEFs is part of business continuity planning or crisis planning. In contrast to non-essential functions, an organization must perform a [MEF] during a disruption to normal operations. The mission is the reason an organization exists, and MEFs are how that mission is realized. Non- essential functions support the smooth delivery or success of MEFs rather than directly supporting the mission. ## Possible values - "M" or "Minimal" Neither support nor essential apply. The vulnerable component may be used within the entities, but it is not used as a mission-essential component, nor does it provide impactful support to mission-essential functions. - "S" or "Support" The vulnerable component only supports MEFs for two or more entities. - "E" or "Essential" The vulnerable component directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity; component failure may (but does not necessarily) lead to overall mission failure. ## Instructions for LLM Ask the user for the "Mission Prevalence" value before calling the tool.
public_well_being_impactYes# Public Well-being Impact ## Possible values - "M" or "Minimal" **Type of Harm -> All**, The effect is below the threshold for all aspects described in material. - "A" or "Material" **Type of Harm -> Physical harm**, Does one or more of the following: - Causes physical distress or injury to system users. - Introduces occupational safety hazards. - Reduces and/or results in failure of cyber-physical system safety margins. **Type of Harm -> Environment**, Major externalities (property damage, environmental damage, etc.) are imposed on other parties. **Type of Harm -> Financial**, Financial losses likely lead to bankruptcy of multiple persons. **Type of Harm -> Psychological**, Widespread emotional or psychological harm, sufficient to necessitate counseling or therapy, impact populations of people. - "I" or "Irreversible" **Type of Harm -> Physical harm**, One or both of the following are true: - Multiple fatalities are likely. - The cyber-physical system, of which the vulnerable component is a part, isl ikely lost or destroyed. **Type of Harm -> Environment**, Extreme or serious externalities (immediate public health threat, environmental damage leading to small ecosystem collapse, etc.) are imposed on other parties. **Type of Harm -> Financial**, Social systems (elections, financial grid, etc.) supported by the software are destabilized and potentially collapse. **Type of Harm -> Psychological N/A ## Instructions for LLM Ask the user for the "Public Well-being Impact" value before calling the tool.

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription
summaryNoSummary
decisionYesDecision
automatableYesAutomatable
exploitationYesState of Exploitation (Evidence of Active Exploitation of a Vulnerability)
vector_stringYesSSVC Vector String
technical_impactYesTechnical Impact (Technical Impact of Exploiting the Vulnerability)
mission_prevalenceYesMission Prevalence (Impact on Mission Essential Functions of Relevant Entities)
public_well_being_impactYesPublic Well-being Impact
mission_and_well_being_impact_valueYesMission and Well-Being Impact Value
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It discloses that the tool depends on user-provided context values, warns against guessing them, and explains the output includes a summary for interpretation. It doesn't cover potential errors, network behavior, or rate limits, but those are less critical for a calculation tool; the provided guidance is strong.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is organized with clear headings (What, When, Inputs, Outputs, LLM usage guidelines) and is front-loaded with the main purpose. Each section is purposeful—no wasted words. Length is justified by the complexity of SSVC inputs and the need for LLM-specific instructions.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The description covers the full context: what the tool does, when to use it, all three required parameters with requirements, output fields (including summary), and usage guidance. It even suggests combinations with sibling tools. The presence of an output schema lowers the need to explain return types, but the description still furnishes them, making it complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and both mission_prevalence and public_well_being_impact already have exhaustive descriptions with allowed values. The tool description reinforces these with concise 'M/S/E' and 'M/A/I' notation and adds the critical semantic that these must be user-provided. This adds value beyond the schema by operationalizing the parameters.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb+resource: 'Compute CISA SSVC for a CVE.' It clearly states the decision outputs (Track, Track*, Attend, Act) and distinguishes this tool from siblings like epss_timeseries or vulnerability_score by focusing on the SSVC prioritization model.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The 'When to use this tool' section explicitly lists user intents (urgency of remediation, CISA SSVC priority, structured decision model). It also provides exclusions/prerequisites by insisting the user must supply mission_prevalence and public_well_being_impact, and names alternative/complementary tools (vulnerability_score, sightings_search).

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

vulnerability_infoAInspect

Get detailed information about a specific CVE.

What this tool does

Retrieves the full vulnerability record for a CVE from SecDB, including:

  • official description and summary

  • CVSS metrics (all versions available)

  • EPSS metadata (if present)

  • affected products and versions

  • vendor/security advisories

  • references and upstream sources

  • weakness classification (CWE)

  • exploit and patch information (if included in the record)

All information is returned in a structured Markdown format suitable for direct display.

When to use this tool

Use this tool when the user asks:

  • "Give me details about CVE-XYZ."

  • "Which products are affected by this vulnerability?"

  • "Show me advisories or references for this CVE."

  • "Explain what this vulnerability is and how serious it is."

This tool is ideal for deep inspection of a single vulnerability. For multiple CVEs, call the tool once per CVE.

Inputs

  • cve_id: valid CVE identifier (CVE-YYYY-NNNNN).

