Read the status of a human wallet approval created by this MCP client. This operation never starts a proof or payment.

All-in-one ZK proof generation. Handles: prepare inputs, request challenge, and submit proof in a single call. Use this when you want the simplest path to a proof. For fine-grained control over each step, use prepare_inputs, request_challenge, and submit_proof individually.

CIRCUITS:

• "coinbase_kyc": Proves the user passed Coinbase KYC verification.

• "coinbase_country": Proves the user's country of residence is (or is not) in a given list. Requires country_list and is_included.

• "oidc_domain": Proves the user authenticated via OIDC and their email belongs to a specific domain. Requires jwt and scope.

• "giwa_attestation": GIWA attestation, optionally binding the wallet's signature to ONE EIP-712 action. Without action it signs the request signal hash. With one, the proof carries that action's hash, so a contract can check WHICH instruction was authorised -- not merely that somebody eligible signed something. Uses a GIWA-attested wallet; verified on GIWA Sepolia (chain 91342).

WITH ACTION: Returns awaiting_approval with an approval URL for the HUMAN to review and sign in their wallet. Keep the request parameters unchanged, query get_action_approval, then repeat with approval_id when approved. ATTESTATION_KEY cannot authorize an action on the human's behalf. Ordinary proofs without action retain automatic signing.

RETURNS: awaiting_approval or the full ProofResult with proof bytes, public inputs, and timing information. Use verify_proof separately to verify on-chain.

List all ZK circuits supported by ZKProofport, including verifier addresses and authorized signers. No parameters required. Call this first to discover available circuits before starting proof generation.

Step 2 of the step-by-step flow: Request a challenge from the server. Pass inputs: {} to discover the live payment offers, nonce and optional TEE key without transmitting private witness inputs. You MUST pass the returned "nonce" to submit_proof — without it the server just issues another challenge. MCP submit_proof does not sign payments or encrypt inputs; use generate_proof or the SDK for paid/encrypted orchestration.

Step 1 of the step-by-step flow. WITH ACTION: human wallet approval is required; returns awaiting_approval until resumed with approval_id. Approved action witnesses stay in private local storage; pass the returned prepared_inputs_id to submit_proof. WITHOUT ACTION: retains the existing credential-key signature and private witness result. Handle private witness inputs only in trusted local code, never expose them to the dApp, model or logs. Call this BEFORE request_challenge. For oidc_domain provide jwt and scope.

Step 3 of the step-by-step flow: Submit prepared inputs to generate the ZK proof. The TEE server runs the Noir circuit and returns the UltraHonk proof. This step may take 30-90 seconds. The TEE server builds Prover.toml from these inputs.

You MUST pass the nonce returned by request_challenge. POST /api/v1/prove answers every request that arrives without that nonce with a fresh 402 challenge, so a submission that omits it can never produce a proof.

Step 4 (optional): Verify a ZK proof on-chain against the deployed verifier contract. Pass the full generate_proof result object directly — verification info (verifierAddress, chainId, rpcUrl) is extracted automatically. Returns { valid: true } if the proof is valid.