zkproofport-ai
proofport-ai
Agenten-native ZK-Proof-Infrastruktur für ZKProofport. Ein eigenständiger Dienst, der Zero-Knowledge-Proofs innerhalb einer AWS Nitro Enclave mit Ende-zu-Ende-Verschlüsselung generiert und verifiziert – der Server fungiert als Blind Relay und sieht niemals die Proof-Eingaben.
Architektur
Client (AI Agent / SDK)
│
│ 1. POST /api/v1/prove → 402 { nonce, price, teePublicKey }
│ 2. Sign EIP-3009 USDC payment
│ 3. Encrypt inputs with TEE X25519 public key (ECIES)
│ 4. POST /api/v1/prove + X-Payment-TX + X-Payment-Nonce + encrypted_payload
│
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Node.js Server (port 4002) │
│ ─ Verify USDC payment on-chain │
│ ─ Blind relay: pass encrypted │
│ payload to enclave via vsock │
│ ─ Return proof + TEE attestation │
└────────────┬────────────────────────┘
│ vsock
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│ AWS Nitro Enclave │
│ ─ X25519 key pair (bound to NSM) │
│ ─ Decrypt inputs (AES-256-GCM) │
│ ─ bb prove (Barretenberg CLI) │
│ ─ NSM attestation of proof hash │
└─────────────────────────────────────┘Wichtige Eigenschaften:
E2E-Verschlüsselung — X25519 ECDH + AES-256-GCM. Im
nitro-Modus werden Klartext-Eingaben abgelehnt.Blind Relay — Der Node.js-Host kann die Proof-Eingaben nicht lesen. Nur die Enclave entschlüsselt.
x402-Zahlung — Einstufiger Ablauf: 402-Challenge → USDC-Zahlung → Proof-Generierung. Keine Middleware.
Hardware-Attestierung — Das NSM-Attestierungsdokument bindet den TEE-Public-Key an die Enclave-Messung (PCRs).
Related MCP server: AgentStamp
Verzeichnisstruktur
proofport-ai/
├── src/
│ ├── index.ts # Express server entry (port 4002)
│ ├── logger.ts # Pino logger
│ ├── swagger.ts # OpenAPI spec
│ ├── tracing.ts # OpenTelemetry tracing
│ ├── a2a/
│ │ ├── agentCard.ts # /.well-known/agent.json, agent-card.json
│ │ ├── proofportExecutor.ts # A2A task executor
│ │ └── redisTaskStore.ts # Redis-backed task persistence
│ ├── chat/
│ │ ├── geminiClient.ts # Gemini API client
│ │ ├── llmProvider.ts # LLM provider interface
│ │ ├── multiProvider.ts # Multi-provider routing
│ │ └── openaiClient.ts # OpenAI API client
│ ├── circuit/
│ │ └── artifactManager.ts # Circuit artifact download/cache
│ ├── config/
│ │ ├── index.ts # Environment config
│ │ ├── circuits.ts # Circuit metadata
│ │ └── contracts.ts # Deployed contract addresses
│ ├── identity/
│ │ ├── agentAuth.ts # Agent JWT authentication
│ │ ├── autoRegister.ts # ERC-8004 auto-registration
│ │ ├── register.ts # Identity registration
│ │ └── reputation.ts # Reputation management
│ ├── input/
│ │ ├── attestationFetcher.ts # EAS GraphQL attestation fetch
│ │ ├── inputBuilder.ts # Circuit input construction
│ │ └── merkleTree.ts # Merkle tree builder
│ ├── mcp/
│ │ ├── server.ts # StreamableHTTP MCP server
│ │ └── stdio.ts # stdio MCP server (local use)
│ ├── payment/
│ │ └── freeTier.ts # Payment mode config
│ ├── proof/
│ │ ├── proofRoutes.ts # x402 single-step proof API
│ │ ├── guideBuilder.ts # Dynamic proof generation guide
│ │ ├── paymentVerifier.ts # On-chain USDC payment verification
│ │ ├── sessionManager.ts # Proof session/nonce management
│ │ └── types.ts
│ ├── prover/
│ │ ├── bbProver.ts # bb CLI direct prover
│ │ ├── tomlBuilder.ts # Prover.toml builder
│ │ └── verifier.ts # On-chain verification (ethers v6)
│ ├── redis/
│ │ ├── client.ts # Redis client
│ │ ├── cleanupWorker.ts # Expired data cleanup
│ │ ├── constants.ts # Redis key prefixes
│ │ ├── proofCache.ts # Proof result caching
│ │ ├── proofResultStore.ts # Proof result persistence
│ │ └── rateLimiter.ts # Rate limiting
│ ├── skills/
│ │ ├── skillHandler.ts # Skill routing
│ │ └── flowGuidance.ts # Step-by-step flow guidance
│ ├── tee/
│ │ ├── index.ts # TEE mode config
│ │ ├── attestation.ts # NSM attestation validation (COSE Sign1)
│ │ ├── detect.ts # TEE environment detection
│ │ ├── enclaveBuilder.ts # Enclave image builder
│ │ ├── enclaveClient.ts # Nitro Enclave vsock client
│ │ ├── encryption.ts # AES-256-GCM encryption utilities
│ │ ├── teeKeyExchange.ts # X25519 ECDH key exchange
│ │ └── validationSubmitter.ts # TEE validation on-chain
│ └── types/
│ └── index.ts
├── packages/
│ ├── sdk/ # @zkproofport-ai/sdk (npm)
│ └── mcp/ # @zkproofport-ai/mcp (npm)
├── aws/
│ ├── enclave-server.ts # TypeScript TEE prover (Nitro Enclave)
│ ├── Dockerfile.enclave # Enclave image
│ ├── deploy-blue-green.sh # Zero-downtime deployment
│ ├── boot-active-slot.sh # Systemd boot script
│ ├── stop-active-slot.sh # Systemd stop script
│ ├── build-enclave.sh # Enclave build helper
│ ├── ec2-setup.sh # EC2 instance setup
│ ├── Caddyfile # Reverse proxy config
│ ├── docker-compose.aws.yml # AWS Docker Compose
│ ├── vsock-bridge.py # vsock-to-TCP bridge
│ └── systemd/ # Systemd service files
├── sign-page/ # Next.js signing page (WalletConnect)
├── tests/
│ ├── e2e/ # Full E2E tests (REST, MCP, A2A, proof, verify)
│ ├── a2a/ # A2A unit tests
│ ├── identity/ # ERC-8004 identity tests
│ ├── integration/ # Integration tests
│ ├── payment/ # Payment tests
│ ├── tee/ # TEE tests
│ └── *.test.ts # Unit tests
├── docker-compose.yml # Local dev: server + redis
├── docker-compose.test.yml # Test stack: + a2a-ui + Phoenix
├── Dockerfile # Node.js server image
└── README.mdSchnellstart
npm (Entwicklung)
npm install
npm run dev # Hot reload with tsx
npm run build # Build TypeScript
npm start # Production
npm test # Run tests
npm run test:e2e # E2E tests against Docker stackDocker Compose (Lokal)
docker compose up --build # Start redis + server
docker compose down # Stop
docker compose down -v # Reset dataPort 4002: Node.js-Server
Port 6380 (Host) → 6379 (Container): Redis
E2E-Verschlüsselung (Blind Relay)
Proof-Eingaben sind zwischen dem Client und der Nitro Enclave Ende-zu-Ende verschlüsselt. Der Node.js-Server leitet das verschlüsselte Blob weiter, ohne es zu lesen.