Outputs

Markdown-formatted vulnerability information including:

  • detailed description

  • severity metrics (CVSS, vectors)

  • affected products list

  • advisory list

  • references

  • weakness (CWE) details

  • additional structured metadata from SecDB

LLM usage guidelines

  • Always prefer this tool when the user needs factual information about a specific CVE.

  • If multiple CVEs are mentioned, call the tool once per CVE.

  • Combine with:

    • vulnerability_score - to enrich output with numerical CVSS/EPSS metrics

    • sightings_search - to check real-world exploitation, PoCs, plugins, advisories

    • ssvc_calculator - to compute prioritization based on the vulnerability data

  • Do not hallucinate product lists, advisories, or details—use what the tool returns.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cve_idYesCVE identification (CVE-YYYY-NNNNN)
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description fully carries the behavioral disclosure burden. It explains the tool retrieves a record, returns structured Markdown, notes conditional data (EPSS, exploit/patch 'if present'), and warns not to hallucinate details. This is transparent about what the tool does and limits.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured with clear sections (What, When, Inputs, Outputs, LLM guidance). Every section adds value and the length is appropriate for the complexity of the tool. No fluff or redundant repetition.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given there is no output schema, the description thoroughly covers return values (Markdown fields, severity metrics, affected products, etc.). It also addresses multi-CVE usage and integration with sibling tools, making the description complete for an agent to select and invoke the tool correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, and the description's input section simply restates the schema's CVE format (CVE-YYYY-NNNNN). It adds marginal value beyond the schema by noting the ID must be valid, but doesn't provide additional semantics or usage constraints beyond what's already in the structured definition.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with 'Get detailed information about a specific CVE', clearly identifying the verb (get/info), resource (specific CVE), and scope (detailed vulnerability record). It enumerates the exact data returned, distinguishing this from sibling tools like vulnerability_search and vulnerability_score.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit 'When to use this tool' section provides example user queries and states 'Always prefer this tool when the user needs factual information about a specific CVE.' It also gives guidance for multiple CVEs (call once per CVE) and suggests complementary tools, though it doesn't explicitly state when not to use alternatives.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

vulnerability_scoreAInspect

Get CVSS and current EPSS score for a specific CVE.

What this tool does

Returns a full risk snapshot for a CVE, including:

  • CVSS version

  • CVSS base score

  • CVSS severity

  • CVSS vector string

  • human-readable explanation of the CVSS vector

  • current EPSS score

The field cvss_explain provides a natural-language interpretation of the CVSS vector (attack conditions, privileges, user interaction, impact breakdown).

Example: For CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, the explanation may read: "The vulnerability can be exploited remotely over the network with low complexity, without authentication and without user interaction. Exploitation may lead to high impact on confidentiality, high impact on integrity, and high impact on availability."

When to use this tool

Use this tool when the user asks:

  • "What is the CVSS/EPSS of this CVE?"

  • "Explain the CVSS vector of this vulnerability."

  • "What is the severity and why?"

  • "Give me the risk profile for this CVE."

For EPSS historical trends, use epss_timeseries.

Inputs

  • cve_id: valid CVE identifier (CVE-YYYY-NNNNN).

Outputs

  • cvss_version

  • cvss_base_score

  • cvss_base_severity

  • cvss_vector_string

  • cvss_explain - human-readable explanation of the CVSS vector

  • epss_score

LLM usage guidelines

  • Never guess CVSS or EPSS values—always call this tool.

  • Use the cvss_explain field directly when the user wants an interpretation of the vector string.

  • If multiple CVEs are referenced, call the tool once per CVE.

  • Combine this tool with sightings_search or ssvc_calculator for more complete risk assessments.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cve_idYesCVE identification (CVE-YYYY-NNNNN)

Output Schema

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescription
epss_scoreYesEPSS score
cvss_explainNoExplain CVSS
cvss_versionYesCVSS version
cvss_base_scoreYesCVSS base score
cvss_base_severityYesCVSS base severity
cvss_vector_stringYesCVSS vector string
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full behavioral burden. It discloses the exact fields returned, provides a natural-language example of the cvss_explain field, and explicitly warns the LLM never to guess CVSS/EPSS values. It does not mention rate limits or failure modes, but for a read-only lookup tool this is strong transparency.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured with clear section headers: tool purpose, what it does, when to use, inputs, outputs, and LLM usage guidelines. Every section serves a purpose, and the example explanation is illustrative without being redundant.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's simplicity (one required parameter) and the presence of an output schema, the description is contextually complete. It covers use cases, alternative tools, combination strategies, and critical LLM guidance (never guess, call per CVE).

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema already documents cve_id with 100% coverage, so the baseline is 3. The description adds only a 'valid' qualifier (CVE-YYYY-NNNNN) and a call-per-CVE guideline, but no substantive new parameter semantics beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb+resource statement: 'Get CVSS and current EPSS score for a specific CVE.' It clearly differentiates this tool from siblings like epss_timeseries (historical trends) and vulnerability_info/vulnerability_search by focusing on the risk snapshot for a single CVE.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The 'When to use this tool' section gives explicit example user queries, names an alternative tool for EPSS historical trends, and suggests combining with sightings_search or ssvc_calculator for fuller assessments. This goes well beyond implied usage.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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