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zallkyre

secrets-mcp

by zallkyre

stage_secret

Store pasted API keys, tokens, or private keys in an encrypted local vault and return equivalent text with non-exposing handles substituted, keeping raw secrets out of prompts and logs.

Instructions

Store any secrets in text and return it with handles substituted.

Use this the moment a user pastes an API key, token, or private key. The returned text is safe to repeat; the original was written to an encrypted local vault and is not returned.

Args: text: the raw text containing the secret(s). name: optional handle to force, e.g. "stripe" -> {{stripe}}.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameNo
textYes

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does substantial work: it states the original is written to an encrypted local vault and is not returned, and that the output text is safe to repeat. That is meaningful disclosure beyond the schema. It omits persistence/lifetime of the staged secret and what happens if the same secret is staged twice with colliding handles.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action and result, followed by the trigger condition, the safety property, and a compact Args block. Every sentence carries information and there is no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be explained, and the description is nonetheless solid on input, side effects, and safety. For a security-sensitive mutation with zero annotation coverage it could say more about handle collisions and how the staged value is later used by request_with_secret, but nothing critical is missing for a correct invocation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must supply the meaning, and it does for both parameters: text is "the raw text containing the secret(s)" and name is an optional forced handle with a concrete example ("stripe" -> {{stripe}}). The explicit handle syntax is the kind of detail the schema cannot convey. The `text` gloss remains close to a restatement, keeping it below 5.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description gives a concrete verb (store) and resource (secrets), and adds the distinctive transformation: the returned text has handles substituted for the raw secret. That clearly separates it from revoke_secret or list_secrets by implication. It stops short of a 5 because it never names or contrasts itself with the actual siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

"Use this the moment a user pastes an API key, token, or private key" is an explicit, unambiguous trigger condition. However, it offers no when-not guidance and never points to the sibling that consumes the staged secret (request_with_secret), so the agent must infer the workflow.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.