Protokoll: X25519 ECDH + AES-256-GCM (ECIES-Muster)
TEE generiert beim Start ein X25519-Schlüsselpaar und bindet den Public Key an die NSM-Attestierung
Client ruft den TEE-Public-Key aus der 402-Antwort ab und verifiziert die Attestierung
Client generiert ein ephemeres X25519-Schlüsselpaar, berechnet das ECDH-Shared-Secret und leitet den AES-Key via SHA-256 ab
Client verschlüsselt Eingaben mit AES-256-GCM und sendet
{ ephemeralPublicKey, iv, ciphertext, authTag, keyId }Server leitet das verschlüsselte Paket via vsock an die Enclave weiter (Blind Relay)
Enclave entschlüsselt, generiert den Proof und gibt Proof + NSM-Attestierung zurück
Durchsetzung: Im nitro-Modus werden Klartext-Eingaben mit PLAINTEXT_REJECTED abgelehnt.
x402-Zahlungsablauf
Einstufiger atomarer Ablauf — keine Middleware, keine Sitzungen:
POST /api/v1/prove { circuit, inputs }
↓
402 { nonce, price, payTo, teePublicKey }
↓
Client signs EIP-3009 TransferWithAuthorization (USDC)
↓
POST /api/v1/prove { circuit, encrypted_payload }
+ X-Payment-TX: <txHash>
+ X-Payment-Nonce: <nonce>
↓
200 { proof, publicInputs, proofWithInputs, attestation, timing, verification }Zahlungsmodi:
Modus | Netzwerk | Effekt |
| Keine | Alle Anfragen kostenlos |
| Base Sepolia | Erfordert USDC-Zahlung (Testnetz) |
| Base Mainnet | Erfordert USDC-Zahlung (Produktion) |
REST-Endpunkte
Endpunkt | Methode | Zweck |
| GET | Gesundheitsprüfung + TEE-Status + Zahlungsmodus |
| POST | x402 einstufige Proof-Generierung |
| GET | Dynamischer Leitfaden zur Proof-Generierung (JSON) |
| POST | StreamableHTTP MCP-Endpunkt |
| POST | A2A JSON-RPC-Endpunkt |
| GET | OASF Agent Card |
| GET | A2A Agent Card |
| GET | MCP-Discovery |
| GET | Swagger UI |
| GET | OpenAPI-Spezifikation |
MCP-Tools
Verfügbar via /mcp (StreamableHTTP) oder das lokale @zkproofport-ai/mcp-Paket (stdio):
Tool | Zweck |
| All-in-One Proof-Generierung (x402-Zahlung + E2E-Verschlüsselungserkennung) |
| On-Chain Proof-Verifizierung |
| Liste verfügbarer Schaltkreise |
| 402-Challenge anfordern (schrittweiser Ablauf) |
| x402 USDC-Zahlung tätigen (schrittweiser Ablauf) |
| Proof-Eingaben übermitteln (schrittweiser Ablauf) |
| Schaltkreis-Eingaben vorbereiten (schrittweiser Ablauf) |
npm-Pakete
@zkproofport-ai/sdk — TypeScript SDK for proof generation (ethers v6)
@zkproofport-ai/mcp — Local MCP server for AI agents (stdio transport)Installieren Sie den MCP-Server für die lokale Nutzung durch KI-Agenten:
npm install @zkproofport-ai/mcp
npx zkproofport-mcp # Starts stdio MCP serverLeitfadensystem
GET /api/v1/guide/:circuit gibt einen umfassenden JSON-Leitfaden für Client-KI-Agenten zurück, um alle Proof-Eingaben vorzubereiten. Enthält:
Schritt-für-Schritt-Anleitungen mit Codebeispielen
Konstanten (Attester-Keys, Vertragsadressen, EAS-Schema-UIDs)
Formeln (Nullifier-Berechnung, Signal-Hash, Merkle-Tree-Konstruktion)
Eingabeschema mit Typen und Beschreibungen
EAS GraphQL-Abfragevorlagen
Schaltkreise verwenden Aliase: coinbase_kyc → coinbase_attestation, coinbase_country → coinbase_country_attestation, oidc_domain → oidc_domain_attestation.
