threat_model

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations (readOnlyHint, idempotentHint) already convey safety and idempotency. Description adds no further behavioral context (e.g., state changes, dependencies, or limitations).

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Single sentence, front-loaded with key information, no redundancy. Every word adds value.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Covers core purpose, methodology, and source. With output schema present, return values are covered. Minor gap: no mention of prerequisites or assumed knowledge about system description.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema has 100% description coverage for both parameters. Tool description adds no additional parameter meaning beyond what the schema already provides.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Description clearly states the action (generate), resource (threat model), methodology (STRIDE-based), and data source (OWASP). It distinguishes from sibling tools like 'assess_stack' or 'get_attack_pattern' by specifying a generative task.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Description implies usage for threat modeling but lacks explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use guidance. No mention of alternatives or context for selecting this tool over siblings.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.