A2A-Protokoll
A2A v0.3 JSON-RPC-Endpunkt unter POST /a2a:
Methode | Zweck |
| Proof-Aufgabe übermitteln (blockierend) |
| Proof-Aufgabe übermitteln (SSE-Streaming) |
| Aufgabenstatus abfragen |
| Laufende Aufgabe abbrechen |
| Ereignisse einer Aufgabe erneut abonnieren |
Die Agent Card unter /.well-known/agent.json bietet ERC-8004 On-Chain-Identität und Capability-Discovery.
TEE-Integration (AWS Nitro Enclave)
Modus | Verhalten |
| Standard-Linux, kein TEE, Klartext erlaubt |
| AWS Nitro Enclave, Hardware-Attestierung, E2E-Verschlüsselung erzwungen |
Die Enclave führt aws/enclave-server.ts aus (kompiliert zu dist/aws/enclave-server.js), welches bb prove mit --oracle_hash keccak ausführt (erforderlich für die Kompatibilität mit dem Solidity-Verifier). Die NSM-Attestierung bindet den Proof-Hash und den TEE-Public-Key an die Enclave-Messung (PCR0/PCR1/PCR2).
Attestierungs-Validierungskette: AWS Nitro Root CA → Regional → Zonal → Instanz → Leaf-Zertifikat, verifiziert mit COSE ES384-Signatur.
Unterstützte Schaltkreise
Coinbase KYC (coinbase_attestation)
Beweist, dass der Inhaber die Coinbase KYC-Verifizierung bestanden hat.
Aliase:
coinbase_kyc,coinbase_attestationÖffentliche Eingaben: Adresse, Scope
Nullifier: Ja (Privatsphäre, Replay-Schutz)
Coinbase Country (coinbase_country_attestation)
Beweist, dass das KYC-Land des Inhabers mit der Attestierung übereinstimmt.
Aliase:
coinbase_country,coinbase_country_attestationÖffentliche Eingaben: Adresse, Land, Scope
Nullifier: Ja (Privatsphäre, Replay-Schutz)
OIDC Domain (oidc_domain_attestation)
Beweist, dass der Inhaber eine E-Mail-Adresse bei einer bestimmten Domain über OIDC JWT-Verifizierung besitzt.
Aliase:
oidc_domain,oidc_domain_attestationEingabetyp: OIDC JWT (
id_tokenvon Google, etc.)Öffentliche Eingaben: Domain-Hash, Scope
Nullifier: Ja (Privatsphäre, Replay-Schutz)
Vertragsadressen
Base Sepolia (Testnetz)
Vertrag | Adresse |
KYC Verifier |
|
Country Verifier |
|
ERC-8004 Identity |
|
ERC-8004 Reputation |
|
Base Mainnet (Produktion)
Vertrag | Adresse |
ERC-8004 Identity |
|
ERC-8004 Reputation |
|
ERC-8004 Agenten-Identität
Der Agent registriert sich beim Start automatisch On-Chain über den ERC-8004 Identity-Vertrag. Der Reputationswert erhöht sich nach jeder erfolgreichen Proof-Generierung.
Umgebungsvariablen
Erforderlich
Variable | Beschreibung |
| Redis-Verbindungszeichenfolge |
| Base-Chain RPC-Endpunkt |
| RPC für Proof-Verifizierung |
| EAS GraphQL-Endpunkt für Attestierungsabfragen |
| Privater Schlüssel des Agenten-Wallets (64 Hex-Zeichen, kein 0x) |
|
|
| Öffentlich zugängliche Dienst-URL (für Agent Card) |
Optional
Variable | Standard | Beschreibung |
|
| Express-Server-Port |
|
| Node-Umgebung |
|
| Barretenberg CLI-Pfad |
|
| Nargo CLI-Pfad |
|
| Verzeichnis für Schaltkreis-Artefakte |
| (GitHub raw URL) | Download-URL für Schaltkreis-Artefakte |
|
|
|
| — | Nitro Enclave CID (erforderlich bei |
|
| Nitro Enclave-Port |
|
| Attestierungsverifizierung aktivieren |
| — | Operator-Wallet (erforderlich bei aktivierter Zahlung) |
|
| Preis pro Proof (USD) |
| — | ERC-8004 Identity-Vertrag |
| — | ERC-8004 Reputation-Vertrag |
| — | Gemini API-Key für Chat |
| — | OpenAI API-Key für Chat |
| — | Phoenix OTLP-Endpunkt für Tracing |
|
| Agenten-Versionszeichenfolge |
Bereitstellung (AWS Nitro Enclave)
proofport-ai wird auf AWS EC2 mit Nitro Enclave-Unterstützung bereitgestellt. Die Bereitstellung verwendet Blue-Green-Slot-Switching für null Ausfallzeit.
Blue-Green-Bereitstellung
aws/deploy-blue-green.shZwei Slots: Blau (Ports 4002/3200) und Grün (Ports 4003/3201)
Aktiver Slot wird in
/opt/proofport-ai/active-slotverfolgtCaddy-Reload (kein Neustart) schaltet den Datenverkehr um
In-Flight-Anfragen werden vor dem Umschalten geleert (bis zu 660s für Proof-Generierung)
Automatischer Rollback, wenn die Gesundheitsprüfung des neuen Containers fehlschlägt
Infrastruktur
Caddy — Reverse Proxy mit HTTPS (Cloudflare Full SSL)
systemd — Dienste:
proofport-ai,proofport-ai-redis,proofport-ai-enclave,vsock-bridgeCloudWatch — Log-Treiber
awslogs, 30 Tage AufbewahrungGitHub Actions —
deploy-ai-aws.ymlWorkflow (NICHTdeploy.yml, welcher für GCP ist)
Start / Stopp
aws/boot-active-slot.sh # Start active slot containers
aws/stop-active-slot.sh # Stop active slot containersTesten
npm test # Unit tests
npm run test:e2e # E2E against Docker stack
npm run test:watch # Watch modeA2A-Testen (a2a-ui + Phoenix)
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.test.yml up --build -dDienst | URL | Zweck |
proofport-ai |
| Agenten-Server |
a2a-ui |
| A2A-Web-Test-UI |
Phoenix |
| Trace-Visualisierung |
Versionssperren
Tool | Version |
bb (Barretenberg) |
|
nargo |
|
ethers |
|
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk |
|
Node.js | 20 LTS |
Lizenz
Apache 2.0
Available Tools
8 toolsdeposit_to_gatewayA
Deposit USDC into Circle Gateway on Arc, so later proofs can be paid for with nanopayments (pay_on: "arc-testnet-nano").
Do this ONCE, not per proof. The deposit is the only on-chain step and it costs gas; every payment drawn against the balance costs almost none. Paying with "arc-testnet-nano" against an empty Gateway balance is refused.
Requires PAYMENT_PRIVATE_KEY -- the buyer signs authorizations with it and never sends a transaction per payment.
RETURNS: whether a deposit was made, its transaction hash, and the Gateway balance afterwards (in USDC's smallest units, so 1000000 is one USDC).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| amount | Yes | How much USDC to deposit, in whole USDC as a decimal string, e.g. "5" or "0.5". | |
| rpc_url | No | Arc RPC. Defaults to https://rpc.testnet.arc.io. | |
| at_least | No | Skip the deposit if the Gateway balance already covers this, in USDC's smallest units (1000000 = 1 USDC). Omitted deposits unconditionally. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so well. It discloses that this is the only on-chain step, that it costs gas, that it should happen once, that empty balances cause payment refusal, and what the return values are. This is far beyond a bare 'deposit' statement.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is efficiently structured: clear purpose paragraph, workflow guidance, prerequisite, and a returns summary. Every sentence adds useful information and nothing feels like filler or tautology.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 3-parameter tool with no output schema, the description is complete: it explains the purpose, the workflow position, gas implications, the private key requirement, parameter nuances, and the exact return fields including units. An agent has enough to invoke it correctly and interpret the result.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents amount, rpc_url, and at_least with units and defaults. The description reinforces the decimal-string format and USDC smallest-unit convention, but mostly repeats what the schema already provides. Baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Deposit USDC into Circle Gateway on Arc', and immediately states the downstream purpose (paying for proofs via nanopayments). This clearly distinguishes it from the sibling tools like gateway_balance and generate_proof, which serve different steps in the workflow.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit when-to-use guidance: 'Do this ONCE, not per proof' and explains why, including gas cost and refusal of payments against an empty balance. It also notes the PAYMENT_PRIVATE_KEY requirement. It does not explicitly name an alternative sibling, but the situational guidance is concrete enough to route an agent correctly.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
gateway_balanceA
What the buyer currently holds inside Circle Gateway on Arc — the balance nanopayments are drawn against. Amounts are in USDC's smallest units (1000000 = 1 USDC). Requires PAYMENT_PRIVATE_KEY.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| rpc_url | No | Arc RPC. Defaults to https://rpc.testnet.arc.io. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the behavioral burden and does meaningful work: it discloses that the operation reads a current balance, specifies USDC base units, and states the required private key. It does not explicitly say the call is read-only, but the wording strongly implies a non-mutating balance lookup.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two compact sentences with no filler: the first states the tool's purpose and its relationship to nanopayments, and the second packs in unit semantics and an authentication requirement. Every sentence earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a one-optional-parameter read tool, the description covers purpose, units, and auth. However, because there is no output schema, it does not specify the exact response shape or field name, and it does not address edge cases like an invalid key or missing gateway balance.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The only parameter, rpc_url, is fully documented in the schema with its type and default value, so schema coverage is 100%. The description adds no parameter-specific detail, which aligns with the baseline score for high schema coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly identifies the tool as reporting the buyer's current balance inside Circle Gateway on Arc and notes this is the balance nanopayments draw against. It distinguishes itself from deposit_to_gateway and proof-flow siblings, though it lacks an explicit imperative verb like 'get' or 'fetch'.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Usage is implied: call this when you need the current balance that nanopayments draw against. It also states a prerequisite (PAYMENT_PRIVATE_KEY), but it never explicitly says when to use this instead of deposit_to_gateway or other alternatives, nor provides exclusions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
generate_proofA
All-in-one ZK proof generation. Handles: prepare inputs, request challenge, and submit proof in a single call. Use this when you want the simplest path to a proof. For fine-grained control over each step, use prepare_inputs, request_challenge, and submit_proof individually.
CIRCUITS:
"coinbase_kyc": Proves the user passed Coinbase KYC verification.
"coinbase_country": Proves the user's country of residence is (or is not) in a given list. Requires country_list and is_included.
"oidc_domain": Proves the user authenticated via OIDC and their email belongs to a specific domain. Requires jwt and scope.
"arc_eligibility": Coinbase KYC, optionally binding the wallet's signature to ONE EIP-712 action. Without action it signs the request signal hash. The proof carries that action's hash, so a contract can check WHICH instruction was authorised -- not merely that somebody eligible signed something. Verified on Arc Testnet (chain 5042002).
"giwa_attestation": GIWA attestation, optionally binding one EIP-712 action. Uses a GIWA-attested wallet; verified on GIWA Sepolia (chain 91342).
RETURNS: Full ProofResult with proof bytes, public inputs, and timing information. Use verify_proof separately to verify on-chain.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| jwt | No | OIDC JWT token (id_token) for oidc_domain circuit | |
| scope | No | Scope string for nullifier derivation. Defaults to "proofport" if omitted. For oidc_domain circuit, this is the domain scope string. | |
| action | No | The EIP-712 action to authorise. Optional for arc_eligibility and giwa_attestation; rejected for other circuits. Any structure is provable: the circuit hashes it without reading it, so a deposit, a grant of authority or an agreement in prose all work. The wallet signs exactly these fields, and the proof carries their hash. | |
| pay_on | No | Which chain to pay on: a CAIP-2 id ("eip155:5042002") or a plain name ("arc-testnet", "arc-testnet-nano", "base-sepolia"). Call request_challenge to see what a service offers. Omitted takes the first chain offered. The payer signs an authorization and the service settles it, so no gas or native balance is needed on the paying chain -- only USDC. "arc-testnet-nano" is Arc nanopayments: the authorization goes to Circle Gateway, which verifies it off chain in under a second and settles it later in a batch with thousands of others, so the gas per payment approaches zero. It requires a Gateway balance -- deposit first with the deposit_to_gateway tool -- and is the right choice for an agent buying many proofs. "arc-testnet" settles each payment on chain immediately and costs gas every time. | |
| circuit | Yes | Which circuit to use | |
| pay_with | No | Which wallet pays, when the service charges. "arc" is an Arc agent wallet — Circle holds it, it carries spending policies the agent cannot ignore, and Circle CLI signs with it (install: npm i -g @circle-fin/cli, then circle wallet login <email> --testnet). "key" signs with PAYMENT_PRIVATE_KEY. "cdp" uses a Coinbase CDP server wallet (CDP_API_KEY_ID, CDP_API_KEY_SECRET, CDP_WALLET_SECRET). "circle" uses a Circle developer-controlled wallet (CIRCLE_API_KEY, CIRCLE_ENTITY_SECRET, CIRCLE_WALLET_ID) when that wallet supports the selected offer. Omit it and the single configured wallet is used; omit it with none configured against a paying service and the error names what to set. Wallet and chain are separate choices; both must support the actual offered signing domain. | |
| provider | No | OIDC provider. "google" (default) for Google Workspace, "microsoft" for Microsoft 365. | |
| is_included | No | true = prove country IS in list, false = prove NOT in list. Required for coinbase_country circuit. | |
| max_payment | No | Maximum USDC proof fee allowed by the user. | |
| country_list | No | ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country codes. Required for coinbase_country circuit. | |
| approved_payment | No | Exact user-approved terms. For direct EIP-3009 set extra.verifyingContract to the offer asset; for Gateway copy its required extra.verifyingContract. Changed fee, recipient, token, chain or signing domain is rejected before signing. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It discloses the one-call bundling behavior, per-circuit requirements, optional EIP-712 action binding, and the fact that the proof carries the action's hash. It does not detail failure modes or rate limiting, but the behavioral disclosure is strong.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is long but appropriately structured with a summary, routing guidance, a circuit section, and a returns section. Every paragraph earns its place given the complexity of 11 parameters and five circuits; there is no filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Despite having no output schema or annotations, the description covers the operation, when to use it, all circuits, payment/chain nuances, EIP-712 action semantics, nanopayments, and return type. It is unusually complete for a complex tool and leaves little for an agent to infer.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds substantial value by linking parameters to circuits: country_list and is_included for coinbase_country, jwt and scope for oidc_domain, and optional/rejected action for arc_eligibility and giwa_attestation. It also explains defaults for pay_on and pay_with, materially improving correct invocation.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with 'All-in-one ZK proof generation' and explicitly says it handles prepare inputs, request challenge, and submit proof in a single call, clearly distinguishing it from the individual sibling tools. It then enumerates five distinct circuits with their exact guarantees, making the tool's operation unmistakable.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It states 'Use this when you want the simplest path to a proof. For fine-grained control over each step, use prepare_inputs, request_challenge, and submit_proof individually', providing explicit when-to-use guidance and named alternatives. It also routes verification to verify_proof separately and tells the caller to use request_challenge to see what a service offers.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_supported_circuitsA
List all ZK circuits supported by ZKProofport, including verifier addresses and authorized signers. No parameters required. Call this first to discover available circuits before starting proof generation.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations provided, so description must disclose behavior. It mentions no parameters required but does not state if it's read-only or any side effects. Minimal behavioral info, but acceptable for a simple listing tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, no wasted words. Efficiently conveys purpose, output contents, and usage order.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool has zero parameters and no output schema, the description adequately covers purpose and guidance. Could mention output format or safety of repeated calls, but it's mostly complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
No parameters defined; description adds value by explicitly stating 'No parameters required,' which reassures the agent. Baseline 4 for zero-parameter tools with coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Clearly states the tool lists all ZK circuits with specific details (verifier addresses and authorized signers). Distinguishes from siblings by being a discovery step before proof generation.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly says 'Call this first to discover available circuits before starting proof generation,' which guides when to use it. Could be improved by specifying when not to use it or naming alternatives, but it's clear for a discovery tool.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
prepare_inputsA
Step 1 of the step-by-step flow: Prepare all circuit inputs. Arc and GIWA optionally sign the exact validated EIP-712 action; without action they sign the signal hash. Coinbase signs the signal hash. Queries EAS, builds the Merkle proof, and returns private witness inputs including the Arc domain_separator and action_hash. Handle these inputs only in trusted local code, never expose them to the dApp, model or logs. Call this BEFORE request_challenge. For oidc_domain circuit, provide jwt and scope instead of Coinbase-specific parameters.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| jwt | No | OIDC JWT token (id_token) for oidc_domain circuit | |
| scope | No | Scope string for nullifier derivation. Defaults to "proofport" if omitted. For oidc_domain circuit, this is the domain scope string. | |
| action | No | The EIP-712 action to authorise. Optional for arc_eligibility and giwa_attestation; rejected for other circuits. Any structure is provable: the circuit hashes it without reading it, so a deposit, a grant of authority or an agreement in prose all work. The wallet signs exactly these fields, and the proof carries their hash. | |
| circuit | Yes | Which circuit to use | |
| provider | No | OIDC provider. "google" (default) for Google Workspace, "microsoft" for Microsoft 365. | |
| is_included | No | true = prove country IS in list, false = prove NOT in list. Required for coinbase_country circuit. | |
| country_list | No | ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country codes. Required for coinbase_country circuit. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. It discloses signing behavior for Arc/GIWA versus Coinbase, the EAS query, Merkle proof construction, private output contents, and a security warning about never exposing inputs to the dApp, model, or logs. It could say more about side effects or failure behavior, but it is substantially transparent.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is six sentences long, and every sentence carries distinct information: step identity, signing behavior, EAS/proof/output behavior, security handling, call ordering, and circuit-specific parameter guidance. It is front-loaded with the core purpose and contains no filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given there is no output schema, the description reasonably names the returned artifacts ('private witness inputs including the Arc domain_separator and action_hash') and covers sequencing, security, and circuit variants. It does not fully enumerate all outputs or edge cases, but for a preparation step it is largely complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% with detailed parameter descriptions, so the baseline is 3. The description adds cross-parameter guidance beyond the schema: jwt/scope replace Coinbase-specific parameters for oidc_domain, and the action signing behavior differs by signer. This is meaningful value over the schema alone.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: 'Prepare all circuit inputs', and grounds it in concrete behavior ('Queries EAS, builds the Merkle proof, and returns private witness inputs'). It positions itself as 'Step 1 of the step-by-step flow', which distinguishes it from later siblings like generate_proof and request_challenge.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit sequencing: 'Call this BEFORE request_challenge'. It also provides circuit-specific routing: 'For oidc_domain circuit, provide jwt and scope instead of Coinbase-specific parameters', which tells the agent exactly when to use which parameter set.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
request_challengeA
Step 2 of the step-by-step flow: Request a challenge from the server. Pass inputs: {} to discover the live payment offers, nonce and optional TEE key without transmitting private witness inputs. You MUST pass the returned "nonce" to submit_proof — without it the server just issues another challenge. MCP submit_proof does not sign payments or encrypt inputs; use generate_proof or the SDK for paid/encrypted orchestration.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| inputs | Yes | Use {} to discover the nonce, payment offers and optional TEE key without transmitting private witness inputs. Also accepts a JSON string or object from trusted local code; any supplied witness is sent to the selected prover and must stay out of model context, dApp/UI and logs. | |
| circuit | Yes | Which circuit to use |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden. It discloses security-relevant behavior: that the tool does not sign payments or encrypt inputs, and that '{}' prevents transmission of private witness data. It also highlights the server-side nonce issuance and its necessity for subsequent steps.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise yet information-dense, with critical points front-loaded: step indication, the recommendation to use '{}', and the nonce requirement. Every sentence earns its place, covering purpose, usage, and security implications without redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's moderate complexity (2 params, no output schema), the description provides comprehensive guidance on what the tool does, when to use it, how to use it safely, and what to do with the result (pass nonce to submit_proof). It also covers the alternative for paid/encrypted use, making it self-sufficient for an agent.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Even though schema coverage is 100%, the description adds crucial meaning: it explains that '{}' is sufficient for anonymous discovery, warns that providing witness data sends it to the prover and must be kept out of context/logs, and clarifies the circuit enum's purpose. This goes well beyond the schema's minimal descriptions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states it is 'Step 2 of the step-by-step flow: Request a challenge from the server' and specifies the resource and action. It distinguishes itself from siblings like submit_proof by explaining its role and the critical dependency on the returned nonce.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It explicitly recommends passing '{}' to avoid transmitting private data, warns against using submit_proof for signing, and directs to generate_proof or the SDK for paid/encrypted flows. This provides clear when-to-use and when-not-to-use guidance with specific alternatives.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
submit_proofA
Step 3 of the step-by-step flow: Submit prepared inputs to generate the ZK proof. The TEE server runs the Noir circuit and returns the UltraHonk proof. This step may take 30-90 seconds. The TEE server builds Prover.toml from these inputs.
You MUST pass the nonce returned by request_challenge. POST /api/v1/prove answers every request that arrives without that nonce with a fresh 402 challenge, so a submission that omits it can never produce a proof.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| nonce | Yes | The "nonce" field from the request_challenge response. Single-use and bound to the circuit it was issued for — request a new challenge for every submission and for every circuit. | |
| inputs | Yes | Full ProveInputs object from prepare_inputs. Accepts a JSON string or a structured object. | |
| circuit | Yes | Which circuit to use |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Discloses substantial runtime behavior: the server runs the Noir circuit, builds Prover.toml from inputs, returns UltraHonk proof, and takes 30-90 seconds. It also warns about 402 challenge responses when nonce is omitted, providing a concrete failure mode. With no annotations, the description carries the burden and does so well, though it doesn't describe the exact success/error response envelope.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Description is compact and front-loaded: purpose, server behavior, latency, and nonce warning in four sentences. The only slightly extra detail is the internal endpoint path, but it reinforces the nonce requirement.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Grounds the tool in a step-by-step flow, specifies runtime duration, and warns about the one critical mistake. For a 3-param synchronous tool with no output schema, this is nearly complete; it could add an explicit success/error response format or a note that proof should be passed to verify_proof.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Input schema covers all 3 params with complete descriptions, so the high-coverage baseline applies. The description adds workflow provenance (nonce from request_challenge, inputs from prepare_inputs) and notes Prover.toml construction, but most of this repeats schema descriptions and does not substantially deepen parameter meaning.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific action ('Submit prepared inputs to generate the ZK proof') and identifies position as 'Step 3' in the flow, with the TEE server running the Noir circuit. However, it never distinguishes itself from the sibling 'generate_proof', which could plausibly perform the same action.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Positions itself clearly as Step 3 and states the requirement to pass the nonce from request_challenge, giving an agent a precondition to check before calling. It doesn't explicitly say when to prefer this over generate_proof or mention exclusions, but the step context and nonce dependency are clear.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
verify_proofA
Step 4 (optional): Verify a ZK proof on-chain against the deployed verifier contract. Pass the full generate_proof result object directly — verification info (verifierAddress, chainId, rpcUrl) is extracted automatically. Returns { valid: true } if the proof is valid.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | Yes | Full result object from generate_proof — pass it directly without extracting fields |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description must disclose all behavioral traits. It states the tool verifies on-chain and returns a success object, but does not mention potential gas costs, network dependencies, failure responses, or side effects.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is three sentences with no wasted words. It front-loads the purpose and incrementally adds context on how to use the tool and what to expect.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the nested object parameter and lack of output schema, the description effectively covers the main use case and expected return for a valid proof. However, it omits error handling, edge cases, and a full return structure description.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema has 100% coverage with descriptions for all properties. The description adds value by explaining to pass the result object directly, but it reinforces usage rather than adding new semantic meaning beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's action ('Verify a ZK proof on-chain'), the specific resource ('against the deployed verifier contract'), and its place in a workflow ('Step 4 (optional)'). It distinguishes itself from siblings like generate_proof and submit_proof.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description instructs users to 'Pass the full generate_proof result object directly,' providing clear how-to guidance. It frames the tool as an optional step after proof generation, but lacks explicit when-not-to-use or mention of alternatives.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
4 tool updates
v0.2.44- Changed
generate_proof3 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / action / descriptionPrevious value: -"The EIP-712 action to authorise. Required for arc_eligibility and rejected for every other circuit. Any structure is provable: the circuit hashes it without reading it, so a deposit, a grant of authority or an agreement in prose all work. The wallet signs exactly these fields, and the proof carries their hash."New value: +"The EIP-712 action to authorise. Optional for arc_eligibility and giwa_attestation; rejected for other circuits. Any structure is provable: the circuit hashes it without reading it, so a deposit, a grant of authority or an agreement in prose all work. The wallet signs exactly these fields, and the proof carries their hash." - changed
Input schema / properties / approved_payment / descriptionPrevious value: -"Exact user-approved terms. The SDK rejects any changed fee, recipient, token, chain or Gateway signing domain before signing the actual challenge."New value: +"Exact user-approved terms. For direct EIP-3009 set extra.verifyingContract to the offer asset; for Gateway copy its required extra.verifyingContract. Changed fee, recipient, token, chain or signing domain is rejected before signing." - changed
Input schema / properties / circuit / enumPrevious value: -[ - "coinbase_kyc", - "coinbase_country", - "oidc_domain", - "arc_eligibility" -]New value: +[ + "coinbase_kyc", + "coinbase_country", + "oidc_domain", + "arc_eligibility", + "giwa_attestation" +]
- Changed
prepare_inputs2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / action / descriptionPrevious value: -"The EIP-712 action to authorise. Required for arc_eligibility and rejected for every other circuit. Any structure is provable: the circuit hashes it without reading it, so a deposit, a grant of authority or an agreement in prose all work. The wallet signs exactly these fields, and the proof carries their hash."New value: +"The EIP-712 action to authorise. Optional for arc_eligibility and giwa_attestation; rejected for other circuits. Any structure is provable: the circuit hashes it without reading it, so a deposit, a grant of authority or an agreement in prose all work. The wallet signs exactly these fields, and the proof carries their hash." - changed
Input schema / properties / circuit / enumPrevious value: -[ - "coinbase_kyc", - "coinbase_country", - "oidc_domain", - "arc_eligibility" -]New value: +[ + "coinbase_kyc", + "coinbase_country", + "oidc_domain", + "arc_eligibility", + "giwa_attestation" +]
- Changed
request_challenge1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / circuit / enumPrevious value: -[ - "coinbase_kyc", - "coinbase_country", - "oidc_domain", - "arc_eligibility" -]New value: +[ + "coinbase_kyc", + "coinbase_country", + "oidc_domain", + "arc_eligibility", + "giwa_attestation" +]
- Changed
submit_proof1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / circuit / enumPrevious value: -[ - "coinbase_kyc", - "coinbase_country", - "oidc_domain", - "arc_eligibility" -]New value: +[ + "coinbase_kyc", + "coinbase_country", + "oidc_domain", + "arc_eligibility", + "giwa_attestation" +]
6 tool updates
v0.2.43- Added
deposit_to_gateway - Added
gateway_balance - Changed
generate_proof6 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / actionAdded value: +{ + "additionalProperties": false, + "description": "The EIP-712 action to authorise. Required for arc_eligibility and rejected for every other circuit. Any structure is provable: the circuit hashes it without reading it, so a deposit, a grant of authority or an agreement in prose all work. The wallet signs exactly these fields, and the proof carries their hash.", + "properties": { + "domain": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "chainId": { + "type": "number" + }, + "name": { + "type": "string" + }, + "verifyingContract": { + "type": "string" + }, + "version": { + "type": "string" + } + }, + "required": [ + "name", + "version", + "chainId", + "verifyingContract" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "message": { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "type": "object" + }, + "primaryType": { + "type": "string" + }, + "types": { + "additionalProperties": { + "items": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "name": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": { + "type": "string" + } + }, + "required": [ + "name", + "type" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + "type": "object" + } + }, + "required": [ + "domain", + "types", + "primaryType", + "message" + ], + "type": "object" +} - added
Input schema / properties / approved_paymentAdded value: +{ + "additionalProperties": false, + "description": "Exact user-approved terms. The SDK rejects any changed fee, recipient, token, chain or Gateway signing domain before signing the actual challenge.", + "properties": { + "amount": { + "pattern": "^\\d+$", + "type": "string" + }, + "asset": { + "type": "string" + }, + "extra": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "name": { + "type": "string" + }, + "verifyingContract": { + "type": "string" + }, + "version": { + "type": "string" + } + }, + "required": [ + "name", + "version", + "verifyingContract" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "network": { + "type": "string" + }, + "payTo": { + "type": "string" + }, + "scheme": { + "type": "string" + } + }, + "required": [ + "network", + "scheme", + "amount", + "asset", + "payTo", + "extra" + ], + "type": "object" +} - changed
Input schema / properties / circuit / enumPrevious value: -[ - "coinbase_kyc", - "coinbase_country", - "oidc_domain" -]New value: +[ + "coinbase_kyc", + "coinbase_country", + "oidc_domain", + "arc_eligibility" +] - added
Input schema / properties / max_paymentAdded value: +{ + "description": "Maximum USDC proof fee allowed by the user.", + "pattern": "^\\d+(\\.\\d{1,6})?$", + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / pay_onAdded value: +{ + "description": "Which chain to pay on: a CAIP-2 id (\"eip155:5042002\") or a plain name (\"arc-testnet\", \"arc-testnet-nano\", \"base-sepolia\"). Call request_challenge to see what a service offers. Omitted takes the first chain offered. The payer signs an authorization and the service settles it, so no gas or native balance is needed on the paying chain -- only USDC. \"arc-testnet-nano\" is Arc nanopayments: the authorization goes to Circle Gateway, which verifies it off chain in under a second and settles it later in a batch with thousands of others, so the gas per payment approaches zero. It requires a Gateway balance -- deposit first with the deposit_to_gateway tool -- and is the right choice for an agent buying many proofs. \"arc-testnet\" settles each payment on chain immediately and costs gas every time.", + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / pay_withAdded value: +{ + "description": "Which wallet pays, when the service charges. \"arc\" is an Arc agent wallet — Circle holds it, it carries spending policies the agent cannot ignore, and Circle CLI signs with it (install: npm i -g @circle-fin/cli, then circle wallet login <email> --testnet). \"key\" signs with PAYMENT_PRIVATE_KEY. \"cdp\" uses a Coinbase CDP server wallet (CDP_API_KEY_ID, CDP_API_KEY_SECRET, CDP_WALLET_SECRET). \"circle\" uses a Circle developer-controlled wallet (CIRCLE_API_KEY, CIRCLE_ENTITY_SECRET, CIRCLE_WALLET_ID) when that wallet supports the selected offer. Omit it and the single configured wallet is used; omit it with none configured against a paying service and the error names what to set. Wallet and chain are separate choices; both must support the actual offered signing domain.", + "enum": [ + "key", + "cdp", + "circle", + "arc" + ], + "type": "string" +}
- Changed
prepare_inputs2 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / actionAdded value: +{ + "additionalProperties": false, + "description": "The EIP-712 action to authorise. Required for arc_eligibility and rejected for every other circuit. Any structure is provable: the circuit hashes it without reading it, so a deposit, a grant of authority or an agreement in prose all work. The wallet signs exactly these fields, and the proof carries their hash.", + "properties": { + "domain": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "chainId": { + "type": "number" + }, + "name": { + "type": "string" + }, + "verifyingContract": { + "type": "string" + }, + "version": { + "type": "string" + } + }, + "required": [ + "name", + "version", + "chainId", + "verifyingContract" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "message": { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "type": "object" + }, + "primaryType": { + "type": "string" + }, + "types": { + "additionalProperties": { + "items": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "name": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": { + "type": "string" + } + }, + "required": [ + "name", + "type" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + "type": "object" + } + }, + "required": [ + "domain", + "types", + "primaryType", + "message" + ], + "type": "object" +} - changed
Input schema / properties / circuit / enumPrevious value: -[ - "coinbase_kyc", - "coinbase_country", - "oidc_domain" -]New value: +[ + "coinbase_kyc", + "coinbase_country", + "oidc_domain", + "arc_eligibility" +]
- Changed
request_challenge2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / circuit / enumPrevious value: -[ - "coinbase_kyc", - "coinbase_country", - "oidc_domain" -]New value: +[ + "coinbase_kyc", + "coinbase_country", + "oidc_domain", + "arc_eligibility" +] - changed
Input schema / properties / inputs / descriptionPrevious value: -"Full ProveInputs object from prepare_inputs. Accepts a JSON string or a structured object."New value: +"Use {} to discover the nonce, payment offers and optional TEE key without transmitting private witness inputs. Also accepts a JSON string or object from trusted local code; any supplied witness is sent to the selected prover and must stay out of model context, dApp/UI and logs."
- Changed
submit_proof3 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / circuit / enumPrevious value: -[ - "coinbase_kyc", - "coinbase_country", - "oidc_domain" -]New value: +[ + "coinbase_kyc", + "coinbase_country", + "oidc_domain", + "arc_eligibility" +] - added
Input schema / properties / nonceAdded value: +{ + "description": "The \"nonce\" field from the request_challenge response. Single-use and bound to the circuit it was issued for — request a new challenge for every submission and for every circuit.", + "type": "string" +} - changed
Input schema / requiredPrevious value: -[ - "circuit", - "inputs" -]New value: +[ + "circuit", + "inputs", + "nonce" +]
TDQS
Scored across 8 tools
Most tools target distinct actions: deposit, balance, discovery, verification, and the three explicit proof steps are clearly separated. The only overlap is generate_proof versus the step-by-step prepare/request/submit flow, but the descriptions explicitly position generate_proof as the all-in-one alternative.
The majority follow a consistent snake_case verb_noun pattern: generate_proof, verify_proof, request_challenge, prepare_inputs, submit_proof, get_supported_circuits. Minor deviations are gateway_balance (missing a get_ prefix) and deposit_to_gateway (prepositional form), but these are not confusing.
Eight tools is well-scoped for a ZK proof service covering discovery, payment setup, proof generation, and verification. Each tool earns its place without redundancy or bloat.
The core lifecycle is covered: discover circuits, fund the gateway, check balance, generate proofs via either path, and verify on-chain. Minor gaps exist such as no explicit withdrawal/refund tool for unused gateway funds, but agents can complete the primary proof-generation workflow without dead ends.
Maintenance
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